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NErACKNOVADGN:1ENTS 
The limits of this thesis 
This thesis analyses the development of judicial and legislative fiats on 
the concept of limited liability in the context of claims on corporate 
members and/or directors by creditors. Strictly speaking it is only 
corporate members who are sheltered by limited liability and not 
directors. However with the trend towards the assimilation of ownership 
and management of corporations the distinction between members and 
directors has lost much of its significance in this context. Accordingly it 
is not proposed to dwell upon the nicety of whether an action against 
an individual arises out of their managerial capacity in relation to the 
company or by virtue of their proprietory interest in the company. 
Rather the perspective will be the ability of unpaid creditors of insolvent 
companies to recover their losses from individuals or entities 
associated with a company regardless of the exact nature of this 
association. Ultimately it would appear that the essential feature of this 
association will be one of control and, on this basis, the term 
"controller" will be used as a generic term to describe the persons or 
entities to whom unpaid creditors will typically look for satisfaction. 
Similarly when considering the various avenues of recovery, in 
particular the common law avenues, it is not proposed to distinguish 
between those which pierce the corporate veil and those which 
technically rescind the privilege of limited liability. Regardless of the 
mechanics, given that the ultimate result is typically to effect a 
rescission of this privilege, the various avenues will be described in 
terms of having this effect. 
The development of the power to examine corporate officials will not be 
explored, although, at a practical level, the availability of this facility is 
often intimately connected with the application of the defaulting officer 
provisions, as an examination will frequently supply the necessary 
evidence to enable proceedings against company officials to 
commence. Furthermore the thesis is confined to an analysis of 
creditors' recovery rights against those who have exploited the 
corporate form and the privilege of limited liability in such a way as to 
cause creditors to suffer loss. Whilst this will necessarily involve some 
consideration of the responsibilities of directors, it is not proposed to 
examine the wider issue of directors' duties and liabilities generally 
although to the extent that liquidators act for the benefit of creditors an 
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incidental analysis of the causes of action available to liquidators will be 
undertaken. This analysis will, however, be primarily directed to the 
issue of whether standing to pursue these causes of action could 
usefully be extended to creditors. 
Similarly whilst the issue of creditor recovery is incidentally related to 
the issue of related party transactions and voidable preferences it is not 
proposed to canvass these matters in any detail. The emphasis will be 
on the recovery rights of individual creditors and these aspects will only 
be considered to the extent that they impact on this issue. 
In chapters 9 and 11 it is argued that the analysis supports a division of 
the defaulting officer regime into three components each tailored to a 
particular type of company. Whilst this discussion necessitates an 
incidental consideration of the calls for the restructuring of the company 
laws generally into regimes more specifically orientated towards the 
different types of companies it is not proposed to enter into this more 
general debate. Although the proposal provides some support for this 
more general proposition a general division of the company laws is not 
a pre-requisite for the proposal canvassed in this thesis to be 
implemented. 
Nomenclature 
Throughout the thesis reference is made to the defaulting officer 
provisions, in particular the misfeasance, fraudulent trading and 
reckless trading provisions. Although the nomenclature used to identify 
these provisions is widely used, the notion of a reckless trading 
provision is probably less well understood. Apart from the United 
Kingdom, which has what is generally described as a "wrongful trading 
provision", Australia, New Zealand and South Africa have all 
possessed what will be referred to as a "reckless trading provision". 
This expression is simply adopted for convenience, and it is not meant 
to imply that these provisions share a common imposition of liability for 
reckless behaviour. Rather the nature of the provision varies with each 
country and, at least as regards Australia, over time. Since 1981 the 
Australian provision could possibly more aptly be termed a "negligent 
trading provision". Indeed, this expression might even be a more 
appropriate description for the South African provision, given its judicial 
interpretation, notwithstanding that it expressly adopts the term 
"recklessly". 
Whilst the expression "insolvent trading provision" will be reserved to 
describe the provision inserted in the Australian legislation by the 1993 
reforms, where the context does not indicate to the contrary a 
reference to the reckless trading provisions will include a reference to 
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this provision. 
The law examined 
The law is stated as at 1 January 1993 although it has also been 
possible for some selected later developments to be included. 
References are to the Australian legal and commercial environment 
unless it is expressly noted to the contrary. For ease of comprehension, 
when considering the caselaw dealing with the Companies Code 
provisions corresponding to the Corporations Law provisions, only the 
Corporations Law section numbers will be referred to. References to 
the Corporations Law provisions are references to the provisions 
predating those contained in the Corporate Law Reform Act 1992 
which came into force during June 1993. These new provisions will be 
dealt with separately. 
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Abstract 
This thesis provides an historical and comparative analysis of the 
development of the avenues of recovery from corporate controllers 
available to creditors of limited liability companies. 
The thesis proposes that the conflicting goals of the promotion of 
enterprise through the provision of the privilege of limited liability and 
the protection of creditors through the provision of a recovery regime 
have presented both the judiciary and legislatures with a difficult 
balancing act. This will be demonstrated with evidence of a history of 
piecemeal and reactive common laws and legislation. 
In particular it will be observed that the common law has identified a 
limited category of circumstances where the privilege of limited liability 
will be rescinded although these have seldom been of advantage to 
creditors with the exception of a limited fiduciary duty owed by directors 
to creditors. 
It will also be demonstrated that whilst the legislature initially perceived 
creditor protection in terms of corporate disclosure together with a 
simplified procedure to enhance the effectiveness of the common law 
remedies, the inadequacies of these remedies soon witnessed the 
creation of statutory remedies in the form of fraudulent and, latter, 
reckless/wrongful trading provisions. These became the lynchpin of the 
creditor recovery regime notwithstanding a history of deficiencies. The 
thesis acknowledges that although recent legislative reforms, in the 
form of an insolvent trading provision, are an improvement these 
reforms are also not without their limitations. 
The thesis will also explore issues that have arisen in creditor 
protection with the emergence of group companies. It will be 
acknowledged that the legislative response has been limited and 
creditors have sought to exploit other legal avenues, with torts law 
providing some assistance. However, against the complexities raised 
by the multinationalisation of company groups little avenue for redress 
exists. 
Abstract 
From a comparative analysis of the development of creditor recovery 
regimes overseas (the United Kingdom, South Africa and New 
Zealand) it will be concluded that, whilst the Australian approach has 
merit, experiences in these jurisdictions provide some useful lessons. 
Possible responses to the inadequacies of the law, including the 
thematic development of the fraudulent and reckless trading provisions, 
are then explored and a tentative reform proposal consisting of a 
tripartite structure which distinguishes between small private 
companies, "typical" trading companies and group companies is put 
forward. This proposal is compared with the Government's recent 
legislation which will be shown to essentially satisfy one limb of the 
reform equation. Outstanding reforms are elaborated upon. 
The thesis concludes with the proposition that the underlying theme of 
the creditor recovery regime is that the transfer of risk inherent in the 
provision of the privilege of liability involves an implicit undertaking by 
corporate controllers that they will not transfer an inappropriate degree 
of risk onto creditors and, through them, the community. This is 
embodied in the requirement that they maintain the solvency of their 
company or risk recision of the privilege. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
"There is little doubt that the separation of the corporation from the 
entrepreneurs behind it provided the 'essential impulse' to the most 
remarkable economic development of the last 200 years". 
Kirby P., 
Metal Manufacturers Ltd v Lewis (1988) 6 ACLC 724 at 727. 
Limited Liability - A Necessary Evil 
This thesis precedes from the basis that the availability of the privilege 
of limited liability is a necessary stimulus to the successful functioning 
of the capitalist society. However it is also acknowledged that there is 
a cost to society, or at least a wealth redistribution effect, arising from 
the provision of the privilege. This cost is, at least initially, borne by the 
creditors of insolvent corporations. 
The Evolution of Abuse 
The privilege of limited liability was originally perceived as applicable 
to the "traditional" corporate form which was characterised by a 
separation between management and the providers of capital. Implicit 
in this was the understanding that the privilege might shelter 
shareholders from the full impact of the unavoidable vagaries of 
commercial life, at the expense of a corporation's creditors, but the 
separation of interests would ensure that any managerial misconduct, 
possibly including gross incompetence, would not go unchecked and 
so creditors would not bear losses arising from such misconduct. 
However with the adaptation of the corporate form to arrangements 
exhibiting an assimilation between management and the shareholders 
this check was removed. The avenues of managerial impeachment 
available to shareholders were obviously not availed of in such 
circumstances. Thus creditors had little protection from managerial 
misconduct or incompetence now sheltered by the combined effect of 
incorporation and limited liability. 
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A Balancing Act 
It was incumbent upon the law to address this concern. However a fine 
line had to be negotiated lest the benefits perceived as arising from 
the availability of limited liability were stifled by a concern to protect 
creditors. A balancing act between the protection of creditors and the 
promotion of enterprise was required. 
Piecemeal Reactive Reforms 
The response was legislation directed at a specific type of abuse. 
Thus began a history of piecemeal, reactive and typically deficient 
legislative reforms. These inadequacies prompted creditors to explore 
other legal avenues for assistance. The common law dealing with 
fraud, fiduciaries, contract and torts have all had an application 
spawning further anomalies and judicial failings. Similarly other 
legislative provisions have occasionally been availed of thereby 
jeopardising the integrity of the corporations jurisprudence. The result 
has been a history of ad hoc decisions and precedent lacking in 
coherency. 
It is arguable that the various ad hoc measures have significantly 
eroded the availability of the privilege of limited liability vis-a-vis 
creditors. The trend of both legislative and judicial development 
appears towards a general recognition that duties of both care and 
good faith are owed by corporate officials to creditors. Furthermore 
developments in the law of torts point to the derivation of either a 
common law or statutory action for misfeasance or nonfeasance in a 
corporate office. 
The Modern Face of The Problem 
As the entrepreneurial imagination has expanded into the realm of the 
corporate group and, more particularly, the international corporate 
group the protection of creditors has taken on a new dimension. Again 
the legal response has been reactive and piecemeal. Again a 
balancing act is required of the law. 
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The Thesis- An Historical and Comparative Analysis 
The thesis proposed is that there is a need to establish a coherent 
regime for the protection of creditors of corporations, or more 
particularly, a regime which enables creditors to recover their debts, in 
appropriate circumstances, from the controllers of corporations. This 
thesis draws upon an historical and comparative analysis of the 
development of the of the avenues of recovery available to creditors of 
corporations in Australia leading to the introduction of the insolvent 
trading provision. 1 
This analysis is also instructive in identifying the deficiencies in the law 
which inspired the reforms. The results of the analysis are then used to 
assess the adequacy of the new provision and whether the need exists 
for further reforms and, if so, whether some insight into the nature of 
these reforms can be identified. 
More particularly it will be demonstrated that whilst the fraudulent and 
reckless trading provisions contained in S.592 and S.593 are deficient, 
developments drawing on the theme of these provisions could be 
envisaged which address these concerns. Given the interpretational 
and design issues associated with the insolvent trading provision it will 
be argued that there is some doubt as to whether the thematic 
development of the fraudulent and reckless trading provisions may not 
have been a more prudent exercise than the introduction of a new 
untested provision with which the business community is unfamiliar. 
Additionally the insolvent trading provision will be demonstrated to 
have embraced some of these deficiencies itself whereas many of the 
issues it does address had already been resolved in relation to the 
fraudulent and reckless trading provisions through ameliorative judicial 
pronouncements. 
Furthermore this analysis will reveal that an issue at the centre of the 
development of the defaulting officer provisions has been whether 
individual creditors ought have standing and if so whether they ought 
be able to sue in their own or in a derivative or representative capacity. 
The resolution of this issue will be demonstrated to have significance 
for the design of the defaulting officer provisions. Given the conclusion 
1 	During 1993 a new defaulting officer regime came into force in Australia replacing the 
Australian reckless and fraudulent trading provisions focused on this thesis. Whilst, 
from the perspective of identifying any theme to the development of the creditor 
recovery regimes operating in Australia and elsewhere, these earlier provisions with 
their many years of operation provide a more useful analytical base, any reform 
implications derived from this historical and comparative analysis will be assessed in 
the context of the new provisions. 
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in support of the provision of individual rights this casts further doubt on 
the desirability of the insolvent trading provision both from the 
perspective that it does not provide standing to individual creditors nor 
does it contain the necessary design features to adequately support 
such actions. 
Notably if individual rights were provided then various issues identified 
in relation to the fraudulent and reckless trading provisions would gain 
currency and require resolution . 2 
Other issues identified in the analysis have implications for the 
structure of the creditor recovery regime, specifically whether a 
distinction ought be drawn between the various types of companies for 
the purpose of defining the approach to be adopted, and emphasise 
the need for the maintenance of a balance between the protection of 
creditors and the encouragement of risk taking. 
Indeed the need to ensure the appropriate sharing of risk is identified 
as the underlying rationale for the creditor recovery regime. It will be 
argued that the existence of the regime is a reflection that limited 
liability and incorporation are concerned with risk transfer. There is a 
price to be paid by incorporators for the privilege of transferring some 
of the commercial risk of a venture onto creditors and, through them, 
the general community and, furthermore, there is a proscription on 
what risks may be transferred. This underlying rationale manifests 
itself in two principles, namely that the price to be paid for the privilege 
of limited liability is that the enterprise must be appropriately 
capitalised and that where the solvency of the enterprise is doubtful 
the enterprise• must be conducted with regard to the interests of its 
creditors as it is their financial interests that are at stake. 
Sub-Themes 
Within this broad thesis a number of sub-themes are explored. 
A tripartite structure 
Whilst it is argued that creditors are not a homogeneous group such 
an observation also applies to corporations and the people who 
control them. The types of corporations vary widely from small family 
concerns to substantial trading enterprises through to members of 
large multinational groups. Similarly the management and controllers 
2 	For example, as to what is required to establish insolvency, the determination as to 
the quantum of awards, the implications of negotiated settlements and whether 
directors can seek reimbursement from their company. 
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of corporations differ widely in levels of sophistication and 
comprehension. Certainly many corporate managers complain of the 
perception of over-regulation and overly complex laws. 
A recovery regime for creditors ought to reflect this diversity, respond 
to the need to promulgate understandable and practical laws and 
avoid the potential stifling of entrepreneurial activity through excessive 
regulation. The legislation, whilst drawing on the general theme 
described above, should also be tailored to the characteristics of the 
entities which it seeks to regulate. 
These considerations are reflected in the suggestion that a creditor 
recovery regime should differentiate between small closely held 
companies, the "typical" trading concern and members of corporate 
groups. The suggested form of response in each case is, respectively: 
• a minimum capital level or, possibly, adoption of the commenda 
principle for small corporations, 
• a defaulting officer regime for the "typical" trading concern, and 
• a general but guided discretion in the courts to rescind the 
privilege of limited liability in the case of corporate groups. 
Individual cause of action or a collective regime? 
Recent legislation provides a mandatory collective regime for the 
recovery of corporate debts and denies individual creditors a direct 
remedy. Whilst a mandatory collective regime has some merit it is 
argued that this feature of the legislation precedes from a flawed view 
that creditors are a homogeneous group. Once it is recognized that 
creditors rights and interests differ widely and, in fact, some creditors 
may have built into their pricing structure a premium for the risks of 
contracting with a corporation whilst others may not have, then there is 
an argument for providing individual creditors with a cause of action. 
Directors' responsibilities and inadequacies of the current defaulting 
officer regime 
Whilst it is outside the parameters of this thesis to examine in detail 
directors' responsibilities, to the extent that creditors' rights have 
traditionally been protected through the medium of a defaulting officer 
regime, the analysis will incidentally examine the issue of directors' 
responsibilities, at least as they are relevant to creditors. It will be 
acknowledged that there is a perception that the pendulum has swung 
too much against directors. The proposals for reform seek to address 
this concern. 
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Finally, to the extent that the analysis reveals deficiencies in the 
legislation reviewed these deficiencies will be identified along with the 
necessary thematic development to address these concerns. 
Chapter Outline 
These themes and sub-themes are explored in ten chapters. 
Chapter 2- Limited Liability and Creditors' Recovery Rights 
Chapter 2 examines the origins of limited liability and the 
circumstances which have given rise to the need for a creditor 
recovery regime. It will be argued that the legal avenues by which 
creditors can recover from controllers of corporations are varied and 
ad-hoc. At common law the privilege of limited liability may be 
rescinded in a number of circumstances. Furthermore there are 
equitable and tortious avenues for recovery from corporate 
management. Statute law also provides avenues for recovery. These 
avenues are primarily, but not exclusively, contained in the companies 
legislation. All these various common law and statutory remedies will 
be explored. It will be concluded that the protection thereby afforded to 
creditors of limited liability companies lacks any theoretical 
underpinning. The search for a theoretical base on which to establish 
an integrated and coherent creditor recovery regime and as to the 
most appropriate manner in which to give it legislative expression, will 
require a detailed analysis of the major categories of the existing 
regime. This analysis is the subject of chapters 3 to 6. 
Chapter 3- The Common Law Fiduciary Duty to Creditors 
In an attempt to supply the defects of the creditor recovery regime 
contained in the companies legislation the judiciary embraced the 
equitable origins of company law and derived a fiduciary duty owed by 
the corporate management of insolvent companies to creditors. The 
development of this duty will be explored in chapter 3. It will be 
observed that it presents many theoretical and practical difficulties. 
Whilst providing some insight into the theoretical basis of a creditor 
recovery regime, it is argued that it otherwise has little to recommend 
it. 
Chapter 4 - The First Defaulting Officer Provision - the Misfeasance 
Provision 
The first legislative provision directed at the means of recovery by both 
shareholders and creditors from corporate management was, and still 
is, known as the misfeasance provision. In chapter 4 the development 
and current status of this provision will be examined from the 
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perspective of the avenue it provides for creditor recovery. It will be 
argued that the provision is significant for a number of reasons. Firstly 
it was initially interpreted as providing a general cause of action 
against misbehaving directors. Whilst this interpretation was 
subsequently over-ruled the concept provides an interesting reform 
possibility. Secondly, to the extent that the provision provides an 
important summary procedure by which to enforce various causes of 
action against defaulting corporate management, it is a critical element 
in the creditor recovery mechanism provided by the common law duty 
considered in chapter 3. Thus the adequacy of the provision from the 
perspective of the support it provides for the enforcement of this duty 
will be explored. Whilst it will be argued that the provision is generally 
adequate for this purpose there must be some doubt as to the 
appropriateness of the summary procedure in the difficult cases which 
typically arise in the enforcement of the common law duty. This serves 
to cast further doubt on the desirability of the common law duty as an 
element of a creditor recovery regime. 
Chapter 5 - The Legislative Development of the Fraudulent and 
Reckless Trading Provisions 
The inadequacies of both the common law and the misfeasance 
provision as the mechanism available to creditors seeking to recover 
from delinquent corporate management was the catalyst for a history 
of legislative activity that has continued unabated to the current day. 
The resultant legislation, known as the defaulting officer provisions, 
typically has embraced two provisions pursuant to which corporate 
management may be liable to creditors. The first of these applies 
where a fraud has been committed against the creditors and, 
accordingly, is known as the fraudulent trading provision. The second 
deals with managerial liability where a company has incurred debts in 
circumstances where these debts are unlikely to be paid. Whilst this 
latter provision differs in its precise form from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 
it can generally be described as a reckless, insolvent or wrongful 
trading provision. 
The fraudulent and reckless trading provisions have been the centre 
piece of the regime providing creditors with a means of recovery from 
corporate controllers. Thus any themes discernible from an 
examination of the historical development of these provisions may be 
instructive for the identification of both the theoretical base of the 
creditor recovery regime and the likely future development of the 
legislation. This historical development will be explored in chapter 5. It 
will be observed that the Australian legislation has exhibited theoretical 
and practical deficiencies, many of which relate to the pivotal issue of 
whether individual creditors ought be provided with a cause of action 
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under the provisions or whether a collective regime ought to apply. 
Chapter 6 - The Judicial Interpretation of the Fraudulent and Reckless 
Trading Provisions 
Many other deficiencies have been identified by the judiciary. 
Furthermore the judicial analysis of the defaulting officer provisions 
has shaped the scope and application of these provisions and 
contributed to an understanding of their theoretical basis. This judicial 
consideration will be explored in chapter 6. It will be argued that there 
has been a discernible trend towards extending the application of the 
provisions in furtherance of a policy of protecting creditors and 
strengthening the obligations imposed on directors. As a result many 
of the defects identified in relation to the provisions were remedied by 
ameliorative judicial pronouncements. Nevertheless problems have 
remained. 
Chapter 7- Creditors and Corporate Groups 
With the greater sophistication of commerce the potential difficulties 
facing creditors of corporations have taken on an added dimension. 
The emergence of groups of companies, and especially multinational 
groups, have provided creditors with new obstacles when seeking to 
recover a debt owed by an insolvent company. The inadequacies of 
the law have provided the controllers of these groups with virtual 
immunity from the claims of unsatisfied creditors. Furthermore new 
avenues for abuse have evolved. 
In chapter 7 the extent of this problem and the existing legal avenues 
available to creditors will be explored. It will be observed that the 
common law response has been inadequate, with the exception of 
certain tortious developments which are yet to be fully explored. 
Similarly the legislature has been slow to respond although reforms 
are beginning to belatedly materialise. It will be argued that reforms 
are urgently required although in the interim creditors might be able to 
seek some recovery through torts law remedies. The uncertainty and 
expense associated with this avenue does not, however, recommend 
it as a mechanism for recovery other than for creditors who have 
suffered major losses. Furthermore the divergence in policy 
considerations on which torts remedies are based from those 
underpinning the companies law raises a concern as to the integrity of 
a creditor recovery regime that encompasses tortious remedies. 
Chapter 8- Some International Perspectives 
In assessing the Australian experience it is appropriate to compare it 
with developments overseas. The Australian legislation was born of 
United Kingdom precedents and so subsequent developments in the 
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United Kingdom are clearly relevant. Whilst these developments are 
explored throughout the body of the thesis, developments of 
significance in two other jurisdictions will also be canvassed in chapter 
8. 
The South African experiment presents a contrast to the creditor 
recovery regimes adopted in Australia and the United Kingdom. It will 
be observed that the United Kingdom Jenkins Committee had, 
amongst other recommendations, recommended the introduction of a 
reckless trading provisions in 1962. Whilst many of that committee's 
recommendations were adopted in both the United Kingdom and 
Australia, South Africa was the only jurisdiction to embrace that 
particular recommendation. The history of the resulting legislation will 
be explored. It will be argued that the subsequent judicial 
interpretation of the legislation has been such as to assimilate the 
scope of the provision with that of the subsequent Australian initiative. 
It will be further argued that the form of the Australian provision was 
preferable to that adopted in South Africa as it avoided the potential 
for the adoption by the Australian courts of the strained interpretation 
placed on the provision by the South African judiciary and was more 
suitable as a cause of action for individual creditors. 
The other jurisdiction considered is New Zealand. For many years the 
New Zealand legislature embraced Australian developments with the 
exception of a special small company regime which provided a unique 
creditor recovery regime based on bankruptcy law. Subsequently a 
hybrid South African and Australian position was adopted. Most 
recently major reforms have been mooted which would involve a 
substantial departure from the traditional approach to a creditor 
recovery regime, embracing the concept of an insolvency test as a 
prerequisite to the entering into by a company of certain transactions. 
It will be argued that the principle of a special small company regime 
has much to recommend it and, in fact, points to the general 
dichotomisation of the creditor recovery regime in recognition of the 
various types of corporate arrangements. Whilst the hybrid reckless 
trading provision also exhibits some benefits over the Australian 
approach, it is the current reform proposals that are most significant. It 
will be argued that these proposals assist in identifying the 
fundamental principles underlying the creditor recovery regime and, 
whilst probably too radical for legislative endorsement, provide an 
insight into the theoretical basis for any resultant legislation. 
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Chapter 9- Blueprint for Future Reforms 
The conclusions identified in the preceding chapters are drawn 
together in chapter 9 with a view to identifying a framework for future 
reform. The history of patchwork reforms and the need for a coherent 
creditor recovery regime is re-iterated. The common law duty to 
creditors is considered and dismissed as an element of this regime. 
The possible thematic development of the fraudulent and reckless 
trading provisions is identified together with the lessons provided by 
the New Zealand, South African and United Kingdom experiences. 
Reforms to cater for the position of creditors of group companies are 
also suggested. 
A proposal that the creditor recovery regime differentiate between 
three types of corporate arrangements, namely small closely held 
companies, "typical" trading companies and members of corporate 
groups is advanced. Whilst defaulting officer provisions ought provide 
an adequate recovery mechanism for creditors of the "typical" trading 
company, the regime requires greater flexibility if it is to adequately 
protect creditors of group companies. To this end a provision 
empowering the judiciary with a substantial, although guided, 
discretion, modelled along the lines of certain taxation provisions, is 
mooted as a mechanism for group company creditor recovery. On the 
other hand, the problems of recovering from assetless controllers, the 
difficulties of establishing a case in the absence of access to detailed 
records and the desirability of keeping minor claims out of the courts 
suggest that, in the case of small closely held companies, preventative 
measures are more desirable than those providing a means of 
recovery. As these companies feature an assimilation between 
shareholder and managerial interests and as the cause of failure is 
typically attributed to under capitalisation it is proposed that the 
creditors of these companies be protected by either a partial denial of 
limited liability or a capitalisation requirement. 
Finally it is emphasised that these reforms seek to balance the 
interests of creditors with the encouragement of entrepreneurial 
activity and recognise that although some commercial risk is to be 
legitimately transferred to the creditors there are some risks which the 
incorporators remain accountable for and at the point of insolvency the 
interests of the creditors become paramount. 
Chapter 10- The Government's Response 
The inadequacies of the existing creditor recovery regime have not 
been lost on the Government and during the last six years a number of 
enquires have been commissioned with consequential reform 
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recommendations. The result has been the Corporate Law Reform 
Act 1992, the relevant provisions of which apply from June 24, 1993. 
These proposed and actual reforms are detailed in chapter 10. 
Essentially the defaulting officer provisions are recast as a duty to 
prevent a company from engaging in insolvent trading. Furthermore, 
provision is made for a cause of action against holding companies 
where subsidiaries have been allowed to trade whilst insolvent, 
although notably this provision does not go as far as the 
recommendations propose. It will be observed that whilst these 
reforms have generally been well received there has been some 
comment to the effect that certain deficiencies of the former provisions 
have been perpetuated and that the group company proposals are 
misguided. It will be argued that although the reforms satisfy the need 
to repair the defaulting officer provision the circumstances of small 
companies and also of members of corporate groups are not 
adequately addressed. Furthermore it is argued that the withdrawal of 
a cause of action from individual creditors is unsound. 
Chapter 11 - A Comparison of the Government's Response to the 
Chapter 9 Proposals 
These concerns are further explored in chapter 11, where the 
Government's reforms are examined in the context of the propositions 
expounded in chapter 9. Whilst it is argued that the insolvent trading 
provision generally satisfies one limb of the reform equation the 
legislation has failed to differentiate between types of corporate 
structures and to adequately address the problems presented to 
creditors by group companies, especially, multinational group 
companies. The approach to a recovery regime for creditors of group 
companies outlined in chapter 9, that is the provision of a general, 
although guided, discretion in the judiciary, is examined in greater 
detail. It is argued that this approach achieves a consensus between 
the twin, but often competing, aims of flexibility and certainty. 
Furthermore, the case for maintaining a cause of action in individual 
creditors is explored. It is argued that a mandatory collective regime 
fails to appreciate the disparity characterised by creditor interests and 
is falsely based on the premise that all creditors are equal. 
Furthermore once it is recognised that the creditor recovery legislation 
is essentially about ensuring a legitimate transfer of risk and what is 
legitimate may, at least to some extent, depend on the circumstances 
of a particular creditor, the case for individual rights of some form is 
overwhelming. 
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Chapter 12- Conclusion 
Finally it is argued that an approach which embraces these proposals 
appropriately balances the protection of creditors with the promotion of 
enterprise and reflects that the foundation on which a creditor recovery 
regime is established is the need to ensure that creditors, and through 
them society, bear only the acceptable risks and costs associated with 
permitting the privilege of limited liability. It is the event of insolvency 
which provides the determining point for ascertaining what risks are, 
and what risks are not, acceptable. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LIMITED LIABILITY AND CREDITORS' RECOVERY RIGHTS 
"Either the limited company was a legal entity or it was not ... it is 
impossible to say at the same time that there is a company and there is 
not" 
Lord Halsbury L.C., 
Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22 at 31. 
1. 	Introduction 
A question of balance 
Limited liability has often been cited as a great stimulus for enterprise. 1 
On the other hand there are those who cite the potential for abuse that 
it affords. 2 Certainly in the last 125 years many creditors of corporations 
have had reason to lament the inception of the concept. The history of 
limited liability is, thus, one of a struggle to maintain a balance between 
the provision of this privilege and the availability of a recovery regime 
for creditors who have suffered loss as a result of the inappropriate 
reliance on the privilege. 
Limited liability - a shield for abuse and incompetence 
This chapter will explore the opportunities for abuse and the shield for 
incompetence provided by the availability of the privilege of limited 
liability. In particular, it will be argued that as a result of the assimilation 
of management and ownership it has been possible to abuse the 
privilege through the undercapitalization of an enterprise and poor 
management. These problems are compounded by the fact that the 
use of companies to conduct small enterprises has been on the 
increase.3 One consequence of this would appear to be that more 
1 	Generally see the discussion in Gower, chapter 3 , especially at 41-47 and see 
Blumberg, "Limited liability and corporate groups", [1986] JnI of Corp Law 573 at 573 - 
605. 
2 	See Blumberg, ibid. For a recent expreesion of concern in the Australian context see 
the press release of an address by Senator Gareth Evans to a Business Seminar on 
Limited Liability and Minimum Capital Requirements organised by the Monash 
University Law Faculty, Regent Hotel, Melbourne, 30 August 1983. Prentice argues 
that the principle creates a perverse incentive for an insolvent company to continue to 
trade: "Creditor's interests and director's duties", (1990) 10 OJLS 265. 
3 	Of the 700,000 plus companies in Australia in 1987, less than 200,000 employed ten 
or more people. See the study by Professor Williams of the Faculty of Economics and 
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people are becoming involved in corporations who do not possess 
adequate skills or have access to sufficient funds. Symptomatic of this 
phenomenon is the increase in company failures. 4 
Furthermore, the complex nature of commerce has manifested itself in 
the form of intricate corporate structures, often involving two or more 
related companies. These corporate structures have provided further 
opportunities for the privilege of limited liability to be inappropriately 
exploited. 
The result has been that, traditionally, creditors of limited liability 
companies have borne a considerable risk of non payment and have, 
thus, ventured into contracting with corporations at their periI. 5 
A history of patchwork reforms 
This state of affairs has been exacerbated by the inadequacies of the 
statutory and common law avenues for recovery. The legal avenues 
available to creditors seeking redress from those involved with an 
insolvent company will be outlined. It will be argued that the response 
of both the judiciary and parliament to control the abuse of limited 
liability and provide an avenue of recovery for creditors has been both 
ad hoc and reactive. Little evidence that the recovery regime has 
embraced a coherent underlying theme is available nor has there been 
any real attempt to analyse the issues and possible responses in terms 
of the nature of the corporate structures at issue. 
The recovery regime established to protect creditors has, typically, 
focused on corporate controllers or, more particularly, corporate 
officials. Whilst fraudulent behaviour by company officials has long 
been recognized as a disqualifying factor for those seeking the 
privilege of limited liability, the extent to which inadequate or 
irresponsible conduct short of fraud should be shielded by the privilege 
has proved a more vexed issue. 
Originally, the judiciary assimilated the position of company officials 
with that of agents and trustees, and recognized the liability of these 
officials to the company for breaches of trust. 6 Creditors, however, in 
Commerce at the University of Newcastle referred to in an article entitled "Big risks of 
Small Business", Tasmanian Business Reporter, June 1987, 20. 
4 	See generally, Ibid. Amazingly approximately three quarters of new companies do not 
survive their first five years. 
5 	Not surprisingly self-help remedies have become a feature of commercial existence. 
Reliance on directors' guarantees, chattel mortgages and retention of title clauses is 
common. Collection agencies, creditor organizations and associated publications and 
information bureaux and collectives have also provided a source of protection. 
6 	In re Wincham Shipbuilding, Boiler and Salt Company (1878) 9 Ch D 322, 328; 
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the absence of fraud or exceptional circumstances, had no recourse 
except by virtue of proceedings by liquidators upon the winding up of 
the company. The liquidator in such circumstances could bring an 
action against such officials on behalf of the company, the fruits of 
which would normally be devoured by the creditors. The utility of such 
proceedings was recognized early by the inclusion in the Companies 
Act 1862 (UK) of a provision providing liquidators with a summary 
procedure by which to pursue such claims. This provision became 
known as the "misfeasance provision" by virtue of the description of the 
categories of reprehensible conduct to which it applied. 
Although there was some initial hesitation it soon became settled that 
this provision did not provide any new statutory cause of action. The 
first statutory cause of action was the fraudulent trading provision 
contained in S.75(1) of the Companies Act 1928 (UK). Both this and 
the misfeasance provision were to form the nucleus of the recovery 
regime contained in the companies legislation. Whilst, over the years, 
many ad hoc and narrowly focused statutory causes of action have 
materialized, contained both in the companies legislation and other 
statutes, only recently has a more general cause of action been 
developed in the form of a provision imposing liability on company 
officials for reckless trading or, at least, the incurring of debts without 
any reasonable prospects that they would be paid, and now insolvent 
trading. 
The common law has also witnessed some developments. Whilst the 
initial assimilation of the position of a director with that of a trustee 
recognized the director as owing a fiduciary duty of good faith to the 
company, recently this duty was extended to encompass the interests 
of creditors. However, the duty would appear to remain owed solely to 
the company. Whilst creditors might indirectly obtain some benefit from 
the enforcement of the duty by a liquidator of an insolvent company, no 
duty towards individual creditors would appear to exist, nor do creditors 
have standing to bring proceedings themselves. 
The judiciary has yet to consider whether a similar metamorphosis in 
relation to the duty of care should occur. Nevertheless, there are some 
indications that should the corporate law duty not offer sufficient scope 
for the imposition of liability on corporate associates, then 
Russell v Wakefield Waterworks Co (1875) 20 Eq 474; Re Oxford Benefit and 
Investment Society (1886) 35 Ch D 502. Gradually distinctions emerged: Re Forest of 
Dean (1878) 10 Ch 450; Smith v Anderson (1880) 15 Ch D 275; In re Faure Electric 
Accumulator Co (1889) 40 Ch D 150; Regal v Gulliver [1942] All ER 378. But see In re 
JE Hurdley & Son, Limited (in liq) [1941] NZLR 686, 725-726. Directors are probably 
best described as administrators of the corporate fund. 
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developments in the law of torts may fill this lacuna. In particular the 
torts arising from intentional unlawful acts, the tort of interference with 
contractual relations, the tort of conspiracy, the action for misfeasance 
in a public office and the general principles of negligence may provide 
creditors with some redress. 
It will be concluded that any reform proposal must balance the need for 
a creditor recovery regime with the desirability of not excessively 
eroding the advantage secured by the privilege of limited liability. 
Furthermore for the recovery regime to effectively counter abuse of the 
privilege a clear vision is required of the underlying principle sought to 
be defined. The resultant legislation must also be adequately designed 
and expressed for the task required of it. 
2. 	Origins of and Relationship between Incorporation and 
Limited Liability 
Prior to examining the opportunity for abuse provided by the privilege of 
limited liability it is appropriate to explore the origins of the concept and, 
in particular, its relationship with the mechanism of incorporation. 
Whilst the corporate form and the privilege of limited liability are distinct 
institutions, nevertheless it was the existence of the former which 
provided the opportunity for the general availability of the latter. 7 
Certainly the essential feature of a corporation from a creditor's 
perspective is the limited liability of its controllers. Piercing the 
corporate veil is for a creditor synonymous with rescinding the privilege 
of limited liability. 
Prior to the introduction by the Joint Stock Companies Registration and 
Regulation Act 1844 (UK) of a routine method of obtaining 
incorporation by registration, companies were created either by charter, 
statute or at common law in the form of unincorporated joint stock 
companies or deed of settlement companies. The purpose of these 
companies was predominantly to provide the framework whereby a 
large number of persons could undertake a commercial venture in 
circumstances where most viewed the venture as an investment and 
wanted no managerial input but rather the ability to liquidate their 
investment at will. 
7 	For a detailed analysis of the origins of limited liability and its relationship to the entity 
principle see Gower, chapter 3, Ford, chapter4 and Blumberg, "Limited liability and 
corporate groups", [1986] JnI of Corp Law 573, especially at 577-605. 
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Limited liability was only occasionally a feature of such arrangements. 
Often the charter or statute limited liability of members by allowing 
creditors to recover only from the assets of the corporation. Similarly 
the common law companies often sought to limit the liability of their 
shareholders. However this limitation of liability applied only as 
between the shareholders unless third parties outside the company 
were given adequate notice that persons making contracts for the 
company did so only on the basis that the liability of the members was 
limited. This notice often took the form of a clause in the contract to the 
effect that the creditor could only recover from the common fund of the 
company. 
With the enactment of the Limited Liability Act 1855 (UK) members 
were authorised to limit their liability to the amount not paid up on their 
shares. Thus, third parties dealing with a limited company were to be 
conclusively presumed to know of and to have accepted a term that 
they should have only limited recourse to the personal funds of the 
members. The Act did, however, provide for the joint and several 
liability of directors to creditors where loans or dividends were made or 
paid to shareholders by an insolvent company. The liability extended to 
the amount of the dividend or of the loan. 
During the following year all the legislation relating to joint stock 
companies was consolidated in the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 
(UK). A further consolidation resulted in the enactment of the 
Companies Act 1862, the first version of the modern companies 
legislation. 
This legislative recognition of the institution of limited liability 
eventuated only after considerable public debate. The major argument 
in support of its recognition was the national economic benefit which 
would accrue from the mobilisation of capital contributions in one 
enterprise by a large number of investors who would readily invest in 
the knowledge that their reserved resources would not be endangered. 8 
Thus, although limited liability has been associated with the process of 
incorporation it is not necessarily a feature of incorporation. Rather 
incorporation facilitates the granting of limited liability by virtue of the 
creation of a separate entity such that claims against the enterprise are 
restricted to the assets of the corporation. Only in the event that these 
assets are inadequate to meet these claims will the question of the 
liability of the members, and indeed corporate controllers, arise. 
8 	The advantages and disadvantages of limited liability are detailed by Blumberg (Id) at 
611-623. He concludes that limited liability is not essential for large scale economic 
activity. 
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Enterprise comprising numerous persons envisaged 
Importantly the notions of incorporation and of limited liability both 
envisage a large enterprise comprising numerous members, some 
fulfilling a managerial role and others an investment role. The 
partnership form was clearly inadequate to accommodate such a 
structure and in the absence of a commenda type entity9 a corporation 
was the obvious framework for pursuing the enterprise. This was 
inherently recognized by the original legislation by virtue of the fact that 
the initial minimum shareholding in order to enjoy the benefits of limited 
liability was 25, although reduced to 7 by the time of the 1862 Act and 
since reduced to 2. 
3. 	The Origins of Abuse of the Privilege of Limited Liability 
3.1 Salomon v Salomon 
The opportunity 
This short history partly explains why the 1862 Act did not contain any 
provisions directed at creditor recovery from incorporators or corporate 
management other than the misfeasance provision. It was envisaged 
that the corporate owners would check the excesses of management 
thereby indirectly protecting creditors who otherwise had no recourse 
against a management sheltered by the corporate personality. The 
assumption was the existence of a dichotomy between management 
and ownership together with a balance of power, the inevitable 
consequence of the numbers associated with the enterprise. The 
assumption was however false and the opportunity thereby presented 
is well illustrated by the facts that gave rise to the Salomon v Salomon 
litigation during 1895 and 1896. 10 
The facts 
Mr Salomon had for a variety of reasons, the prime of which being to 
secure limited liability, transferred his boot manufacturing business to a 
company of which he and his immediate family were the only seven 
shareholders. Mr Salomon held 20,000 one penny shares whilst each 
of the other shareholders held one share each. Debentures forming a 
floating security on the capital were issued to Mr Salomon in part 
payment of the amount for which he sold his business to the company. 
9 	See the discussion in chapter 9, section 7.2. 
10 Broderip v Salomon [1895] 2 Ch 323; 336 (CA); Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22 
(HL). 
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The business went into decline leaving the unsecured creditors out of 
pocket. The issue was as to the liability of Mr Salomon. 
The Trial Judge 
Vaughan-Williams J., at first instance, 11 had little hesitation in holding 
that the company was the mere nominee or agent of Mr Salomon. To 
allow such an arrangement to stand would in the opinion of his 
Lordship have the effect of defeating and delaying creditors and 
accordingly there had to exist an implied agreement that Mr Salomon 
would indemnify the company against the debts which its assets were 
insufficient to pay. 
The Court of Appeal 
The Court of Appeal 12 affirmed the decision although on a different 
basis, namely, that the object of the whole arrangement being contrary 
to the intent of the legislation it could not stand and rather the company 
was to be seen as the trustee for Mr Salomon. The Court considered it 
was never intended that limited liability would be extended to sole 
traders (or to a fewer number than seven) as was the effect of this 
arrangement. In their view if the legislature was in due course to extend 
the privilege to sole traders it would no doubt do so with such 
safeguards as it thought necessary. 
The Court condemned such an arrangement as that effected by Mr 
Salomon. Lindley L.J. stated that: 
"They do infinite mischief; they bring into disrepute one of the most 
useful statutes of modern times, by perverting its legitimate use, and by 
making it an instrument for cheating honest creditors ....the scheme is 
a device to defraud creditors." 13 
In the words of Lopes L.J.: 
"...to legalise such a transaction would be a scandal". 14 
When the Davey Committee 15 reported its approval of this decision few 
would have given Mr Salomon's appeal to the House of Lords, much 
hope of success. 
11 [1895] 2 Ch 323. 
12 [1895] 2 Ch 336. 
13 Id, 339. 
14 Id, 341. 
15 1895 C 7779. 
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The House of Lords 
However, as is well known, the House of Lords was to hand down the 
singularly most important decision for the development of company 
law. 16 Their Lordships refused to impose liability on Mr Salomon. The 
mere existence of control was insufficient to render the company the 
agent of Mr Salomon in the absence of other evidence. Furthermore 
the company had been duly incorporated according to the express 
provisions of the 1862 Act and, in the absence of fraud, was not a 
sham. It was not possible to imply from the object and intent of the 
legislation that such a company was prohibited and its incorporation an 
improper application of the legislation. There simply was no evidence 
that it was contrary to the intent of the legislation and even if it was this 
did not of necessity mean that the company was then a trustee for Mr 
Salomon. 
The judgments of their Lordships both implicitly and expressly imposed 
an onerous duty on creditors in their dealings with companies, justified 
as a necessary burden if the nation was to derive the benefits of a 
business community prospering under the mantle of limited liability. It 
was up to the creditors to protect themselves by checking the 
documentation filed by the company in which they would have 
discovered the terms of the purchase of the business, the issue of 
debentures to Mr Salomon and the number and value of shares held by 
each member. Indeed, Lord Watson stated that it was the duty of 
creditors to make such enquires and there was no obligation on the 
company or its shareholders to warn the creditors that they ran a risk of 
not being paid. The fact that, as the Court of Appeal acknowledged, in 
practice such enquires were not made, or were only made once a fear 
of not being paid had manifested, was not the point. In the words of 
Lord Watson: 
"... the apathy of a creditor cannot justify an imputation of fraud against 
a limited company or its members, who have provided all the means of 
information which the Act of 1862 requires; and, in my opinion, a 
creditor who will not take the trouble to use the means which the 
statute provides for enabling him to protect himself must bear the 
consequences of his own negligence". 17 
The judgments also reveal that their Lordships were concerned with the 
possibility of opening the flood gates should Mr Salomon be personally 
liable. Where was the line to be drawn? This was a case where one out 
of seven shareholders controlled the company. Would it make any 
16 [1897] AC 22. 
17 	Id, 40; Also see p.46 and p.53. 
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difference if three or four of the shareholders were "dummies" rather 
than six? In any event, it should not matter to the creditors how the 
shares were held given that the liability of the shareholders was limited. 
Lord Herschell acknowledged it may have been that the arrangement 
at issue was not within the contemplation of the legislature when limited 
liability was given statutory recognition. His Lordship conceded that had 
it been then it was possible that a minimum sum may have been fixed 
as the least denomination of any particular shareholding. 18 Presumably 
this would ensure a balance of power and accountability. 
Lord Macnaghten agreed adding that in the absence of such provisions 
or provisions requiring that the members be independent or 
unconnected or that they should have a mind and will of their own or 
that there should be anything like a balance of power in the constitution 
of a company the arrangement had to stand. 19 
3.2 Implications of Salomon v Salomon 
The principle 
The principle for which this case is authority is that a company has a 
separate identity from its controllers. The implications of this principle 
are profound and it has played a part in the development of virtually 
every aspect of company law. 
In the context of the subject matter of this thesis the result of the case 
was that no matter how contrived and close the arrangement the active 
participants in the management of an enterprise could derive the 
advantages of limited liability through the medium of incorporation. This 
is arguably the real mischief of the decision. 20 By permitting limited 
liability companies to exist where there was an assimilation of 
management and ownership the inherent checks which secured the 
integrity of the arrangement were removed. Who was now to complain 
of incompetent management or breach of trust? Who was to ensure 
that the enterprise was appropriately capitalised? 
18 	Supra, 46; The Companies Act 1980 (UK) requires that public limited companies have 
a minimum paid up capital of £50,000. 
19 	Supra, 51. 
20 	Some would argue that the real mischief of the decision was that it foreclosed the 
adoption in English law in relation to small enterprises of the commenda principle. 
Ford; Principles of Company Law (4th ed), Butterworths 1986 (Not taken up in the 6th 
edition.). Others would argue that it is the unreality and formalism into which the 
decision has led the law: Windeyer J, Gorton v FCT (1964-65) 113 CLR 604 at 627. 
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The exceptions 
The subsequent developments directed at regulating this principle are 
the subject matter of this thesis. The decision itself recognizes that the 
principle is not unchallengeable and indeed postulates some limits of 
the principle. The veil may be pierced, and importantly for creditors the 
privilege of limited liability rescinded, where the company is a sham or 
where it can be shown that it was created in order to facilitate a fraud. 
Furthermore the privilege will be effectively lost if an agency or trustee 
relationship can be shown to exist. 21 
It will be argued below that an analysis of the case law in which these 
exceptions to the Salomon principle have been considered reveals no 
general theme as to their application which seemingly has been on an 
ad hoc basis. 22 
The exceptions do, however, have one common feature namely that 
they were recognized in Salomons case. Thus the question arises as to 
whether the judgments in that decision provide an indication of any 
general theme underlying the exceptions? Furthermore does an 
investigation of these judgments provide or engender any other useful 
principles or indeed do these judgments provide assistance in 
determining the existence or otherwise of a central theme for the 
imposition of liability on corporate controllers for a corporation's debts? 
Disclosure - the creditors' panacea? 
One of the most notable aspects of the House of Lords decision is the 
emphasis placed by their Lordships on prevention rather than cure and 
on self help rather than regulatory intervention. Companies are under 
an obligation to disclose certain information and the onus is on 
creditors to satisfy themselves as to the desirability of dealing with the 
company. This philosophy of disclosure rather than regulation has been 
a feature of company law since its inception. In this context it is 
apparent that it derives from the freedom of contract principle, namely 
that a party can obtain limited liability provided that that is a term of the 
contract known and accepted by the other party. The requirement that 
the name of the company disclose the fact that the liability of its 
members is limited ensures that creditors have knowledge of this term. 
The financial disclosure requirements ensure that a source of 
information is available to creditors to enable them to ascertain whether 
21 	In such circumstances it is not correct to characterize the veil as being lifted, an error 
often made by the courts, for example see the House of Lords criticism of the decision 
of the Court of Appeal in Salomons case. 
22 For example see the comprehensive analysis of these cases in Gower, Modern 
Company Law (4th ed) Stevens & Sons 1979, especially at pp.130-131 and pp.136- 
138. The analysis in the 5th edition is more truncated: see pp. 132-134. 
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they should accept this condition or make alternative arrangements 
such as securing personal guarantees. 
The philosophy of freedom of contract is undergoing revision by those 
engaged in contract law reform 23 and it is notable that this new attitude 
embracing regulation and control by the State has filtered through to 
company law manifesting itself in the form of increased control by 
regulation rather than by disclosure. 
Control by disclosure or regulation? 
The conflict between the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal may 
also provide some guidance for the future development of company 
law. The Court of Appeal emphasised the origins of the legislation - the 
need for a structure to accommodate large mixed groups of investors 
and managers at the same time encouraging investment by the 
availability of limited liability. The arrangement before the Court was not 
in the contemplation of the legislature with the result that no safeguards 
to regulate such arrangements had been enacted. Accordingly their 
Lordships saw it as their duty to protect the business community from 
this "perversion" 24 of "one of the most useful statutes of modern 
times". 25 
The House of Lords on the other hand took the conservative literalist 
approach that their duty was "to interpret the law not to make it" 26 and 
that "the sole guide must be the statute itself". 27 Given that the 
legislature had not contemplated the arrangement and there were, 
accordingly, no provisions in the legislation regulating it, the 
arrangement stood. 
A question of classification 
What this conflict highlights, apart from the philosophical schism 
between the courts, is an inadequacy in the relevant legislation that has 
been perpetuated through to modern times. The same legislation 
simply cannot deal with such dissimilar scenarios as a small closely 
held company and a large public investment enterprise. There is 
23 For example see the plethora of recent amendments to the Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Aust), especially those effected by the Trade Practices Revision Act No.17, 1986, in 
particular the introduction of the basis of setting aside a contract for unconscionable 
conduct. The enactment of this provision follows the lead of the High Court in 
Commercial Bank of Australia Limited v Amadio (1983) 46 ALA 402; (1983) 57 AUR 
358; (1982-83) 151 CLR 447. 
24 [1895] 2 Ch 336 at 341. 
25 	Id, 339. 
26 [1897] AC 22 at 46. 
27 	Id, 29. 
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nothing new in this conclusion. 28 The novelty is simply in the 
recognition that it has been obvious for so long. 
A possible conclusion arising from this observation is that control by 
regulation of corporate conduct ought be a feature of the legislation 
authorising the creation of small closely controlled corporations. Control 
by disclosure might be restricted to legislation authorizing the creation 
of large corporations in the nature of investment vehicles. 29 
Their Lordships provided some indications as to the type of regulatory 
safeguards that might be desirable. Minimum capital levels together 
with minimum share denominations are envisaged. Alternatively 
provisions requiring that members be independent or unconnected, or 
that they should have a mind and will of their own, or somehow 
ensuring that there is a balance of power in the constitution of a 
company, could be enacted. 
However whatever regulations are enacted their Lordships warned of 
the danger of imposing too extensive restrictions or obligations, as in 
their view the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the Trial Judge 
would have done, as otherwise the national interest in fostering limited 
liability would be jeopardised. A balance is required. 
Their Lordships also referred to the need to determine the point at 
which a controlling influence in the affairs of a company is manifested. 
This indeed is an acknowledgment of the major difficulty presented by 
an attempt to draw a dichotomy between large investment companies 
and small closely held entities. How and where is the line to be drawn? 
The problem of group companies 
A. Salomon and Company Ltd can be contrasted with a large listed 
public company but the grey area is clearly significant. In this context 
group companies present a particular problem. Where does a 
subsidiary of a large public company stand? If the company is wholly or 
substantially owned by its parent then the control factor is made out. 
Does it make any difference that the parent is a large public company, 
possibly a multinational corporation? The controlling shareholder in the 
28 For example, see "Company Law and the Smaller Firm", (1988) 9 Co Law 118. 
29 Ibid. The commentator acknowledges the need for reforms to the present legal regime 
for smaller businesses and notes the differing views as to whether more or less 
disclosure should be required of small companies. The arguments in favour of more 
disclosure do not take into account alternative control mechanisms and merely 
'advocate more disclosure in the absence of any other form of control. To the extent 
that some control by disclosure is better than nothing no issue can be taken with these 
arguments. 
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subsidiary might be an artificial entity unlike Mr Salomon but 
nevertheless the purpose of the arrangement is most likely the same, 
to obtain the advantage of limited liability in respect of a particular 
enterprise. 
Another problem presented by a group of companies arises if the 
creditors of such a company adopt the advice of the House of Lords 
and examine the financial information disclosed by the company. In the 
case of a typical company envisaged by the 1862 Act they will discover 
a large pool of investment funds and other financial information 
arguably sufficient for them to make a decision as to the prospects of 
repayment. Where the company is a member of a group the creditors 
might discover the connection with a large conglomerate of 
corporations. Most likely the affiliation of the company with these 
entities would already be known given the common practice of 
advertising in the corporate letterhead the impressive connections of 
the company. Connections however without strings. A creditor seeking 
to rely on these connections to support the financial position of an 
insolvent subsidiary may be rudely disappointed. In effect the 
disclosure, far from protecting creditors, may act to their disadvantage 
by luring them into a false sense of security. 
The judgments handed down in the Salomon litigation provide little 
assistance in answering the question as to how corporate groups 
should be dealt with. The concept of a corporate group was not only 
not within the contemplation of the legislature; it was not within that of 
their Lordships nor even the business community. 30 
The issue of creditor recovery in the context of group companies is the 
subject matter of chapter 7. 
4. 	Circumstances where the Privilege is Rescinded 
Whilst the privilege of limited liability has become institutionalised in 
capitalist society, the law has developed limits to the principle which 
provide creditors of insolvent companies with some scope to recovery 
from corporate controllers. It is proposed to briefly outline the various 
avenues of recovery available. It will be argued that these are ad hoc 
and provide no central theme. 
30 	See Blumberg, "Limited Liability and corporate groups", [1986] J of Corp Law 573. 
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4.1 The common law 
Traditional heads of rescission 
The analysis of Salomon v Salomon identified four31 traditional 
circumstances in which the corporate veil might be lifted in such a way 
as to rescind the privilege of limited liability; 32 
(i) where the company was formed in order to enable fraud or 
improper conduct to be perpetrated, 
(ii) where the company is a "sham" or "facade" or merely an "alias" 
of its controller, including circumstances where the company has 
failed to satisfy the essential conditions of incorporation, 
(iii) where an equity arises such that the company is properly the 
trustee for its controller, and 
(iv) where there is evidence that the company is acting as the agent 
of its controller. 
A fifth category-the economic unit? 
Since the English Court of Appeal decision in DHN Food Distributors 
Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough CounciP3 it has been argued 
that there is a fifth category namely that the veil will be lifted and the 
privilege of limited liability rescinded where the business realities are 
such that in truth there is one economic unit in existence. 
Much was initially made of this decision. It was said that it was "but a 
short step" to "the proposition that the courts may disregard Salomons 
case whenever it is just and equitable to do so". 34 Subsequent cases 
have, however, casts serious doubts on the decision. In Woolfson v 
Strathclyde Regional CounciP5 the House of Lords distinguished and 
31 	A further exception of national emergency will not be considered (see for an example 
of the application of this exception Daimler Co Ltd v Continental Tyre and Rubber Co 
Ltd [1916] 2 AC 307). 
32 	For current purposes no distinction will be drawn between circumstances and 
legislative provisions which result in the actual piercing of the corporate veil as distinct 
from some other form of rationalisation as to the basis upon which liability has been 
imposed on corporate officials. Where the effect is the imposition of liability on 
corporate officials this will be described as lifting or piercing the veil notwithstanding 
that a more precious rationalisation could be formulated. Note Ford, (Op. cit.) (4th 
edition), 92. 
33 [1976] 1 WLR 852 (CA). 
34 	Sugarman & Webb, "Three-in-one': Trusts, Licenses & Veils", (1977) 93 LQ Rev 170, 
174. 
35 	[1978] SC (HL) 90; Followed in Stewarts Supermarkets v Secretary of State (1982) 8 
NILRB 1; Discussed in a note in (1986) 7 Co Law 157; Williams & Humbert Ltd v W & 
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doubted it, Lord Fraser stating that he doubted that the Court of Appeal 
had properly applied the principle that the corporate veil could only be 
pierced where special circumstances exist indicating that it is a mere 
facade concealing the true facts. As a result of this comment it has 
been argued that the case is best understood as an improper 
application of either the fraud or sham categories of lifting the veiI. 36 
More recently Young J. of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in 
Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd v YeIna Pty Ltd expressed strong 
disapproval of the DHN case stating that it ought to be viewed as "one 
of those too hard cases in which judges have for policy reasons 
justified the lifting of the corporate veil" rather than as a "case which 
lays down any great principle". 37 
His Honour stated that the DHN principle ought to be confined to cases 
where: 
"...the court can see that there is in fact or in law a partnership between 
companies in a group or alternatively where there is a mere sham or 
facade" 38 
This has not surprisingly led to the argument that the DHN principle 
has been rendered completely impotent. Either the fraud and sham 
categories would cover any potential field of operation of the principle 
or if the company is in a partnership the actions of the company will 
bind the other partners according to normal partnership law without any 
recourse to notions of lifting the corporate veiI. 39 
Furthermore, there are numerous authorities which support the 
existence of the separate legal identity of holding and subsidiary 
companies. These cases together with an analysis of the reasoning 
and authorities relied on the DHN decision add to the doubts 
associated with that case. 49 Taking all these factors into account, it 
would seem an "unchallengeable" proposition that that decision "was 
H Trade Marks (Jersey) Ltd [1986] AC 368 ; National Dock Labour Board v Pinn & 
Wheeler Ltd (1988) The Times, 17 Nov; discussed in Hawke & Marston, "Facades and 
Corporate Veils", (1988) 86 LS Gaz 17, 32. The High Court decision in Industrial 
Equity Ltd v Blackburn (1977) 137 CLR 567 is also arguably inconsistent with DHN 
decision. The traditional view has also been adhered to in New Zealand: Savill v 
Chase Holdings (Wellington) Ltd [1989] 1 NZLR 257. 
36 	Rixon, "Lifting the Veil between Holding and Subsidiary Companies", (1986) LQ Rev 
402, 415. 
37 (1987) 5 ACLC 467, 475. 
38 	Ibid. 
39 See Herzberg, "Current Developments - Legal & Administrative", (1987) 5 C&SLJ 199. 
40 	Rixon (op. cit.). 
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an aberration".41 
Thus there remain four traditional categories although there is even 
disagreement as to the integrity of these four categories. For example, 
Gower merges the first three of these categories into the "mere facade" 
category which he describes as the only true veil lifting category. He 
notes the lack of judicial guidance as to when a company will be 
treated as a mere facade. Gower then adds a further category, namely 
that the courts will effectively lift the corporate veil where the 
construction of a statute, contract or other document requires it. 
Ultimately, however, he acknowledges that the judicial inroads into the 
corporate entity principle would appear to have contracted in recent 
years 42 
No central theme 
This uncertainty as to how to categorise the instances of piercing the 
corporate veil illustrates what has been acknowledged by many 
commentators, namely that these instances disclose no central theme 
and the circumstances in which the common law will pierce the 
corporate veil is difficult to accurately predict.43 Recent decisions 
support this sentiment. For example, in Briggs v James Hardie & Co 
Pty Ltd44 the New South Wales Court of Appeal refused to lift the veil 
between group companies in the context of a tort action. The caselaw 
was comprehensively reviewed but the Court conceded that no general 
principle was identifiable. Certainly complete ownership and control by 
itself was insufficient. 45 Particular weight was attached to the English 
Court of Appeal decision in Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd v Department of 
Trade & Industry6 which had reached a similar conclusion. 
41 	Id, 422. The lifting of the corporate veil in the context of group companies will be 
explored further in chapter 7. 
42 See Gower, chapter 6. 
43 For example see the comprehensive analysis of these cases in Gower, Modem 
Company Law (4th ed) Stevens & Sons 1979, especially at pp.130-131 and pp.136- 
138. The analysis in the 5th edition is more truncated: see pp. 132-134. Other 
commentary to this effect includes Gates, "Disregarding the Corporate Entity in favour 
of Beneficial Ownership and Control", [1984] ABLR 162 at 165; Pickering, "The 
Company as a Separate Legal Entity", (1968) 31 Mod LA 481; Ford, p.135; Woods, 
"Lifting the Corporate Veil in Canada", (1957) 35 Can Bar Rev 1176. 
44 (1989) 7 ACLR 841. Also see the New Zealand decision of Trevor Ivory Ltd & Anor v 
Anderson & Ors (1992) 6 NZCLC 67, 611. 
45 Also see Denis Willcox Pty Ltd v FCT 88 ATC 4292; (1988) 79 ALR 267. 
46 (1988) 3 WLR 1033. Affirmed by the House of Lords (1989) 3 WLR 969. Also see 
National Dock Labour Board v Pinn & Wheeler Ltd [1988] The Times, 17 November. 
Discussed in Hawke & Marston, "Facades and corporate veils", (1989) 86 LS Gaz 17, 
32; Monarch Airlines Engineering Ltd v Intercom (cattle-meats) Ltd (1986) 11 Con LA 
58; Adams & Ors v Cape Industry plc & Anor [1990] 2 WLR 657, [1990] BCLC 479, 
discussed in Griffin, "Holding Companies & Subsidiaries - The Corporate Veil", (1991) 
12 Co Law 16; Kirkbride, "Adams v Cape Industries plc - group reality or legal reality?", 
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Little reliance on these principles by creditors 
In any event the existence of a central theme to the application of these 
exceptions to the principle in Salomons case is arguably not of major 
concern in the context of creditors' rights. This isbecause there are few 
reported decisions where creditors have sought to rely on the 
application of any of these exceptions. 
In the context of the fraud or sham exceptions the absence of cases 
can probably be explained by the existence of alternative actions 
available to creditors in the event that a company is used to perpetrate 
fraud, such as that provided by the fraudulent trading provision. The 
greater certainty surrounding the application of these provisions makes 
them more attractive to creditors than reliance on the uncertain 
application of the Salomon exceptions. 
Nevertheless there are some examples of the application of the fraud 
exception for the benefit of creditors. In Re Darby47 an action against a 
bankrupt director for secret profits upon the sale of the company's 
business at an overvalue to a company owned by the director 
succeeded notwithstanding the director's claim that the profit was 
derived by the other company and not himself. More recently in Re A 
Company48 a prospective insolvent divested himself of his assets to a 
complex network of corporations for the purpose of defeating any future 
recovery by his creditors and the Court had no hesitation in piercing the 
veil where necessary in order to ensure that justice was done. 
Similarly the agency and trustee exceptions have rarely been relied 
upon by creditors probably because, as Salomons case demonstrates, 
the courts require substantial evidence before they will infer such a 
relationship. This would appear to be so regardless of whether it is the 
creditors of the company who are seeking to lift the veil or the creditors 
of an insolvent company controller. The case of Clarkson Co Ltd v 
Zhelka 49 illustrates that the courts are just as hesitant to lift the veil in 
the latter circumstances. This was so notwithstanding that the 
bankrupt, who was in complete control and domination of a family of 
companies, had conducted their affairs with the view of delaying and 
(1991) 12 Business L Review 21. Other recent writings on the subject include: 
Silvertown, "Piercing the Corporate Veil", (1989) 133 SJ 346; Ottolengui, "From 
peeping behind the corporate veil to ignoring it completely", (1990) 53 Mod LA 388; 
Galleher & Ziegler, "Lifting the corporate veil in the pursuit of justice", [1990] JnI of Bus 
L292. 
47 	[1911] 1 KB 95. 
48 [1985] BCLC 333; Also see Wallersteiner v Moir [1974] 1 WLR 991, and, more 
recently, Creasey v Breachwood Motors Ltd (1992) The Times, 29 July. 
49 (1967) 64 DLR (2d) 457. 
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hindering their creditors. The Court examined the various heads of 
exceptions but, although agreeing that the case was close to the line, 
concluded that the facts did not support the application of one of these 
exceptions. 
This is not to say that in appropriate circumstances an equity might not 
arise between the creditor of a company and its directors. In Lion 
Breweries Ltd v Scarroti50 the New Zealand High Court held directors 
liable to account for the proceeds of a sale by auction carried out by a 
since insolvent company in circumstances where the directors were 
aware of the facts and party to the company's breaches of fiduciary 
duty. Thus where a creditor is owed a fiduciary duty by the debtor 
company equity may supply a remedy against the company's directors. 
4.2 Contract and torts law 51 
In addition to the limited common law instances in which corporate 
controllers may be responsible for corporate obligations liability may 
attach by virtue of the general principles of contract and torts law. 
Contract law 
Where a corporate official enters into a contract then, should the third 
party be unaware that the individual is contracting on behalf of a 
company, liability will attach to the individual pursuant to normal 
contractual principles. 52 In some instances the courts have held that the 
individual is jointly liable with the company on the basis that he 
contracted on behalf of himself and the company. 53 This situation often 
arises where the individual induces the third party to contract with the 
company on the understanding that the individual is associated with the 
company. In effect the individual guarantees the performance of the 
contract. 
More commonly creditors will require express guarantees or 
indemnities from corporate officials. 
50 [1987] NZ Recent Law 127; following Sevin v De Vere and Bank of New South Wales 
[1984] NZ Recent Law 152. 
51 	The criminal law provides various crimes in relation to defrauding creditors. Where 
persons have been so convicted most jurisdictions empower the courts to order the 
felon to compensate those wronged, either at the discretion of the court or upon 
application by a creditor. It is not intended to canvass either these provisions, or other 
provisions or common law principles which are directed at fraud generally. 
52 However as a general principle a director is not personally liable to a third party on a 
contract into which he has entered on behalf of his company: Ferguson v Wilson 
(1866) LR 2 Ch App 77. 
53 The Swan [1968] 1 Lloyd's Rep 5. Discussed in (1969) 85 LC) Rev 92. 
Page 32 
Chapter 2 
Creditors' Recovery Rights 
Occasionally the courts have found the existence of an express agency 
relationship so rendering the controller liable. 54 More often the courts 
have found that there is an implied agency relationship, thereby 
upholding one of the exceptions to the Salomon principle. 
A director may also be liable on the ground of breach of warranty of 
authority, where he has acted beyond his own powers or the powers of 
the company, and this was not actually or constructively known by the 
other party. 55 He will also be liable if he contracts on behalf of an 
illusory company, 56 and also for ultra vires acts. 57 
There are also instances where directors have been held liable to third 
parties for a company's wrongdoing where they expressly authorized 
the conduct complained of. The complicity of the company's agent can 
render him liable together with the company. 55 
Torts law 
Although the instances to date where corporate controllers have been 
held liable in tort for corporate obligations are rare, recent 
developments in the law of torts provide significant scope for the 
imposition of liability. The following torts have particular relevance: 
(i) deceit, 
(ii) conspiracy, 
(iii) interference with contractual relations, 
(iv) the general torts arising from intentional unlawful acts, 
(v) misfeasance in a public office, and 
(vi) negligence. 
A difficult question of policy 
Before examining these torts it would appear since C Evans & Son Ltd 
54 	See Gower (op. cit.) 132. 
55 West London Commercial Bank Ltd v Kitson (1884) 13 QBD 360; Firbank's Executors 
v Humphreys (1886) 18 QBD 54. 
56 	Harrill v Davis 168 F 187 (1909). 
57 	Halsbury (4th edition) p.301-302. 
58 	Scott & Scott v Rieht & Schumak (1959) 15 DLR (2d) 67. Generally on the liability of 
directors as agents see: Arora, "When Directors are personally liable", (1981) 2 Co 
Law 201. 
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v Spritebrand Ltd & Anot59 that a director who had authorized, directed 
and procured the commission by a company of a tortious act cannot be 
personally liable in tort unless it is established that he committed the 
acts in the knowledge that they were tortious or had acted recklessly 
without caring whether they were or not. Conversely a director is not 
automatically liable for the torts of his company no matter how small 
the company or how powerful his control over its affairs. Rather 
whether a director is personally liable in tort is a product of all the 
circumstances, in particular the role he played in relation to the alleged 
tortious acts. 
Some doubt in this regard had been created by earlier English and 
Canadian authorities. 60 Probably these cases should best be 
characterized as stating an element to be established in order to make 
out the specific torts at issue in each case or simply as an over-zealous 
attempt to protect the principle of limited liability from erosion via the 
medium of torts law. Certainly these cases highlight the difficult policy 
questions at issue. In the words of Le Dain J. in Mentmore 
Manufacturing Co Ltd v National Merchandising Manufacturing Co 
Inc,61 
"What is involved here is a very difficult question of policy. On the one 
hand, there is the principle that an incorporated company is separate 
and distinct in law from its shareholders, directors and officers, and it is 
in the interests of the commercial purposes served by the incorporated 
enterprise that they should as a general rule enjoy the benefit of the 
limited liability afforded by incorporation. On the other hand, there is the 
principle that everyone should answer for his tortious acts. The 
balancing of these two considerations is particularly difficult." 
Thus, subject to implications arising from these background policy 
issues, torts law principles may apply to company directors in the same 
way as to any other persons. Therefore it will normally be necessary to 
show that either the company was the agent of the director or the 
director owed a personal duty of care. 
4.2.1 Deceit 
Prior to the introduction of the statutory remedy for corporate fraud, this 
remedy was provided by the tort of deceit. Some would argue that its 
59 	[1985] 2 All ER 415. 
60 	Mentmore Manufacturing Co Ltd v National Merchandising Manufacturing Co Inc 
(1978) 89 DLR (3d) 195; White Horse Distillers Ltd v Gregson Associates Ltd [1984] 
RPC 61; Fairfax Dental Ltd v SJ Filhol Ltd (20 July 1984 Unreported). 
61 	(1978) 89 DLR (3d) 195 at 202. 
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inadequacies stimulated the enactment of the statutory remedy, 62 
although there is also a view that the statutory remedy adds nothing to 
the law. 63 
The tort of deceit requires proof of a subjective dishonest intention in 
circumstances where a false representation is made which induces the 
representee to act to his detriment. 64 
Williams claims that litigants have overlooked the advantages enjoyed 
by this action over the statutory remedy. For example, it is available 
against all companies and not a limited category of insolvent or 
terminating companies, the plaintiff need not secure a conviction of the 
defendant before instituting civil proceedings as traditionally required 
by the Australian fraudulent trading provision, any moneys awarded by 
the court as damages accrue to the plaintiff and not the company, and 
the plaintiff is entitled to damages as of right and not as a matter of the 
court's discretion. 65 Williams does however acknowledge the difficulties 
presented by the common law action. 66 
In practice the action is normally only pursued where the company is 
insolvent, as only then is there a financial advantage in suing officers 
involved in the fraud rather than in suing the company in contract or in 
tort. 
Ultimately however, the very fact that a need was perceived for the 
introduction of the statutory remedy during the 1930s, and that there 
has been little development of the tort of deceit in the 50 years since 
indicates the questionable utility of the tort in this context. 
4.2.2 Conspiracy 
The tort of conspiracy requires proof that two or more persons have 
combined together with the intention of injuring another and damage 
has in fact resulted to the other. It is a defence to show that the 
predominant purpose of the combination was the lawful protection or 
promotion of any lawful interests of the combiners. That is, if the 
common object or motive is "the protection or advancement of trading, 
professional or economic interests common to the defendants, there is 
no liability".67 
62 	Williams, "Fraudulent Trading", (1986) 4 C&SLJ 14 at 15. 
63 	R v Rollafson [1969] 2 All ER 833, 834. 
64 Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337(HL). 
65 	Williams, op. cit. 15-16. 
66 	Id, 15. 
67 McKeman v Fraser (1931) 46 CLR 343, 400 per Evatt J.; See generally Trindade and 
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It is conceivable that circumstances could arise where a company 
and/or its controllers could be said to be acting together with the intent 
of injuring creditors and that the subsequent insolvency of the company 
does in fact cause damage to the creditors. 68 Arguably the defence 
would be unavailable to the controllers because the interests of the 
company are hardly being advanced in circumstances where it is 
rendered insolvent. 
Except where group companies are concerned it is questionable 
whether the availability of this tort advances creditors' rights. It is likely 
that corporate controllers in circumstances where a conspiracy could 
be established would be liable on the ground of common law fraud or 
by virtue of the fraudulent, or more recently, reckless or wrongful 
trading provisions. Nevertheless there may be circumstances where 
these alternative causes of action cannot be established. In particular 
an application of the tort could be envisaged in the context of group 
companies where a subsidiary has been left to languish by the other 
group members. Even in such circumstances the need to establish that 
the conspirators had an intent to injure creditors may limit the 
usefulness of the tort although arguably this element imposes a lesser 
burden than the element of an intent to deceive which must be proved 
in order to make out fraud. 
Furthermore there is some contention as to whether there can be a 
conspiracy between a company and its controller. The basis for this 
view is that "it would be artificial to take the view that the company, 
although it is clearly a separate legal entity, can be regarded as a 
separate person or a separate mind". 69 On the other hand there is 
authority stating an alternative viewn and in Belmont Finance Corp Ltd 
v Williams Furniture Ltd, whilst the company was found not liable in 
conspiracy with its directors because it lacked knowledge, no issue was 
raised that it might lack capacity to conspire. 71 
Cane, The Law of Torts in Australia, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1985, and 
Balkin & Davis, Law of Torts, Butterworths Australia 1991 at 653-664. The discussion 
here is limited to "simple" conspiracy. 
68 Conceivably a conspiracy could arise where the conduct of one person constitutes 
both an individual's conduct and that of the company. This is discussed below. 
69 R v McDonnell [1966] 1 QB 233. 
70 	R v ICR Haulage Ltd [1944] KB 551; [1944] 1 All ER 941 (CCA); R v Blamires 
Transport Services Ltd [1964] 1 QB 278; [1963] 3 All ER 170 (CA). Also the High 
Court has recently held that a managing director can be liable as an accessory to 
offences committed by a company: Hamilton v Whitehead (1989) 7 ACLC 34. 
71 
	
	[1979] Ch 250; [1979] 1 All ER 18 (CA). Also see Heffey, "The survival of civil 
conspiracy", (1975) 1 Mon U L Rev 136 at 182-3. 
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Conceivably any difficulty here might be avoided by reliance on the fact 
that a company may have no fewer than two shareholders and two 
directors and arguing that these two persons were the relevant 
conspirators. The difficulty with this argument is that unless they can 
both be shown to be playing an active part in the conduct and control of 
the company or at least in the specific matter giving rise to the action, 
then the tort would not be made out. The fact that one shareholder or 
director is merely a nominee providing the necessary consent as and 
when required and otherwise acquiescing in the other director's or 
shareholder's control of the company will not satisfy the requirements 
for a conspiracy. 
4.2.3 Interference with contractual relations 
This tort requires proof of conduct which either induces a breach of 
contract or interferes in some way with its performance. This conduct 
may take the form of a direct or indirect interference. Direct interference 
is in the nature of direct persuasion or inducement to breach a contract 
or by direct action such as action to prevent a party to a contract from 
performing his part of the contract. Except in the event of the first type 
of direct interference the traditional view is that the interference must 
be effected by or include an unlawful act. 72 
Where an indirect interference is relied upon the breach of contract 
complained of must be the necessary consequence of the 
interference. 73 
The tort also requires proof that the defendant knowingly induced or 
procured the breach. This can be established by showing that the 
defendant had knowledge of the existence of the contract and also had 
an intention to interfere with its performance. There is some authority to 
the effect that constructive knowledge of the contract, that is the 
knowledge of a reasonable man, will suffice. An intentional interference 
includes both deliberate and reckless interference. Should the 
defendant reasonably entertain a bona fide belief that he was not 
inducing a breach of contract he will not be liable. 74 
It is a defence to the tort to establish that the interference was justified. 
A common justification is where the defendant interferes in order to 
protect his own existing contracts in circumstances where the contracts 
interfered with were inconsistent with these earlier contracts. 
72 See Trindade and Cane, 178. 
73 	Id, 179. 
74 	Id, 179-181. 
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Where the controller of the company conducts the business of the 
company in such a way that it cannot pay its debts the controller could 
be said to have induced the company to breach its contracts. The 
interference could be said to be direct, by virtue of the fact that the 
controller in its capacity as the mind and will of the company has 
decided that the company will not pay a debt; or indirect, in that the 
company is prevented from paying the debt either by virtue of the fact 
that the company has been rendered insolvent or is simply unable to 
pay this particular debt by virtue of the conduct of the controller. 
Relevant conduct might be the manner in which the business of the 
company generally has been conducted, the payment of other debts in 
lieu of the debt in issue, the failure to provide sufficient capital to 
conduct the business or the drawing of funds from the company. 
The requirement of an unlawful act 
Although the requirement that the defendant have knowledge of the 
contract should normally be satisfied given that the defendant controls 
the company, proof of an intent to interfere with its performance may be 
more difficult. Furthermore if and where it is required to establish the 
existence of an unlawful act this too may limit the applicability of the 
tort. For example in Airlines Airspaces Ltd v Handley Page Ltd75 a 
receiver and manager was held entitled, in the absence of fraud or 
impropriety, to frustrate a contract entered into by the company by 
causing the subject matter to be transferred to a subsidiary 
incorporated for that purpose. The decision turned on the special 
position of a receiver and manager in respect of contracts between 
unsecured creditors and the company. It is arguable that a mere 
director would have been liable on these facts, such conduct being in 
breach of his duties to the company, and hence unlawful. 
On the other hand, in Einhom v Westminster Investments Ltd76 Disbery 
J. upheld the validity of a statement of claim alleging that directors, who 
had prevented a company from performing its contract by diverting its 
assets to an associated company, had committed the tort of inducing a 
breach of contract. His Honour did not require that the plaintiff prove 
interference by an unlawful act, the conduct of the directors being 
tantamount to fraud. 
75 [1970] Ch 193. 
76 (1969) 6 DLR (3d) 71(Sask); Affirmed (1973) 73 WWR 161(CA). Also see Thermo 
King Corp v Provincial Bank of Canada (1981) 130 DLR (3d) 256 (Ont CA). 
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Similarly in Esso Petroleum Ltd v Kin gswood Motors (Addlestone) Ltd 77 
an injunction was granted requiring a company to retransfer service 
station premises to a fellow subsidiary company, the defendant, in 
circumstances where the original transfer had had the effect of 
defeating a solus agreement between the defendant and the plaintiff. 
The Court considered that such an order was necessary in order to 
remedy the consequences of a conspiracy to induce a breach of 
contract. The holding and subsidiary companies, once they had control 
over the defendant company, procured a direct breach by it of its 
contractual obligations. This interference with the contractual 
relationship was both deliberate and direct. 
The particular feature of these cases is that there was a direct 
interference with the contract so the courts were not concerned to 
establish an unlawful act, whilst at the same time the interfering 
conduct clearly evidenced an intent to interfere. This situation can be 
distinguished from where a company becomes unable to pay its 
obligations due to its insolvency. In such circumstances proof of an 
intent to interfere by an unlawful act would probably be required and 
may be difficult. In any event it is likely that if such an act can be 
established it would render the directors liable to impeachment under 
the fraudulent or reckless/wrongful trading provisions or constitute a 
breach of duty. For example had the defendant in the Airlines 
Airspaces case been a director he might have been liable for breach of 
his duty as a director. However, admittedly, this would only have 
entitled the company or a liquidator to proceed against him whereas 
the tortious action is available to the creditor. 
Thus as with the tort of conspiracy there is probably little incentive for 
creditors to rely on this tort given the general availability of alternative 
actions. Only where these alternative remedies are inadequate or non-
existent can reliance on this tort be justified. Again in chapter 7 the 
relevance of the tort in the context of group companies will be explored. 
4.2.4 General torts arising from intentional unlawful acts 
There is some authority in Australia, England and Canada for the 
existence of a tort of causing loss by interference with trade or 
business by unlawful means. It is uncertain whether it requires proof of 
an intent to inflict harm or merely proof of an intentional act which 
results in harm.78 The tort clearly encompasses the tort of interference 
77 	[1973] 3 All ER 1057. 
78 	See generally Trindade and Cane (op. cit.), 194-196, Hazel Carty, "Unlawful 
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with contractual relations as well as the other economic torts. However, 
to the extent that its potential application is broader it may enhance the 
rights of creditors. 
The tort has been applied in a number of contexts. One context has 
been the power of trade unions to affect proposed contractual 
arrangements or to affect the performance of a contract short of its 
breach. Another is in the context of the sale of illegal recordings of live 
performances where although no contracts are breached by this 
"bootlegging" the potential profits from contracts between musicians 
and recording companies are reduced. 79 The cases in this latter 
category appear to accept that unlawful acts include those which are 
not independently actionable but only constitute the breach of a purely 
penal statute, but are conflicting on whether interference with 
contractual expectations or profit potential or with the economic 
advantages to be obtained from a contract satisfy the requirement of 
interference with trade. 
The most important context for present purposes however is that of 
associated companies and the issue of instructions from one to another 
to the effect that the subsidiary should not enter into any further 
contracts with the plaintiff. This point will be further discussed in 
chapter 7. 
What these cases demonstrate is that the tort of unlawful inducement 
of breach of contract may actually be broader in its application than 
traditionally viewed or merely a specific instance of a wider tort of 
unlawful interference with trade. Except to the extent that this wider tort 
might require a lower standard of unlawfulness it arguably adds little to 
the rights of a creditor of an insolvent company where the failure of the 
company to pay its debt clearly constitutes a breach of contract. 
Furthermore there is Australian authority for the existence of a tort 
where a person causes loss to another as the inevitable consequence 
of his unlawful intentional and positive acts. It is clear that this tort does 
not require an intent to cause harm but merely an intentional unlawful 
act which in fact causes harm. 80 
interference with trade", (1983) 3 Legal Studies 193 and Balkin & Davis (op. cit.) 664- 
672. 
79 	Ibid. 
80 	Beaudesert Shire Council v Smith (1966) 120 CLR 145. Discussed in Trindade and 
Cane at p.197. 
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Identifying the unlawful act 
It is conceivable that circumstances may arise where these torts could 
provide a creditor with a cause of action. The major limitation is the 
need to establish the existence of an unlawful act by the company's 
controller together with a connection between that act and the loss to 
the creditor. There will normally be a variety of acts and events which 
could be particularised as giving rise to the creditor's loss or otherwise 
interfering with the business of the creditor. For example: (a) causing 
the company to contract with the creditor, (b) causing the company to 
be liquidated, (c) causing the company to incur other debts, or (d) 
causing the business of the company to be conducted in a particular 
way. 
Probably the answer to determining what is the relevant act is to 
identify the main cause of the company's insolvency. Once this act is 
identified it is still necessary to establish that it was unlawful and it may 
also be necessary to establish that it was performed with an intent to 
inflict harm on the creditor. Should causing the company to enter into 
the contract be identified as the relevant act then proof that this was 
unlawful might cause further problems for the creditor because in some 
circumstances an unlawful contract is unenforceable. 
It is submitted that this requirement that the act which caused the 
creditor's loss be unlawful is a major limitation on the applicability of 
these torts as where the act is shown to be unlawful then the creditor 
would probably have more appropriate alternative remedies. 81 However 
there is some authority for the proposition that, at least in the context of 
the tort of unlawful interference with trade, "unlawful" means an act that 
the defendant is not at liberty to commit, for example, a breach of a 
penal statute, and is not restricted to independently actionable 
wrongs. 82 This point is further explored in chapter 7. In any event there 
may also be occasions where the creditor's loss cannot be attributed to 
the acts of the controlling official, such as where the insolvency of the 
company arises due to external circumstances. 
4.2.5 Misfeasance in a public office 
Where a public officer does an act which to his knowledge amounts to 
an abuse of his office and he thereby causes harm to another person 
then an action in tort for misfeasance in a public office may be brought 
81 	Although often the alternative remedies are not available to the creditor but to the 
company or shareholders so that in some cases the possibility of a torts action may be 
of vital importance. 
82 	Acrow (Automation) Ltd v Rex Chainbelt Inc and Anor [1971] 3 All ER 1175. 
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against him at the suit of that person. 83 It is conceivable that with some 
further development this tort might have an application to companies in 
their dealings with the public, especially creditors. 
A public officer has been defined as a person who is paid out of public 
funds and who "owes duties to members of the public as to how the 
office shall be exercised". 84 An actionable abuse arises where such an 
officer acts maliciously in the sense of having an intent to injure or 
where he acts with knowledge that what he is doing is in excess of his 
powers. A plaintiff must not only show damage but also that he is a 
member of the public to whom the holder of the office owed a duty not 
to commit the particular abuse complained of. 
Certainly with respect to the largest corporations operating within 
Australia there is a case for arguing that their officials are public 
officers, being indirectly paid from public funds, being the funds 
generated by the extensive business of the company. In particular, with 
the trend towards privatisation of traditional public functions there is 
likely to be a further blurring of the concept of public officer with that of 
the corporate officia1. 86 Furthermore, the privilege of limited liability 
could be said to carry with it certain community responsibilities, thereby 
establishing a case for extending the definition of public officers to 
encompass all company officials. This would lead to the proposition 
that there is a duty on all who shelter behind this privilege not to abuse 
it and when they do a creditor who suffers consequential damage may 
bring an action against them. 
Over the last 125 years there have been various judicial references to 
the civic responsibilities of corporate officials and companies generally. 
The difficulty is determining when in fact such obligations have been 
breached. What conduct does amount to abuse of the corporate office? 
Fraud has long been regarded as such conduct and more recently 
recklessness. Further specific instances of unacceptable conduct have 
been recognized by the legislature. 86 
Probably rather than providing an alternative cause of action this tort 
then provides the underlying rationale for the instances where the law 
has allowed creditors resort against corporate officials. The more 
specific causes of action such as fraudulent and reckless/wrongful 
trading simply particularise acts which the law considers as unlawful or 
as amounting to an abuse of office. 
83 See generally Trindade and Cane, 198-199. 
84 Tampion v Anderson [1973] VR 715, 720. 
85 	See Balkin & Davis, Law of Torts (1st ed), Butterworths Australia 1991 at 781. 
86 See section 4.3 below. 
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4.2.6 Negligence 
Company law traditionally has not recognized any causes of action for 
losses arising from nonfeasance. No conduct short of fraud or 
recklessness has given rise to liability. The general view is that the 
common law duty to creditors rather surprisingly derived from the duty 
of good faith rather than the duty of care, although it will be observed in 
chapter 3 that there is some authority for this duty having its origins in 
the tort of negligence. In any event to date that duty is yet to 
experience any developments in support of creditors' rights as opposed 
to those of shareholders. 
With the recent recognition by the courts that an action can lie in 
negligence for pure economic loss it is conceivable that officials could 
be liable in negligence to creditors for losses incurred by them arising 
from corporate insolvency. In its present state of development the law 
of negligence requires that there exist between the plaintiff and 
defendant a special relationship on the basis of which the defendant 
ought to have the plaintiff particularly in mind as likely to suffer 
economic loss. 87 
A dichotomy is made between ad hoc and continuing relationships. In 
the case of ad hoc relationships a distinction is drawn between 
statements and acts. Negligent mis-statements have been actionable 
for the last 30 years. The plaintiff must establish that he relied on a 
negligently made statement resulting in loss in circumstances where 
the maker knew that it would be used by a specific class of persons in 
a specific class of transactions. In the same way that an accountant 
might be liable to company investors for carelessly preparing an 
account, a director could conceivably be liable to creditors for careless 
statements inducing them to grant credit to the company. 
More recently, liability has been held to lie for negligent acts causing 
economic loss. The leading case is the High Court decision in Caltex 
Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dredge "Willemstad". 88 The judgments in that 
decision appear to lay down three alternative principles. Their Honours 
are undecided as to whether foreseeability of loss to the particular 
87 See generally Trindade & Cane, 296-305 and Balkin & Davis, 418-450. Of course, 
tortious liability may arise from the special circumstances of the directors' dealings 
involving the creditor. For example, see Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life 
Nominees Ltd [1990] BCLC 868 (discussed in Watts, "Company Law", [1990] NZ 
Recent Law Review 190) and National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd v Worn (1990) 5 
NZCLC 66,384. 
88 (1976) 136 CLR 529. 
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plaintiff is required, alternatively whether foreseeability of the specific 
economic loss is necessary or whether liability for all loss caused by 
breach of a duty should be imposed in the absence of public policy 
reasons limiting recovery. 
There is some authority in support of the first view and other authority 
which rejects any attempt to extend the principle to foreseeability of 
loss to a class no matter how limited. 89 Furthermore the principle has 
not been embraced in the United Kingdom where it is, broadly, a 
requirement that the loss be consequential on damage to the plaintiff's 
property.90 
The difficulty giving rise to this variety of opinion is that of constructing 
an appropriate definition of the relationship required to impose liability. 
Foreseeability of the particular plaintiff is arguably too narrow whilst 
foreseeability of a particular class creates its own difficulties as to how 
to define the parameters of the class and hence the rationale for the 
non-extension of the principle to the foreseeability of loss to members 
of a class. However should an appropriate matter arise for decision it is 
arguable that the class of corporate creditors might be a sufficiently 
identifiable class to overcome these concerns. In the ultimate however 
the decision in each case may well depend as much on the issue of 
public policy as on anything else. 
Where continuing relationships are concerned no distinction is drawn 
between words or acts and the relationship solves all problems of 
proximity and indeterminacy. The issue in these cases is even more 
clearly identifiable as one of public policy. 
Conflicting policy considerations at play 
In this state of flux it is difficult to state with any authority the existence 
of a cause of action in negligence against corporate officials for loss 
suffered by creditors as a result of corporate insolvency. Certainly the 
category of "creditors" arguably satisfies the proximity test. The issue 
remains one of public policy. 91 The availability of alternative causes of 
action together with the same community pressures which gave rise to 
the institutions of the corporate personality and limited liability may 
persuade a court to err on the side of discretion rather than innovation. 
The difficulty is that companies were designed as a vehicle for risk 
89 See Balkin & Davis, at 437-438. 
90 	Id, 439. See the recent decision in Murphy v Brentwood DC [199111 AC 398. 
91 	McPherson argues that no duty of care in negligence exists nor should exist as no 
legal duty of care is capable of protecting a creditor half as well as his own judgment. 
"Duties of directors to shareholders and creditors", Legal Research Foundation 
Seminar, Auckland 1989, 1. 
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taking and the same public policy behind their introduction is unlikely to 
support the qualification inherent in the imposition of a duty of care. In 
any event the standard of care required would need to be very low to 
accommodate the taking of legitimate business risks. 
It is submitted that if any developments are forthcoming then they will 
most likely be where a continuing relationship has been shown to exist, 
such as where a creditor had developed a longstanding relationship 
with the now insolvent company. 92 With proximity not an issue, the 
policy of allowing such a creditor to claim against the assets of a 
careless director, where no express personal guarantees were 
obtained, might be embraced. 
Notably in the South African decision of Ex Parte De Villiers and 
Another MNO: In Re Carbon Developments (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation)93 
acknowledged the potential application of the principles of negligence 
in this context. In particular the Court observed that a corporate officer 
might be liable in negligence to a creditor in one of two circumstances. 
Firstly, where there was a negligent failure to perform the duty of 
causing the company to raise such capital to restore its solvency as a 
reasonable man could and would have raised or as a result of a 
negligent failure to perform the duty of causing the company to be 
wound up when a reasonable man would have done so and this 
caused the creditors foreseeable loss. Secondly, where an officer upon 
ordering goods on credit negligently misrepresented expressly or by 
implication from his conduct that the company was not insolvent 
thereby causing the creditor to contract resulting in loss. No authority 
was however, cited for these propositions. Furthermore, as discussed 
in chapter 8, whilst the South African judiciary has embraced some 
particularly strict principles in relation to the liability of directors of 
insolvent companies some recent reconsideration of these principles is 
evident. 
92 	A recent novel development has been the imposition of liability in negligence on a 
director in relation to the loss suffered by a person with whom the company had 
entered into a contract in circumstances where the services contracted to be 
performed by the company could only be rendered by the exercise of skill and care by 
the particular director. It was held that the circumstances were such as to impose a 
duty on the director towards that person to act with proper skill and care: Fairline 
Shipping Corporation v Adamson [1975] QB 180. See Diamond (1975) 38 Mod LA 198 
who argues that this presupposes an independent tort which cannot be inferred from 
the company's tort. Cf. Pollnow v Garden Mews St Leonards Pty Ltd & Ors (1984) 9 
ACLR 82, and also see Kuwait Asian Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd 
[1990] BCLC 868. 
93 1992 (2) SA 95 (W). 
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Again, as with the intentional torts, the most likely scenario in which a 
cause of action in negligence might be relied upon is in the context of 
group companies. Where a holding company is carelessly conducting 
business through a subsidiary the absence of alternative causes of 
action might render attractive an action in negligence against either the 
holding company or its controllers. 
4.3 The legislation 
There are numerous instances in the various companies legislation 
where liability is imposed on corporate officials for corporate 
obligations, whether by the mechanism of piercing the corporate veil or 
otherwise. Furthermore other legislation often provides circumstances 
where the corporate identity will be ignored but seldom are such 
instances designed to sheet home to corporate officials the obligations 
of a company to its creditors. The major statutory bases of liability are 
the subject matter of this section. 
4.3.1 Minimum shareholding provisions 
Company legislation typically provides for a minimum number of 
members. Traditionally these provisions provide that should the 
company carry on business with less than the prescribed minimum 
number of members then after a specified period all persons who are 
members and who have knowledge of the deficiency will be liable for 
the future debts contracted by the company. 94 These provisions do not 
operate to terminate the company although the company may be 
subsequently wound up on this ground. 95 Their most significant feature 
is the relative rarity of their application. 
4.3.2 Negotiable instruments 
Another circumstance where personal liability may be imposed on 
corporate officials is where these officials have signed or authorised the 
signature on behalf of the company of any bill of exchange, promissory 
note, cheque or order for goods or money and the name of the 
company is not mentioned thereon in legible characters. In such 
circumstances personal liability will only arise should the amount due 
be not duly paid by the company. 96 
94 See for example Corporations Law S.114 and S.186. 
95 	S.461. 
96 	S.219(7). For a recent example of the application of such a provision see Rafsanjan 
Pistachio Producers v Reiss [1990] BCLC 352. cf S.116 of the Companies Act 1955 
(NZ) discussed by Watts in [1990] NZ Recent Law Review 190. The 
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These provisions are examples of a number of provisions designed to 
ensure that the name of the company appears on all business 
documents and letters and wherever it does business. Normally such 
provisions are enforced by penal sanctions rather than by civil liability. 
Nevertheless where the provisions provide for such liability it has been 
strictly enforced, particularly in the early days of the legislation. 
It was observed earlier that one of the reasons for the legislative 
recognition of limited liability was in order to control this increasingly 
popular commercial phenomenon. In particular it was intended to 
protect third parties by ensuring that where they dealt with limited 
companies this fact was known to them. Accordingly the legislature has 
sought to ensure that the true name of the company is always used 
and in particular that the word "limited" appears where applicable. 
Hence the significance of these provisions. 
4.3.3 Pre-incorporation contracts 
Liability may also be imposed on corporate officials in relation to pre-
incorporation contracts. This is particularly the case in the United 
Kingdom where the legislation does not provide for the subsequent 
ratification of such contracts by the company97 but rather imposes 
direct liability on the promoter in the absence of a clear contractual 
intention to the contrary. 98 
Recently attempts have been made by creditors to rely on this 
provision where a contract has been entered into with a company 
trading under a false99 or misprinted name. 100  These attempts have 
been unsuccessful drawing the comment that the courts will not readily 
permit misprints to be used as a basis to impose personal liability on 
corporate officials. 101 
Companies(Ancillary provisions)Bill 1991 (NZ) proposed to remove this head of liability 
in response to the recommendations of the Law Reform Commission: Report No. 9, 
June 1989, para 362 and S.21 of the draft legislation. Also see S.22 of the Companies 
Bill 1990. 
97 Pursuant to S.183 of the Corporations Law the company may subsequently ratify the 
contract although the promoter will remain liable on the contract effectively as a 
guarantor for the company (unless exemption from liability has been obtained from the 
other party). 
98 S.36C of the Companies Act 1985. 
99 Oshkosh B'Gosh v Dan Marbel (1988) 4 BCC 795. Noted in (1989) 10 Business L 
Review 23 and (1989) 103 Accountancy 39. 
100 Badgerhill Properties v Cottrell [1991] BCC 463. 
101 Griffiths, "Trading names, misprints and the risk of personal liability", (1992) 13 Co 
Law 102 and also "Contracts with non-existent or wrongly named companies", (1992) 
136 SJ 186. 
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S.117(8) of the Companies Act 1985 (UK) also imposes personal 
liability on corporate officials where a newly incorporated public limited 
company conducts business or borrows prior to complying with certain 
statutory particulars. No similar provision exists in Australia and the 
provision is of limited practical significance. 102 
4.3.4 The liability of directors of corporate trustees 
S.233 of the Corporations Law provides that directors of a corporate 
trustee will be jointly and severally liable with the corporation for a debt 
incurred by it whilst they were directors in circumstances where the 
corporation was not entitled as trustee to be fully indemnified out of the 
trust assets with respect to the liability. Although this is a rather specific 
provision it does provide another example of circumstances where the 
privilege of limited liability will be rescinded. The provision owes its 
existence to the fact that a trustee may choose between paying trust 
expenses and then claiming on its indemnity or paying the expenses 
directly from trust funds. In certain circumstances where it adopts the 
former strategy it may be prevented from claiming on its indemnity 
where it has not properly incurred the expense in the performance of its 
trust obligations. For example, it may have acted in excess of its 
powers or in breach of its duty to execute the trust with reasonable 
diligence and care. Where the trustee is a two dollar company then it 
will be the creditors who will suffer in the event that the trustee has lost 
its entitlement to indemnity. Neither the common law nor the other 
statutory provisions could avail a creditor in such circumstances and 
accordingly S.233 was enacted. 
General application of "who takes the benefits must bear the burdens" 
principle 
In this context a common law principle which enables creditors to 
pursue beneficiaries of trading trusts for debts of the trust should be 
mentioned. It has been held that the trustee's right of indemnity 
extends to beneficiaries personally where the trustee is a bare 
trustee, 103 where he accepted the trust at the request of the 
beneficiaries 104 or where the beneficiaries created the trust. 105 The 
importance of this is that by virtue of the doctrine of subrogation these 
rights may be transferred to creditors, thereby providing the creditor of 
102 See Gower, 117-118. 
103 Hardoon v Belilios [1901] AC 118. 
104 Jervis v Wolferstan (1874) LA 18 Eq 18 at 24; JW Broomhead (Vic) Pty Ltd (in liq) v 
JW Broomhead [1985] VR 891, discussed in (1981) 13 MULR 1. 
105 Matthews v Ruggles - Brise [1911] 1 Ch 194. 
Page 48 
Chapter 2 
Creditors' Recovery Rights 
a trading trust with a direct remedy against the beneficiaries. 106 This 
principle derives from the equitable maxim that those who take the 
benefits of a trust must also bear its burdens. The essential element is 
that the trust was established at the instigation of the beneficiaries. 
Given the equitable origins of company law the question which merits 
some discussion is whether this principle could be extended to a 
normal trading company arrangement. 
Firstly no issue of indemnity or subrogation arises as the creditors' 
contracts will be with the company directly, the directors acting merely 
in a representative capacity when dealing with the creditors. 
It is true that the average company can be characterized as having 
been created at the instigation of its shareholders, who in the case of 
small private companies will normally be the directors in any event. 
However to go further and argue that therefore the shareholders who 
ultimately share the benefits derived by the company should bear its 
burdens, in the sense of making good any deficiency on liquidation, is 
arguably to go too far and to run contrary to fundamental principles of 
company law. In effect this principle is already operational by virtue of 
the fact that shareholders risk their paid-up capital and will be required 
to satisfy any issued but uncalled capital should the company go into 
insolvent liquidation. Thus, the equitable maxim is given effect to but 
tempered to allow some scope for the doctrine of limited liability. In this 
way the competing principles are reconciled, a reconciliation which 
would be endangered if the principle supporting the cases referred to 
above were extended from trading trusts to trading companies. 
4.3.5 Defaulting officer provisions 
Companies legislation typically contains provisions designed to impose 
liability on defaulting or delinquent officers. Traditionally these 
provisions have imposed both a criminal sanction and a civil liability for 
the same conduct. From a creditor's perspective the criminal aspect is 
only relevant in so far as the criminal courts have interpreted the 
elements common to the cause of action and to the criminal offence 
and to the extent that a conviction may be of assistance or necessary 
in establishing a civil liability. 
106 The limitations to this principle are discussed in Chalmers, Introduction to Trusts, The 
Law Book Co Ltd 1988 at p.203. 
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In the 1862 Act only one delinquent officer provision was enacted. 107 
This provision was know as the "misfeasance" provision. Although 
there was some initial doubt it was subsequently interpreted as 
providing a summary remedy for those who had suffered loss as a 
result of misfeasance or breach of trust by corporate officials. 
Gradually, with the enactment of new provisions providing causes of 
action designed to counter specific abuses, the application of the 
misfeasance provision fell into decline. However, with the derivation of 
a duty owed to creditors by corporate officials this provision has taken 
on a new significance. The development of this duty and of the 
misfeasance provision will be considered in chapters 3 and 4 
respectively. 
Most important of the provisions providing causes of action against 
corporate officials in specific situations are the fraudulent and 
reckless/wrongful trading provisions now to be found in most 
companies legislation. These provisions are directly aimed at imposing 
liability on corporate officials for unacceptable conduct which has 
resulted in loss to creditors. As Gower has stated with reference to the 
fraudulent trading provision: 
"There is no doubt that in practice this section represents a potent 
weapon in the hands of creditors which exercises a restraining 
influence on over-sanguine directors ... Of all the exceptions to the rule 
in Salomons case it is probably the most serious attempt which has yet 
been made to protect creditors ..."108 
This comment predated the enactment of the wrongful trading provision 
in the United Kingdom which is an even more serious attempt to protect 
creditors. 
In chapters 5 and 6 the development of these provisions will be 
examined in detail, with the developments leading to the recent 
enactment of the Australian insolvent trading provision considered in 
chapter 10. 
4.3.6 The liability of disqualified directors 
Legislation exists in the United Kingdom 109 imposing personal liability 
for corporate debts on a person who acts as a director of a company 
within twelve months of it going into insolvent liquidation and who 
107 S.165. 
108 Op. cit. (4th ed), 115-116. 
109 Also now see S.588Z of the Corporations Law, inserted by the Corporate Law Reform 
Act 1992 with effect from 24 June 1993. 
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during the subsequent five years is concerned with a company trading 
under the same or similar name, or who in contravention of a 
disqualification order, has been involved in the management of a 
company.ilo Such a person is jointly and severally liable with the 
company in respect of debts incurred whilst they were so involved. 
Liability is also imposed on undischarged bankrupts who become 
involved in the management of a company. 
Personal liability is also imposed on persons involved in the 
management of a company who take instructions from persons whom 
they know to be subject to the application of these provisions. 
4.3.7 S.1324 of the Corporations Law 
Since 1980 the Australian company legislation has contained a 
provision authorising, amongst others, a person "whose interests have 
been, are or would be affected" by conduct contravening the 
companies law to apply for an injunction or other relief, such as 
damages. 111 
This provision is clearly very broad and, on the face of it, has the 
potential of providing an avenue by which to pierce the corporate veil. 
This has been recognised by commentators 112 but not, it would appear, 
potential applicants and the scope of the provision has remained 
untested. 
Specifically in the context of a creditor, the viability of whose interest 
has been threatened by corporate conduct, the provision affords a 
potential avenue of redress against defaulting directors at, at least, 
three levels: 
(i) if the conduct has involved the directors in a breach of the 
Corporations Law, 
(ii) if the conduct has required the directors to take into account the 
interests of creditors and there is evidence that their interests 
have not been considered, and 
(iii) if the conduct has involved a breach of the duty owed to 
110 Insolvency Act 1986, S.216 and S.217 and Company Directors Disqualification Act 
1986, S.15 respectively. 
111 Initially S.574 of the Companies Code. 
112 See Baxt, "Will S.574 of the Companies Code please stand up! (and will S.1323 of the 
Corporations Act follow suit), (1989) 7 C&SLJ 388 and the articles there referred to at 
footnote 4. 
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creditors. 
Baxt has argued that the availability of a cause of action to creditors at 
the first and second levels is most unlikely but concedes that in the 
present state of flux in the law anything is possible. Whilst he would 
appear to acknowledge some scope for creditors to proceed at the third 
level much will depend on the scope of this duty which he argues would 
not be readily extended. 113 
Trethowan has also canvassed that potential reliance on S.1324 at the 
second and third levels. 114  Whilst conceding that a creditor has 
standing to proceed under S.1324 and that, furthermore, the provision 
authorises the awarding of damages irrespective of whether an 
injunction could properly be granted, she doubts whether the provision 
envisages any party other than the company affected as the 
appropriate beneficiary of any damages award. 
Certainly in the current state of the law it would be anomalous if 
creditors were to be permitted by the courts to proceed under S.1324 at 
any level. The bulk of authority does not recognise any duty to 
individual creditors. 115 Furthermore, to permit S.1324 to be interpreted 
broadly would raise the issue of its reconciliation with fundamental 
principles of corporate law as to the fiduciary responsibilities of 
directors. 116 
In any event for creditors of insolvent companies wishing to pursue 
nonfeasance, as distinct from misfeasance, against company directors 
the provision possibly contains a limitation namely that "conduct" be at 
issue. However it might be argued in a given set of circumstances that 
if there was a failure to take a particular step or steps then the residual 
"conduct" of the directors might nevertheless satisfy the requirement 
that there be a breach of the Corporations Law. 
Ultimately the importance of this provision in the context of creditor's 
rights may be that if the common law duty is developed to extend to 
individual creditors then, given the inherent restrictions in the S.598 
procedure, 117 S.1324 might provide the basis for the enforcement of 
113 Id, 398-400. 
114 Trethowan, "Directors' personal liability to creditors for company debts", (1992) 20 
ABLR 41, 56-59. 
115 See chapter 3. 
116 See the discussion in chapter 3 and, in particular, the cases referred to in footnote 3 of 
that chapter. 
117 See chapter 4. In particular creditors have no automatic standing to proceed under 
S.598. 
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this duty. 
4.3.8 Group company provisions 
It was observed earlier that the demands and contingencies of modern 
commerce have witnessed the development of the group company 
concept. It was observed that the common law has sought to reconcile 
the various interests of external parties and group entities by 
application of agency and equitable principles. 
Company legislation recognizes that a special relationship exists 
between group companies. 118  Examples of this recognition include: 
(i) the requirement that group accounts be filed, 119 
(ii) the prohibition on subsidiary companies holding shares in a 
parent company, 120 
(iii) restrictions on dealings between a company and directors of a 
related company, particularly in relation to the giving of loans, 121 
(iv) the prohibition on subsidiary companies providing financial 
assistance for the purchase of parent company shares, 122 and 
(v) the facilitation of schemes of arrangements involving the 
amalgamation of group companies. 123 
Obviously for these purposes the definition of "group company" is very 
important. The expression embraces the concepts of "holding" and 
"subsidiary" companies. These are dealt with in S.46 to S.50 of the 
Corporations Law and the essence is one of majority control or 
ownership. A similar approach has also been adopted in the United 
Kingdom where the definitions were recently altered to focus on control 
rather than ownership. 124 
Although these instances illustrate that the legislature acknowledges a 
118 See generally Ford, 161; Gower, 118 - 123 and Pennington's Company Law (5th 
edition) Butterworths, 1985 pp.799-806. 
119 Corporations Law, S.295. 
120 Corporations Law, S.185. 
121 Corporations Law, S.243A-S.243ZI. 
122 Corporations Law, S.205. 
123 Corporations Law, S.410-S.415A, particularly S.411(1A) and S.413. 
124 The purpose and nature of the amendment is discussed in: Walsh and Rees, 
"Subsidiary undertakings and subsidiary in the Companies Bill 1989", (1989) 10 Co 
Law 195. Also see chapter 7. 
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financial convergence between the interests of a subsidiary and of a 
parent company, only in recent times has legislation been proposed in 
Australia enabling creditors of a subsidiary some recourse against the 
resources of the group. These proposals have included provisions 
which operate to impose liability on companies for the debts of related 
insolvent companies and those which require the pooling of assets of 
related companies where they are being wound up. These 
developments are considered in chapter 7. 
4.3.9 Commenda provisions 
S.218(2) of the Uniform Companies Acts provided for a company to be 
formed on the basis that the directors would be subject to unlimited 
liability to contribute to the company for the payment of its debts upon a 
winding-up. Although this provision has not been retained in the current 
legislation it would no doubt be possible to provide for such liability in 
the articles. 125 
4.3.10 Trade Practices Act - misleading or deceptive conduct _ 
It is conceivable that a debt might be incurred by a company in 
circumstances where a company official has engaged in misleading or 
deceptive conduct in breach of S.42 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 
and is, accordingly, liable to the company's creditor in an ancillary 
capacity. 126 Alternatively such an official might be primarily liable for 
such conduct under the corresponding provisions of the 
complementary State fair trading legislation. 127 
Clearly such a cause of action would require proof of conduct that is 
misleading or deceptive or calculated to mislead or deceive. It is 
arguable that a failure, during precontractual negotiations, to disclose 
to the creditor a company's precarious financial position could satisfy 
this requirement. 
Trethowan has assembled the authorities on whether silence can 
amount to misleading or deceptive conduct. 128  She concludes that, 
whilst the matter is not free from doubt, failure to inform a potential 
125 Also see S.306 Companies Act 1985 (UK). 
126 Under S. 75B. 
127 Fair Trading Act 1985 (Vic), S.11; Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW), S.42; Fair Trading 
Act 1989 (Qld), S.38; Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA), S.56; Fair Trading Act 1987 (WA), 
S.10; Fair Trading Act 1990 (Tas), S.14, Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Act 1990 
(NT), S.42. 
128 "Directors' personal liability to creditors for company debts", (1992) 20 ABLR 41, 71- 
73. 
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creditor that the company may not be able to repay the debt may 
amount to a representation. Furthermore deeming provisions exist to 
the effect that such a representation would be deemed to be 
misleading in the absence of reasonable grounds for making it. 129 The 
effect of this then would be to place the onus on the corporate official 
concerned to prove that reasonable grounds to expect that the debt 
would be paid did in fact exist. 
It would appear, however, that this position would be reserved to 
proceedings under the State fair trading legislation as where a 
company official is proceeded against under the Trade Practices Act 
there is authority to the effect that the official must be shown to have 
been aware of the company's financial position. That is, there is a 
mens rea requirement. 130 
To the extent that the application of the consumer protection legislation 
in these circumstances might appear surprising, this suggests a 
potential barrier to the application of these provisions to insolvent 
companies. The legislation is directed at consumer protection and, 
accordingly, the courts may be hesitant, on policy grounds, to extend 
its application to debt recovery, particularly where the effect is to 
undermine corporate personality. 
There are a number of cases in which the courts have examined the 
limits of the legislation. 131 Whilst the better view would appear to be that 
the conduct at issue need not affect a "consumer" it must be of a 
trading and commercial character. Whilst this caveat clearly would 
have no application in the context under consideration this does 
illustrate that •the courts are prepared to contemplate limits to the 
application of the provisions and it may be that on the policy grounds 
described above, the provisions may not be permitted to extend to debt 
recovery from corporate officials. 
4.3.11 Other statutory provisions 
There are many instances scattered throughout the statute books 
where corporate identity is pierced for various reasons. In some 
instances these provisions may have the effect of imposing a corporate 
obligation on the members or officials of the company. 132 Apart from the 
129 S.51A, Trade Practices Act (1975)(C/W). 
130 Trethowan, op. cit. 76. 
131 See Trethowan, op. cit. 73-76. 
132 See Gower, 123-124. The voidable preference provisions may in some circumstances 
also provide creditors with a means of redress against corporate members or officials. 
Also see Equity and Commercial Relations Ch. 5, p.120, "Directors Duties and the 
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companies legislation the most notable circumstance in which this 
occurs is in the context of taxation. 133 
Tax legislation 
There are a variety of situations where the tax laws look behind the 
corporate identity whether for the purpose of the recovery of a debt or 
unpaid tax or for other purposes. Examples provided by the Australian 
income tax laws are the treatment of dividends, 134 group companies, 136 
loans and payments by companies to shareholders and their 
associates, 136 and rolled over assets. 137 
Of course any such provisions are relevant to only one creditor, namely 
the relevant taxing authority. Nevertheless, as will be explored in 
chapters 9 and 1 1 , reference to this legislation may provide an insight 
into useful reform possibilities which can be applied in the context of a 
general creditor recovery regime. With this in mind it is appropriate to 
make reference to the most significant tax law principles in this regard, 
namely the anti-avoidance provisions. 
Anti-avoidance provisions 
Arguably the most encompassing recognition of the intimate 
relationship between companies and their controllers is contained in 
the anti-avoidance mechanisms to be found in tax laws. It would 
appear that where the government by the agency of its revenue 
collecting authority is a creditor then special consideration is to be 
given to the enforcement and collection of the debt. These 
mechanisms may be either specific or general. Specific anti-avoidance 
provisions proliferate in the tax legislation. Such provisions are 
normally enacted in response to schemes that have come to light and 
are often precise and stringent in their application. 138 
Company's Interests" by Heydon, Law Book Company 1987, pp.133-134. 
133 This analysis will be restricted to a consideration of income taxation principles. Most 
taxation regimes contain provisions which look behind the corporate veil in certain 
circumstances. 
134 In Australia dividends are taxed but shareholders receive a credit for the tax paid on 
the underlying company profits. In effect the company is treated as the agent of the 
shareholders, having paid tax in advance on their behalf. 
135 Companies are entitled to a rebate on the tax paid on dividend income derived by 
them. Concessional tax treatment is also extended to enable group companies to 
transfer assets, tax losses and other tax concessions between them. 
136 Provisions exist to restrict such payments because it is recognized that the close 
association between the parties could be used to reduce the incidence of taxation. 
137 In Australia the relationship between companies and their controllers is recognized by 
virtue of provisions enabling assets to be transferred between companies or from an 
individual to a company without attracting any adverse taxation consequences. 
138 Examples of schemes which have resulted in amendments to the Australian legislation 
in the nature of veil lifting provisions include dividend stripping schemes, bottom of the 
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The general anti-avoidance mechanisms are particularly savage in their 
treatment of the corporate form and the privilege of limited liability. The 
legislation does not hesitate to impose personal liability on corporate 
officials or members for corporate tax obligations. The purpose of such 
legislation is to prevent the avoidance of taxation liabilities and give 
effect to the true intent of the tax legislation. It would appear that the 
policy that all citizens should pay their dues takes precedence over the 
policy of promoting enterprise through the provision of limited liability. 
The general anti-avoidance mechanisms in place in both the United 
Kingdom and Australia illustrate this proposition. In the United Kingdom 
one of the major anti-avoidance mechanisms was created by the 
judiciary in response to various capital transfer tax avoidance 
techniques. It is known as the doctrine of fiscal nullity. 139 Pursuant to 
this doctrine a court is, for the purposes of taxation, to give effect to the 
substance of an arrangement rather than its form. That is, the court 
may look behind the formal legal arrangement and impose tax liability 
on the relevant taxpayer on the basis of the true economic effect of the 
arrangement. In other words, where the court concludes that a complex 
arrangement was established in order to minimise the incidence of 
taxation the aspects of the arrangement that have no economic effect 
or justification other than to facilitate the avoidance of taxation can be 
ignored. Clearly circumstances could arise where the application of this 
doctrine may result in a corporate identity being ignored and the 
taxation liability of the corporation assessed to its controllers. 
A similar effect has been achieved in Australia by virtue of Part IVA of 
the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. These provisions 
provide the Federal Tax Commissioner with an extremely wide 
discretion to disregard or reconstruct features of an arrangement where 
the dominant purpose of the arrangement, objectively determined, is to 
provide the relevant taxpayer with a tax benefit. The powers of 
reconstruction appear to be extremely wide and unfettered. Again the 
application of these provisions may result in the existence of a 
corporation being disregarded for tax purposes and liability imposed 
upon its controllers. 
harbour schemes and Curran schemes, all being arrangements whereby shareholders 
sought to avoid tax liabilities in relation to their corporate investments. 
139 Ramsay v IR Commis [1982] AC 300; IR Commis v Burmah Oil Co [1982] STC 300; 
Furniss v Dawson [1984] 2 WLR 226; IR Commrs v Bowater Property Developments 
Ltd; Baylis v Gregory [1989] AC 398; [1988] 3 All ER 495. Where the Inland Revenue 
is involved the courts appear to be more ready to pierce the corporate veil. See the 
discussion by Whincup in "Inequitable Incorporation - the abuse of a Privilege", (1981) 
2 Co Law 158, 159. 
Page 57 
Chapter 2 
Creditors Recovery Rights 
Although the United Kingdom doctrine and Australian provisions 
obviously cannot assist any creditors other than the relevant taxing 
authorities they do provide an illustration of one potential means of 
combating abuses of the corporate form and protecting creditors. 
Indeed the doctrine of fiscal nullity displays similarities to the business 
realities doctrine enunciated by Lord Denning in the DHN Food 
Distributors case. 
Similarly it is arguable that the Australian provisions may provide a 
focus for future legislative development. For example, a legislative 
scheme could be envisaged whereby the court would be empowered to 
ignore the corporate form in favour of creditors where objectively 
determined it was established that a corporate business was conducted 
in such a manner as to enable certain unacceptable benefits to be 
obtained. Indeed the legislation to date is, arguably, merely illustrative 
of the various unacceptable benefits which such legislation might seek 
to prevent. Furthermore the objective factors which might be referred to 
in order to ascertain the intent of the scheme are already embodied in 
the current legislation or at least in the rules for the application of the 
legislation established by the courts. For example, one such factor 
might be whether the company is thinly capitalised, a factor which is, 
arguably, inherently recognised as a relevant consideration in most of 
the existing creditor recovery mechanisms. 140 
The problem with the adoption of these tax law principles in the 
company law arena is that different considerations and policies have 
shaped the tax principles. The public benefit in promoting the corporate 
form and the privilege of limited liability together with the need to weigh 
up the respective rights of corporate management and investors 
against those of third parties, in particular creditors, are not relevant 
considerations when deriving taxation principles. On the other hand, 
the policy of ensuring that each citizen pays his share of public dues 
and that the government has sufficient revenue with which to function 
are factors which are taken into account but have no place in the 
company law arena. 
This is well illustrated by the DHN Food Distributors principle, a major 
criticism of which is that its limits are too imprecisely defined. Thus, 
whilst clearly of relevance, the significance of tax law principles to the 
future development of creditors' rights ought not be overstated. 
140 See chapter 9, section 6. 
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5. 	Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the origins of the relationship between 
incorporation and limited liability together with the origins of their 
abuse. It was observed that because of the deficiencies of the original 
companies legislation and the unwillingness of the courts to depart 
from a literal interpretation of the legislation, abuse of the privilege of 
limited liability was allowed to flourish at the expense of creditors. 
Creditors were expected to protect themselves or, as a last resort, to 
rely on the limited exceptions to the corporate identity principle 
established at common law. 
No common thread 
It was observed that, over time, creditors were provided with other 
legislative and common law avenues of recovery from corporate 
controllers. These various avenues were identified, namely the 
common law causes of action and exceptions to the corporate identity 
principle, contractual and tortious causes of action, and legislative 
provisions. It was observed that neither the common law exceptions 
nor the legislative provisions revealed any common thread. The most 
that could be said was that the judiciary tended to embrace the 
exceptions where the justice demanded it, whilst the legislature had 
become increasingly aware of the need to extend the potential liability 
of corporate controllers. Developments in torts law provided some 
scope for the imposition of liability on corporate officials although the 
real significance of these developments was likely to be in the context 
of group companies where the legislature has been slow to react and 
the common law exceptions have proved inadequate. 
This lack of coherency or central theme in the avenues providing 
recourse to the controllers of companies is undesirable. Each category 
of exception to the limited liability and incorporation principles has 
developed, typically in response to a particular malaise, without regard 
to the over-all balance between the need to promote entrepreneurial 
behaviour and the need to provide creditors with a recovery regime. 
Whilst, over time, the position of creditors would appear to have 
strengthened there is every possibility that the independent 
development of each of these ad hoc categories could, if it has not 
already done so, result in the stimulation of entrepreneurial behaviour 
being excessively stifled. 
If we are to establish a coherent creditor recovery regime based on a 
central theme then what is this theme and how should it find legislative 
expression? In particular do the primary categories of creditor redress 
provide any insight in to the answers to these questions? Should these 
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categories feature in such a regime, and if so, what reforms, if any, are 
required to them? 
It is proposed in chapters 3 to 8 to consider the major avenues for 
recovery available to creditors in more detail with a view to formulating 
a framework for future development in chapter 9. The Government's 
recent reforms will be identified in chapter 10, with these reforms 
analysed, from the perspective of the chapter 9 conclusions, in chapter 
11. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE COMMON LAW FIDUCIARY DUTY TO CREDITORS 
"... when these ghosts of the past stand in the path of justice clanking 
their medieval chains the proper course for the judge is to pass through 
them undeterred". 
Lord Atkin, 
United Australia Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1941] AC 1, 29. 
1. Introduction 
It was observed in chapter 2 that the protection of creditors of limited 
liability companies was initially entrusted to the disclosure 
requirements of the legislation together with the common law remedies 
against corporate controllers. Whilst these common law remedies 
extended to fraud, the remedies for breach of trust and misfeasance 
were typically not available to creditors. Such remedies resided in the 
company and where there was an assimilation between management 
and the shareholders then in the absence of a liquidator being 
appointed, it was unlikely that these remedies would be enforced 
against corporate management to the advantage of the creditors) 
The inadequacies of the legislative response to the provision of a 
creditor recovery regime has ensured that the common law remedies 
have retained their importance. Recently the judiciary responded to 
these inadequacies with the derivation of a duty owed by company 
directors to creditors. This duty has its origins in the fiduciary 
responsibilities of directors to their company. The duty to creditors is 
perceived as arising only at such time as the company becomes 
insolvent at which time the interests of the company become immeshed 
with those of its creditors. Consistent with this rationalisation the duty 
is not owed directly to the creditors but is owed to the insolvent 
company. 
1 	Even when a liquidator was appointed there remained the issue of whether the breach 
of trust or misfeasance was actionable where the company had ratified the directors' 
conduct. Furthermore not all conduct damaging to creditors was actionable by the 
company. This is discussed further in chapter 4. 
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The extent of the development of this duty is examined in this chapter. 
It will be observed that, notwithstanding the restrictive nature of this 
development, criticism directed at its incompatibility with traditional 
jurisprudence has been most vehement. Whilst a reconciliation with 
traditional analysis can be supported if the interests underlying a 
company are viewed as liable to change upon the insolvency of the 
company, many of these criticisms remain unanswered. 
In these circumstances it will be argued that this judicial creation ought 
not to feature in a creditor recovery regime. On the other hand, this 
development serves to emphasize the significance for creditors' 
interests of the event of insolvency and highlights this as a central 
consideration in defining a creditor recovery regime. There is a need to 
recognise the change in the interests underlying a company upon 
insolvency or, stated differently, the risk transfer that occurs in a limited 
liability company. 
Furthermore the fact that the cases supporting the existence of the duty 
all feature closely held companies may suggest that it is in this context 
that the legislative recovery regime is most inadequate and that, 
possibly, different considerations apply to these companies than apply 
to other types of companies. 
The criticisms of the duty also emphasise that the categories of 
creditors differ thereby supporting the view that creditors are not a 
homogeneous group. This is a relevant consideration in determining 
whether a collective regime or one which permits individual creditors a 
cause of action ought be established. The inadequacies of the judicial 
response to resolving this issue in relation to the common law duty 
serves to emphasise the need to determine the issue one way or the 
other in respect to future legislative reforms. 
Other considerations relevant to the reform agenda highlighted by the 
common law developments include a recognition that the development 
of a creditor recovery regime must have regard to the need to maintain 
the integrity of the law and be reconcilable and consistent with both 
underlying principles and the manner in which these find expression. 
Reforms must also have regard to the importance of ensuring a 
balance between the promotion of entrepreneurial activity and the 
protection of creditors. 
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2. 	Australasian Origins of the Duty 
2.1 What is meant by acting in the best "interests" of the 
company? 
The equitable origins of company law place company directors in a 
fiduciary relationship with their company. Thus they are regarded as 
owing a duty to their company to act in good faith. In other words to 
"act honestly for the benefit of the company they represent".2 
From an early date creditors of companies seized on these equitable 
notions to argue the existence of a trust relationship between them and 
company directors. The basis for this argument was the special 
position of directors, namely that the only way the company could act 
was through its directors. Such an argument persuaded one member of 
the English Court of Appeal in Wilson v Lord Bury and Others3 but the 
majority rejected any notion that directors were under other liabilities to 
dealers with a company than normal servants of the company. 
Nevertheless the split decision in this case was an early sign of the 
underlying tension that was to shape future development. 
This development was to hinge on the interpretation of what was in the 
best interests of a company and on the meaning of the term "company" 
itself. Was not the placating of creditors in the best interests of the 
company or might it not be said that debt participants were as much 
part of the company as equity participants? 
Duty owed to members only 
The initial judicial response was restrictive. The duty was owed to the 
company, meaning the members or corporators 4 , and to them alone. 
No duty was owed to employees, customers, creditors or even the 
nation. In fact, should directors consider the interests of these other 
parties then they were liable to impeachment for breach of their duties. 
This point is graphically illustrated by the decision in Dodge v Ford 
Motor Co5 . In a commendable spirit of altruism Henry Ford determined 
to utilise surplus company funds to reduce prices in order to make the 
motor car accessible to all. In his words: 
2 	Lagunas Nitrate Co v Lagunas Syndicate [1899] 2 Ch 392, 435. 
3 	[1880] QB 518. Also see In re Wincham Shipbuilding, Boiler and Salt Company 
(1879) 9 Ch D 322 at 328-329, In re H Linney & Co Ltd [1925] NZLR 907 at 922 and 
In re JE Hurdley & Son Limited (in liq) [1941] NZLR 686 at 726. But cf. Re National 
Funds Assurance Co (1878) 10 Ch D 118 and In re B Johnson & Co [1955] Ch 634 at 
791. Most recently see the Privy Council decision in Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National 
Mutual Life Nominees Ltd [1990] BCLC 868. 
4 	Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas [1951] Ch 286, 291. 
5 	(1919) 170 NW 668 . 
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"My ambition is to employ still more men, to spread the benefits of this 
industrial system to the greatest possible number to help them build up 
their lives and their homes. To do this we are putting the greatest share 
of our profits back into the business". 6 
This ambition was apparently not shared by all the shareholders, two of 
whom sought to force a dividend distribution from the company. In an 
affirmation of the strict approach the Court found that Ford's behaviour 
was an illegitimate exercise of management powers. It was not for 
directors to conduct the affairs of the company to benefit anyone other 
than the shareholders. 
Forty years later this view was still prevalent. In Parke v Daily News 
Ltd a board of directors were reprimanded for giving undue weight to 
the welfare of the employees of the company. This was not a proper 
management concern. 8 
Similarly the position of creditors was not the concern of directors. 
Then in 1974 Mason J., in an often cited passage from his judgment in 
Walker v Wimbome, stated: 
"...it should be emphasised that the directors of a company in 
discharging their duty to the company must take account of the 
interests of its shareholders and its creditors. Any failure by the 
directors to take into account the interests of the creditors will have 
adverse consequences for the company as well as for them". 9 
Walker v Wimbome concerned a misfeasance summons issued by a 
liquidator against directors of a group of companies who had adopted 
the practice of moving funds between the companies as exigencies 
demanded. Read in this context his Honour's comments are a 
condemnation of this practice. However much more has been made of 
this passage. 
6 	Ibid. 
7 	[1962] Ch 927. 
8 	Contrast Cmnd 5391, paras 55 to 59. 
9 	(1976) 137 CLR 7. 
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2.2 A duty owed to creditors 
The last decade has witnessed a gradual revolution in the !awl° as to 
the requirements to satisfy directors' fiduciary duties. Since the 
judgment of Mason J. in Walker v Wimbomell it has been recognised 
that in some circumstances the performance of duties by directors will 
require them to take into account the interests of creditors. Recent 
cases have expanded on this proposition and in particular examined 
the circumstances where the interests of creditors become relevant. 
The result has been the formulation of a duty owed by directors to 
creditors. 12 
Landmark decision - Nicholson & Others v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd (in Liq) 
With the exception of a number of minor incursions into the subject13 
the judiciary did not at first place much significance on the judgment of 
Mason J. However in a landmark decision in 1985 the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal in Nicholson & Others v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd (in Liq) 14 
examined what authority there was and concluded that directors are 
required to take into account the interests of creditors where: 
"... the company is insolvent or near insolvent, or of doubtful solvency, 
or if a contemplated payment or other course of action would 
jeopardise its solvency". 15 
The Court was of the view that where a company is in a situation of 
marginal commercial solvency creditors were to be seen as beneficially 
interested in the company. This duty did not extend to future new 
creditors but where continuing creditors were concerned, if at the time 
10 	Some would call it a "silent and paradoxical revolution". See the casenote by Dawson 
[1984] NZULR 68 at p.77. 
11 	(1976) 137 CLR 7. Discussed in a note in (1976) 50 All 591. 
12 	It has been argued that this formulation of a duty derives from a misconception of the 
comments made by Mason J. His Honour was not enunciating a separate duty to 
creditors but simply recognising that sometimes the best interests of the company 
require paying attention to the interests of creditors. See Heydon, "Directors' Duties 
and the Company's Interests", in Finn (ed), Equity and Commercial Relationships, 
Chapter 5, at p 120, Law Book Co North Ryde NSW 1987. Sometimes the decision is 
referred to as authority for this more narrow proposition, for example see ANZ 
Executors & Trustees Co Ltd v Qintex Australia Ltd (1990) 8 ACLR 980. 
13 For example: Re Avon Chambers Ltd. [1978] 2 NZLR 638, Re Day-Nite Carriers Ltd 
[1975] 1 NZLR 172, Ring v Sutton (1980) 5 ACLR 546, Wright v Frisina (1983) 7 
ACLR 532, Morgan v Flavel (1983) 1 ACLC 831 at 838, Hurley v BGH Nominees Pty 
Ltd (1984) 2 ACLC 497 discussed by Barrett in (1985) 59 All 46, Re 67 Budd Street 
Pty Ltd & Ors, The Commonwealth v O'Reilly (1984) 2 ACLC 190 at 197. But see 
Grove v Flavel (1986) 4 ACLC 654. 
14 (1985) 3 ACLC 453. 
15 	Per Cooke J. at p. 459. Applied in Hilton International Limited (in liq) v Hilton & Anor 
(1988) 4 NZCLC 64, 721 and David Neil & Company Ltd v Neil (1986) 3 NZCLC 
99,658. 
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of the payment in question the directors "should have appreciated" or 
"ought to have known" 16 that the payment was likely to cause loss to 
these creditors or threaten the continued existence of the company, 
then the payment constituted a misfeasance by the directors. 
It is clear from the judgments handed down in the Nicholson case that 
in deciding when the duty to take into account the interests of creditors 
arises a distinction must be drawn between solvent and insolvent 
companies. However the Court noted that in the intermediate situation 
of near insolvency or doubtful solvency greater difficulties of legal 
principle arise. As the evidence before the Court indicated that the 
company was solvent at the relevant time the Court was able to avoid 
deciding this difficult question. 
Cooke J. gives some indication as to the possible source of the duty 
being in the tort of negligence. 17 However this presents conceptual 
difficulties because it is the director's primary role to take risks, not to 
take care 18 . On the other hand, whilst it can be conceded that there 
are conceptual difficulties with sourcing the _duty in negligence, tort 
principles may provide a more adequate basis from which to regulate 
the extension of liability in this context than general equitable principles 
and would overcome problems of locus standi for a creditor before 
winding-up. 19 This uncertainty as to the exact source of the duty 
foreshadows the nature of the criticisms that have been levied at it. 
16 	Per Cooke J. at p. 460. 
17 	Ibid. 
18 	See Sealy, "Directors' "Wider" Responsibilities - Problems Conceptual, Practical and 
Procedural", a paper presented to the Australian University Law Schools Association 
Conference at Monash University, August 1987; at p.11. Subsequently published in 
(1987) 13 Mon ULR 164. Also see Sealy, [1988] Cambridge 1-1 176. Sealy also 
demonstrates the difficulties in rationalising the source of the duty in contract or trust 
law. 
19 	Farrar, "The Obligations of a Company's Directors to its Creditors", an unpublished 
paper, Christchurch New Zealand, 1987 at p.11. Also see (1989) 4 Canta LA 12 at 19- 
20 and 31 and [1985] JnI of Bus L 413 at p.416. But contrast Prentice, "Creditor's 
interests and Director's Duties", (1990) 10 Oxford J Legal Stud 265 at 275. 
Worthington also criticises the theoretical foundation of the duty, but from a new 
perspective. She distinguishes the duty to act bona fide and in the interests of the 
company from the duty to act for proper purposes. Whilst the former duty is owned to 
the company the latter is arguably owned to a wider group, including creditors. She 
argues that creditors' interests are therefore protected by virtue of this latter duty and 
they may have transactions, in breach of this duty, avoided: "Directors' duties, 
creditors' rights and shareholder intervention", (1991) 18 MULR 121. 
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Australian endorsement - Kinsela & Another v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd 
(in liq) 
This decision was subsequently endorsed by the New South Wales 
Court of Appeal in Kinsela & Another v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd (in liq). 20 
At issue was whether a liquidator could set aside a lease taken out by 
the directors from the company at a reduced rental when the company 
was in the state of imminent collapse. It was clear from the facts that 
the purpose of the lease was to put assets beyond the reach of 
company creditors. 21 The Court in the course of unanimously upholding 
the liquidator's claim again emphasised the solvency/insolvency 
dichotomy. On the facts before them the company was clearly insolvent 
at the time of the transaction and so it was unnecessary to formulate a 
general test of the degree of financial instability which would impose 
upon directors an obligation to consider the interests of creditors. 
However, Street C.J., who gave the judgment of the Court conceded 
that: 
"the duty arises when a company is insolvent in as much as it is the 
creditors' money which is at risk in contrast to the shareholders' 
proprietary interests". 22 
His Honour noted the danger inherent in attempting to state any wide 
ranging principles given the varying nature of companies and the 
business they conduct. However subsequently the South Australian 
Court of Appeal encountered in Grove v Flavel23 facts which required 
them to delineate the degree of insolvency required to give rise to the 
duty. 
Insolvency requirement explored - Grove v Flavel 
The defendant who was a director of seven companies had been 
charged with seven breaches of the duty not to make improper use of 
information namely that a particular company was experiencing liquidity 
problems. The evidence was that the defendant armed with this 
knowledge had effected a "round robin" of cheques between the 
20 (1986) 4 ACLC 215. 
21 	Hill (1986) 60 All 525 at 527 queries the interaction of this "purpose" factor with the 
insolvency criterion. It is likely that the application of this purpose factor might involve 
considerable difficulties given that directors are required by this duty to balance the 
interest of shareholders and creditors. The difficulties in determining whether 
improper purposes were taken into account was considered in Whitehouse v Carlton 
Hotel Pty Ltd (1987) 61 ALJR 216. 
22 At page 223. Herzberg (1987) 5 C&SLJ 157 argues that the Kinsela case illustrates a 
new approach to tackling voidable preferences which significantly extends the scope 
to recover such preferences and improves the position of creditors. To the extent that 
it effects an extension to directors duties he would like to see these duties extended 
even further (p.161). 
23 (1986) 4 ACLC 654. 
Page 68 
Chapter 3 
Duty to Creditors 
company concerned, himself and certain debtor and creditor 
companies which he controlled. The result was that the debt to the 
defendant was reduced and the director and companies which were 
previously debtors of the troubled company became debtors of another 
company which had previously been a creditor of the troubled 
company. That is the troubled company was effectively extracted from 
the arrangement leaving certain debtor and creditor companies in a 
direct relationship. 
The issue before the Full Court was whether by reference to the 
defendant's duties as a director there was an "improper use of 
information". 
The Court concluded that there was an "improper use" if there was 
conduct inconsistent with the proper discharge of the duties of the 
officer concerned. There had been conduct by the defendant which 
was to the possible detriment of the creditors of the company. The 
difficulty was however that there was no evidence that the company 
was insolvent at the time of the transactions and so it was arguable that 
there was no duty to take into account the interests of creditors. 
Jacobs J., who gave the judgment of the Court, examined the earlier 
authorities. His Honour noted that the company concerned in Walker v 
Wimbome24 was in fact insolvent at the time of the impugned 
transactions but otherwise there was nothing in the judgment of Mason 
J. to suggest that it is insolvency that gives rise to the duty. 
His Honour also noted that the decision in Ring v Sutton25 was a case 
where the challenged transaction was entered into at the time the 
company was solvent. However his Honour rejected this case as 
authority for the proposition contended by the liquidator that there is a 
duty owed to creditors independently of insolvency or financial 
instability. Rather his Honour viewed this case as an application of the 
general principle that the duty is to act in the interests of the company 
as a whole. 
It is submitted that this aspect of the judgment is tenuous relying as it 
does upon a vague and inconclusive passage in the judgment of the 
New South Wales Court of Appeal in Ring v Sutton. 26 It is, with respect, 
24 (1976) 137 CLR 7. 
25 (1980-1981) 5 ACLR 546. 
26 The passage is quoted at p. 654 of the judgment of Jacobs J. It reads: "None of the 
three transactions was for the benefit of the company, their terms as to interest were 
detrimental to the company and were arrived at for the benefit of the respondent and 
the respondent was able to procure the terms because of his position as director." 
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clear that their Honours were addressing the aspect of the directors' 
duty to creditors. Their Honours quoted from the relevant passages in 
the judgment of Mason J. in Walker v Wimbome. Furthermore the 
following passage can be found in the judgment of Hope J.A., who 
gave the leading judgment: 
"The present case is one that concerns the interests of creditors and it 
has not been nor could it be suggested that they approved or affirmed 
the terms of the loan contracts." 27 
This passage was in response to the argument that the shareholders 
had consented to the loan agreements and therefore the liquidator 
could not complain. The fact that the Court rejected this argument 
gives further weight to the view that the breach of duty at issue was a 
breach of duty owed to creditors and therefore the conduct of the 
shareholders was irrelevant. 28 
In any event to the extent to which Ring v Sutton is authority for the 
proposition that a duty to creditors is owed by directors of a solvent 
company it is inconsistent with the narrower duty propounded by the 
authorities referred to above. 
Jacobs J. also referred to the judgment of Wallace J. in Wright v 
Frisina29 which he cites as authority for the proposition that a director 
may be in breach of his duty even though he knows only that the 
company is facing financial difficulties. 
Finally, his Honour referred to the Nicholson case39 and the Kinsela 
case31 noting that the solvency/insolvency distinction was not rigidly 
applied especially by Cooke J. in the former case whose judgment was 
cited with approval by Street C.J. in the latter case. In the event his 
Honour concluded that not only does the duty to creditors arise when 
the company is known to be insolvent but also arises where the director 
has "knowledge of a real risk of insolvency". 32 Whether there is such a 
real and perceived risk of insolvency must depend upon the facts of the 
particular case. 
His Honour noted that the effect of the conduct at issue was to involve 
a disposition of the assets of the company in the form of debtors. This 
27 At page 548. 
28 Also see the note in (1982) 56 All 189. 
29 (1983) 1 ACLC 716. 
30 (1985) 3 ACLC 453. 
31 	(1986) 4 ACLC 215. 
32 At 663. 
Page 70 
Chapter 3 
Duty to Creditors 
conduct constituted a possible detriment to creditors. Accordingly, 
notwithstanding that the company was not shown to have been 
insolvent, the conduct amounted to an improper use of information. In 
the words of his Honour: 
"A director of a company X limited who, upon acquiring information 
which leads him to believe that the company faces a risk of liquidation - 
whether voluntary and because it cannot pay its debts as they fall due 
or at the suit of the creditors - which is a real and not a remote risk, 
thereupon acts to protect himself and other companies of which he is a 
director from the consequences of such liquidation to the possible 
detriment of the creditors of X limited, is acting "improperly". 33 
Clearly this case effected an extension of the duty owed to creditors. 
On the authority of this case a liquidator has a cause of action against 
a director who entered into a transaction at a time when he perceived 
that the company was in financial difficulties and a creditor of the 
company suffers loss as a result of the transaction. 34 
Duty to present and future creditors - Jeffree v NCSC 
This decision was endorsed by the Western Australian Full Court in 
Jeffree v National Companies & Securities Commission35 in 
circumstances where a business had been transferred to another 
company for the purpose of avoiding a prospective liability. The 
importance of this decision is the recognition that the duty owed by 
directors extends to both present and future (or contingent) creditors. 
Such a rationalisation of the duty had been suggested in a United 
Kingdom decision which had been criticised as going too far and 
placing a too onerous duty on directors. 36 Similar criticisms have been 
levied against this decision. 37 
33 At 662-663. 
34 Applied in McNamara v Flavel (1988) 6 ACLC 802. 
35 (1989) 15 ACLR 217; 7 ACLC 556. 
36 Winkworth v Edward Baron Development Co Ltd [1987] 1 All ER 114. See the 
discussion below and the commentators there referred to. 
37 	For example see: Baxt, "A Senior Australian Court gives the "thumbs up" to the 
Winkworth principle - directors owe a duty to creditors both present and future", (1989) 
7 C&SU 344, and the commentators he refers to. Also see Baxt (1989) 63 AU 846 
and (1990) 64 AU 345. 
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2.3 Cause of action for individual creditors? 
There is some support for the proposition that this duty provides 
individual creditors with a cause of action. Cooke J. stated in the 
Nicholson case: 
"The foregoing principles relate to actions by the company against 
directors, whether or not in truth brought by the liquidator. It does not 
exclude the possibility of an action by a particular creditor against the 
directors or the company for breach of a particular duty of care arising 
on ordinary negligence principles. ... But that is territory which need not 
be explored in the present case". 38 
The territory was also not explored in the Kinsela39 or Grovel° cases. 
Further scope to argue that individual creditors have a cause of action 
is provided by the NSW Supreme Court decision of Young J. in Hooker 
Investments Pty Ltd v. Email Ltd & 0rs41 . His Honour was required to 
rule on whether a statement of claim should be struck out. The matter 
concerned proceedings by a shareholder against directors for a breach 
of duty arising from a share issue. Young J., after stating the traditional 
view that normally the company is the proper plaintiff in such 
circumstances, noted that there was some support for the alternative 
view that a duty is owed by directors in these circumstances to 
individual shareholders or creditors. Alternatively it may be that there 
are a series of duties, some owed to the company, some owed to the 
shareholders and some owed to the creditors and that it is possible to 
sue in respect of each type of breach. 
His Honour considered various authorities, including the Kinsela42 and 
Nicholson.* cases and Coleman v Myers44 , and concluded that in the 
light of these decisions and in view of the way that the law of fiduciary 
duty is moving he was not able to say that it was unarguably clear that 
a shareholder himself has no personal cause of action in respect of a 
breach of duty by a director. 
Thus both this decision and the judgment of Cooke J. in the Nicholson 
case provide some support for the existence of a personal cause of 
38 Supra, 460. 
39 (1986) 4 ACLC 215. 
40 (1986) 4 ACLC 654. 
41 	(1986) 10 ACLR 443. 
42 (1986) 4 ACLC 215. 
43 (1985) 3 ACLC 453. 
44 [1977] 2 NZLR 225. 
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action for creditors.45 
There must be some doubt as to whether it would be desirable to 
provide individual creditors with a cause of action to enforce this duty, 
whether in a derivative form or otherwise, given the onerous 
responsibilities and duties already imposed on directors by legislation, 
in particular the reckless and fraudulent trading provisions contained in 
S.592 and S.593 of the Corporations Law. On the other hand, it would 
be anomalous for a duty to be owed to creditors, which could not be 
waived without their consent, yet they would be unable to individually 
enforce it. 
Probably the greatest objection to providing individual creditors with a 
cause of action is that it would enable them to subvert the statutory 
scheme of distribution. Although a similar comment can be made in 
relation to S.592 and S.593 arguably as they were conceived by 
parliament they are reconciled with, and indeed elements of, the 
statutory scheme of distribution. The same cannot be said for the 
common law duty to creditors. 
Similar observations are ventured by Sealy who also observes that 
such a duty would run counter to established insolvency policy 
considerations, namely that the priority is for the company to be 
salvaged as a going-concern. 46 Typically, however, the arguments 
advanced against a duty to individual creditors mirror the arguments 
against a duty to creditors generally, detailed below. In particular, it has 
been suggested that the duty would require that some recognised 
standard of conduct by directors be recognised as otherwise honest 
business decisions which result in insolvency might attract personal 
liability and the courts would be required to arbitrate on commercial 
decisions.47 Furthermore the existence of the duty would create 
uncertainty and lead to conflicts of interest. 48 More specifically, other 
commentators have referred to the multiplicity of actions, problems of 
double recovery and the expense of providing individual creditors with 
a cause of action, whilst acknowledging that enforcement of the duty by 
creditors would make it most efficient and effective. 49 
45 	Hill argues that it is but a short step to hold that creditors have individual rights of 
action and it is odd that to date is has not been so held given that directors have a duty 
to consider their interests and a breach of that duty cannot be waived without their 
consent: (1986) 60 AU J 525 at 527. 
46 	Op. cit., 18. 
47 	Trethowan, "Directors' personal liability to creditors for company debts", (1992) 20 
ABLR 41, 59. 
48 	Id, 53-56. 
49 	Riley, "Directors Duties and the interests of creditors" (1989) 10 Co Law 87. Generally 
see Prentice, op. cit., 275-276. 
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It is of note that the Companies and Securities Law Review Committee 
has recommended the establishment of a derivative action which would 
permit creditors, amongst others, to seek the leave of the court to 
enforce the duties of corporate officials. 50 If enacted this would provide 
individual creditors with an avenue to enforce this duty albeit with leave 
and by way of derivative action. Notably the criteria for granting leave is 
generous. 51  Furthermore the court would be empowered to order the 
corporation to indemnify or pay the applicant's costs and also to direct 
that any proceeds from a successful action be paid to any creditor of 
the corporation or a related corporation. 
Whilst this would clearly appear to promote a major advance in 
creditors' recovery rights, rather surprisingly the proposal is expressed 
to be predicated on the need to protect the interests of the company 
and not those of creditors. 52 It is suggested that the width of this 
provision is such that the Committee may not have been sufficiently 
focused on the principles they were attempting to express and may 
have been over-reacting to the corporate excesses of the 1980's. 
Certainly to assert that the provision is solely concerned with the 
interests of the company and not those of creditors appears 
inconsistent with the tenor of the provision in relation to creditors' 
rights. Notably the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee 
rejected the extension of the action to encompass creditors as potential 
applicants. 53 
Whilst this specific reform is problematical it is argued that the 
suggestion of a derivative type action by creditors is worthy of 
consideration •in the limited circumstances of the defaulting officer 
provisions. This issue of whether creditors should have a direct cause 
of action against corporate management, whether derivative in nature 
or otherwise, is explored in detail in chapter 11 where it is concluded, in 
the context of the legislative remedy, in favour of such a development. 
Whilst the conclusion is drawn below against the further development 
of this common law duty, in the event that the preferred regime were 
not adopted and the common law duty was retained as an element of 
the creditor recovery regime, for the reasons advanced in section 2 of 
chapter 11, primarily the disparate nature of corporate interests, it is 
argued that there are grounds for providing individual creditors with a 
50 Enforcement of the duties of directors and officers of a company by means of a 
statutory derivative action, Report No 12, November 1990. 
51 	Essentially that the corporation is unlikely to take proceedings but that it is in its best 
interests. 
52 	Op. cit., para 48. 
53 	Report on a Statutory Derivative Action, July 1993. 
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cause of action. Possibly, to accommodate the opposing arguments, 
which have much force in the context of the common law duty, this 
action ought be more readily identifiable as necessarily derivative in 
nature. 
	
3. 	The Position in the United Kingdom 
3.1 	Judicial support for a duty to creditors 
Initially the existence of a duty to creditors was resisted by the United 
Kingdom judiciary and the traditional view that directors are only 
accountable to shareholders endorsed. 
Initial support - Re Horsley and Weight Ltd 
The first English case to consider the matter was Re Horsley and 
Weight Ltd. 54 The liquidator had argued that a payment of a pension to 
a director was in breach of the duty owed to creditors to preserve the 
company's capital fund. In the course of rejecting this argument 
Buckley L.J. also rejected any notion of a duty to creditors. However 
the other members of the Court have often been cited as authority 
recognising the existence of the duty. Templeman L.J. stated: 
"If the company had been doubtfully solvent at the date of the grant to 
the knowledge of the directors the grant would have been both a 
misfeasance and a fraud on the creditors for which the directors would 
remain liable". 55 
Although it is arguable that in this passage his Lordship acknowledges 
misfeasance in the form of breach of a duty to creditors it is also 
arguable that the passage refers to a misfeasance [vis-a-vis the 
company] and a fraud on the creditors. There has never been any 
doubt that directors are liable for fraud on creditors. 
In any event his Lordship found no evidence of fraud or misfeasance 
given that the company's business was solvent at the time of the 
transaction. Furthermore there was nothing to suggest that the 
likelihood of loss to creditors should have been appreciated by the 
directors. 
54 [1982] Ch 442. 
55 At 455. 
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Cumming-Bruce L.J. concurred with Templeman L.J. and together 
these judgments were, for many years, the strongest English authority 
for the proposition that a duty is owed to creditors. Some other 
supporting authority was provided by a passage from the judgment of 
Diplock L.J. in Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co LtcP6 where his 
Lordship stated that the interests of the company "are not exclusively 
those of its shareholders but may include those of its creditors". His 
Lordship does not refer to any authority for this proposition and indeed 
the passage arises by way of a side remark only incidentally related to 
the issues raised by the case. 
Leading authority - Winkworth v Edward Baron Development Co Ltd 
and Others 
The leading authority in support of this duty is the judgment of 
Templeman L.J. in the House of Lords decision in Winkworth v Edward 
Baron Development Co Ltd and Others57 in which his Lordship took the 
opportunity to re-affirm his view that a duty is owed to creditors. At 
issue was a claim by a director that a company held property on trust 
for that director. In the course of dismissing this claim his Lordship 
referred to the fact that equity would only intervene to uphold a 
constructive trust where it was conscionable in all the circumstances. 
On the facts the enforcement of a constructive trust in favour of the 
director would defeat the claims of creditors. In the circumstances this 
would be unconscionable because: 
"... a company owes a duty to its creditors, present and future. The 
company is not bound to pay off every debt as soon as it is incurred 
and the company is not obliged to avoid all ventures which involve an 
element of risk, but the company owes a duty to its creditors to keep its 
property inviolate and available for the repayment of its debts. The 
conscience of a company, as well as its management, is confided to its 
directors. A duty is owed by the directors to the company and to the 
creditors of the company to ensure that the affairs of the company are 
properly administered and that its property is not dissipated or exploited 
for the benefit of the directors themselves to the prejudice of the 
creditors." 58 
His Lordship noted that the directors had committed acts which 
constituted a breach of their duty to the company and its creditors. 
However these breaches did not become of any significance until the 
company became insolvent. 58 
56 [1980] 1 WLR 627 at 634. 
57 	[1987] 1 All ER 114. 
58 	At 118. 
59 	However it is arguable that his Lordship is not restricting the duty to the insolvency 
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Although these comments would appear to be a forceful and 
unambiguous affirmation of the existence of a duty to creditors it is 
submitted that they constitute only persuasive and far from decisive 
authority. The decision was not founded on the existence of this duty 
but rather on the general principle that in all the circumstances equity 
should not intervene. The finding that the director had breached this 
duty to creditors constituted a neat way of categorising her conduct, 
conduct which would arguably not have been considered equitable 
regardless of whether there could be identified a specific duty which the 
director had breached. Furthermore no consideration of the authorities 
was undertaken nor was any supporting authority cited. 
Nevertheless the other four members of the Court concurred with the 
judgment of Templeman L.J. This may suggest a judicial re-
consideration of the existence of the duty although, on the other hand, 
it could be argued that for the reasons stated above, namely that the 
reference to this duty was only for the purpose of categorising the 
director's conduct, that their Lordships considered the slight over-
indulgence in judicial creativity by their learned friend to be too 
insignificant to warrant qualification 60 
Certainly it is arguable that these comments go too far and if they are 
taken literally it would mean that a company could not engage in any 
activities that did not result in a profit to the company. Furthermore they 
extend too far the capital maintenance rules and the suggestion that 
directors owe duties to future creditors creates practical difficulties. 61 
Possibly they are better regarded as loosely expressed (and possibly 
obiter) dicta addressed to the particular problems of capital 
maintenance and misfeasance in a winding-up. 62 
context but merely recognising the self-evident proposition that the breach would not 
have been at issue had the creditors been paid out. 
60 	However in Hilton International Limited (in liq) v Hilton & Anor (1988) 4 NZCLC 64721 
this decision was relied on in support of the proposition that directors, when declaring 
a dividend, owe a duty to its creditors of all kinds likely to be affected. 
61 	See Baxt (1987) 5 C&SLJ 247 at 248. Requiring directors to take into account the 
interests of potential creditors would seem particularly onerous. 
62 	See Farrar "The Obligations of a Company's Directors to its Creditors", an unpublished 
paper Christchurch New Zealand, 1987, at p.5. Also see (1989) 4 Canta LA 12 at 14. 
'He rationalises the remarks as using the alter ego theory (in the guise of the corporate 
conscience) to pierce the corporate veil in favour of creditors in a way which is 
unprecedented. 
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Subsequent decisions 
Liquidator of West Mercia Safety Ltd v Dodd 
In any event, subsequently the English Court of Appeal in Liquidator of 
West Mercia Safety Ltd v Dodo confirmed that, at least in the case of 
insolvent companies, directors are under a duty to take creditors' 
interests into account when disposing of company property. In this case 
a director had transferred company funds to pay off the overdraft of 
another company which he had personally guaranteed. Rather than 
rely on the preference provisions the liquidator sought a declaration64 
that the director was liable for breach of trust and misfeasance in 
transferring the money. 
The Court held that there was a clear fraudulent preference 65 of the 
overdrawn company and it therefore followed that the director had 
breached his duty to the company because he had disregarded the 
interests of the general creditors of the insolvent, or near insolvent, 
company. The traditional position that no duty was owned to creditors 
was to be confined to circumstances of a solvent company. 
Brady & Anor v Brady & Anor 
This decision was affirmed in Brady & Anor v Brady & Ano1 88 , the 
Court of Appeal holding that in the case of an insolvent or near 
insolvent company the interests of the company are in reality the 
interests of the creditors. This view was not disturbed on appea1. 67 
3.2 Some support for the traditional view 
There is some authority in support of the traditional view, although what 
authority there is, is either implied authority, authority which mentions 
the issue in passing or authority which lays down principles 
conceptually inconsistent with the existence of a duty to creditors. 
Multinational Gas 
The strongest English authority discounting the duty to creditors is that 
of Multinational Gas and Petro Chemical Co v Multinational Gas and 
Petro Chemical Services Ltd and Others 68 . The complicated facts of 
that case basically gave rise to the issue of whether the shareholders 
63 (1988) 4 BCC 30. 
64 	Under the equivalent of S.594 of the Corporations La 
65 	For a consideration of the relationship between the 
and the fraudulent preference provisions see the 
C&SLJ 72. 
66 [1988] BCLC 20. Note also Re Stanford Services Ltd 
67 	[1988] 2 All ER 617. 
68 	[1983] 2 All ER 563. 
w. 
position established by this case 
casenote by Herzberg (1989) 7 
[1987] BCC 326. 
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of a company could ratify the conduct of directors who had entered the 
company into improvident contracts. The liquidator had alleged that the 
directors were in breach of duty by virtue of entering into the high risk 
contracts, notwithstanding that at the time the company was solvent. 
The directors alleged that the shareholders had lawfully ratified these 
contracts and accordingly they could not be impeached by the 
liquidator. 
The majority of the Court of Appeal found the conduct of the directors 
was ratifiable. Dillon L.J. stated: 69 
"An individual trader who is solvent is free to make stupid but honest 
commercial decisions in the conduct of his own business. He owes no 
duty of care to future creditors. ... A company ... likewise owes no duty 
of care to future creditors. The directors indeed stand in a fiduciary 
relationship to the company as they are appointed to manage the 
affairs of the company and they owe fiduciary duties to the company 
though not to the creditors, present or future ..." 
His Lordship had been referred to Re Horsley & Weight Ltc1 70 by the 
liquidator as authority for the proposition that shareholders cannot ratify 
conduct of directors amounting to misfeasance. Dillon L.J. noted that 
Templeman L.J. in that case had drawn a distinction between 
negligence and gross negligence amounting to misfeasance. In his 
view what Templeman L.J. had in mind by the term misfeasance was in 
fact recklessness. Thus the case was only authority for the proposition 
that in the event of recklessness shareholders could not absolve 
delinquent directors. On the facts before his Lordship there was nothing 
in the nature of recklessness proved. Furthermore his Lordship noted 
that the comments of Templeman L.J. concerned a situation where the 
directors were also the shareholders. Again that was not the case on 
the facts before his Lordship. 
It is arguable, however, that both these bases of rejecting the dicta 
contained in the judgment of Templeman L.J. are not to the point. 
Whether shareholders can ratify the conduct of directors does not 
depend on some spurious distinction between misfeasance and 
negligence. Rather it depends upon whether the duty at issue is one 
owed to shareholders or one owed to creditors. This was recognised in 
the Australian decision in the Kinsela case. 71 The New South Wales 
Court of Appeal, having found that the impugned conduct took place in 
the context of insolvency and therefore amounted to a breach of duty 
69 At 585. 
70 [1982] Ch 442. 
71 (1986) 4 ACLC 215. 
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owed to creditors, concluded that the shareholders could not authorise 
this breach by ratification. 
Once it is recognised that the duty is owed to shareholders or creditors 
depending upon the financial solvency of the company, then the 
question of whether shareholders can ratify can be easily decided. 72 
Therefore it becomes unnecessary to draw the distinction between 
ratifiable negligent acts and unratifiable acts of misfeasance or to 
examine the body of shareholders and only allow them to ratify where 
they are independent from the directors of the company. 73 
The other member of the majority, Lawton L.J., similarly identified the 
company with the shareholders thereby implying that the directors are 
only liable to the shareholders and not creditors. By ratifying the 
conduct of the directors the shareholders had made that conduct their 
own. As shareholders owe no duty to creditors then no breach arose. 
His Lordship stated that this was so notwithstanding the dicta contained 
in Re Horsley & Weight Ltd. 74 In any event that dicta referred to the 
inability to ratify conduct amounting to misfeasance which conduct 
probably does not include that which would give rise to an ordinary 
claim for damages. 
Again it is submitted that his Lordship, by failing to recognise that a 
duty to creditors arises where the company is insolvent, has found it 
necessary to draw this spurious distinction between misfeasance 
actions and ordinary claims for damages. Furthermore had his Lordship 
recognised this duty he would not have needed to reduce the analysis 
to a question of whether shareholders owe duties to creditors. It is 
submitted that the relationship between shareholders and creditors is 
vastly removed from the relationship between directors and creditors. 
To reduce the issue to a consideration of the relationship between 
shareholders and creditors is to entirely avoid the issue. 
The dissenting judge May L.J. similarly did not recognise a duty to 
creditors and as a result was forced to go to the other extreme by 
stating that in no circumstances would ratification by shareholders 
72 	In Aveling Barford Limited v Perion Limited (1988 A No 5742; 17 April 1989) 
shareholders were held unable to ratify a breach essentially because creditors' 
interests were at stake. Whilst the company was solvent at the time of the breach it did 
not have sufficient distributable profits to make a distribution of equivalent value to the 
property lost as a result of the breach. It has been argued that this case is persuasive 
authority for an extension of the circumstances in which the duty to creditors arises to 
a company in financial difficulties approaching insolvency: Rose, "Corporate Gifts & 
Creditors' Rights", (1991) 11 Co Law 91 at 95. 
73 	The ratification issue resulting from an acceptance of the traditional view has been 
recognised by a number of commentators, for example Hill (1986) 60 AU 525 at 527. 
74 [1982] Ch 442. 
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absolve directors from actions for breach of duty brought by a 
liquidator. With respect to the dicta contained in Re Horsley & Weight 
Ltd his Lordship expressed difficulties distinguishing between gross 
and ordinary negligence. However, he considered that the dicta did not 
rule out claims by a company against its directors based on negligence 
in the circumstances of the instant case. Again the difficulties 
encountered by his Lordship would not have arisen if the conduct of 
directors was properly dichotomised into a breach of duty to 
shareholders or a breach of duty to creditors. Furthermore it would 
have been unnecessary to go to the lengths of stating that 
shareholders can never ratify negligent conduct by directors. 
Notwithstanding the reservations expressed concerning features of this 
decision it clearly is authority for the traditional view that the interests of 
creditors have no relevance to the performance of duties by directors. 
However, the difficulties encountered by their Lordships in their 
judgments could have been overcome had they recognised that in 
some circumstances a duty to creditors arises. 
Rolled Steel Products 
In Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd v British Steel Corporation and 
Others,75 in the course of dismissing the defendant director's attempt 
to raise the defence of ratification, Slade L.J. made some obiter 
references to the power of shareholders to ratify the conduct of 
directors. His Lordship stated: 
"... the clear general principle is that any act that falls within the 
corporate capacity of a company will bind it if it is done with the 
unanimous consents of all the shareholders or is subsequently ratified 
by such consents. ... This last mentioned principle is certainly not an 
unqualified one. In particular, it will not enable the shareholders of a 
company to bind the company itself to a transaction which constitutes a 
fraud on its creditors ... but none of the authorities which have been 
cited to us have convinced me that a transaction which (i) falls within 
the letter of the expressed or implied powers of a company conferred 
by its memorandum and (ii) does not involve a fraud on its creditors 
and (iii) is assented to by all the shareholders Will not bind a fully 
solvent company merely because the intention of the directors, or the 
shareholders, is to effect a purpose not authorised by the 
memorandum. The recent decision of this Court in the Multinational 
case seems to me to point to a contrary conclusion (see also A-G's 
Reference (No. 2 of 1982) [1984] 2 All E.R. 216 at 223 ...). However 
none of these matters relating to ratification in my opinion call for 
75 [1985] 2 WLR 908. 
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decision on this appeal." 76 
This is a clear statement of the traditional position. It is difficult to 
envisage how the decisions in the Multinational casen and the 
Attorney-General's Reference might point to a contrary conclusion. In 
the latter case it was held that the shareholders could not ratify 
dishonest or illegal conduct by directors. This decision does not 
represent a departure from the traditional position. The conduct of the 
directors in that case could be clearly characterised as fraud on the 
creditors. The companies concerned were in debt to the sum of 7 
million pounds at the relevant time representing a deficiency as regards 
creditors of over 2.5 million pounds. Nevertheless the directors lived an 
extravagant life using the companies' funds for their private purpose. In 
as much as the Court upheld charges of stealing from the company 
against the directors their conduct also amounted to fraud against the 
creditors. 
It is interesting to note that the above quotation from the judgment of 
Slade L.J. is cited with approval by Street C.J. in the Kinsela case. 78 
His Honour refers to this passage as authority for the proposition that 
the principle of validation of directors' conduct by ratification is not an 
unqualified one. Furthermore his Honour used this passage to illustrate 
that the general principles of ratification are restricted to solvent 
companies, thereby enabling him to hold that in the case of insolvent 
companies different considerations apply. 
This analysis by Street C.J. illustrates the inherent limitation of the 
English authorities which affirm the traditional position. All these 
authorities are confined to statements of principle in the context of 
solvent companies. In none of these cases has the company 
concerned been insolvent at the time of the impugned transactions. 
Thus the position in the United Kingdom would now appear to be that a 
duty of care is owed to creditors by directors of an insolvent or near 
insolvent company. 
76 At 947-948. 
77 	[1983] 2 All ER 563. 
78 (1986) 4 ACLC 215. 
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4. 	Legislative Recognition of the need to take into account the 
Interests of Creditors 
Whilst the judiciary has clearly recognised that directors' fiduciary 
duties include a duty to consider the interests of creditors which is, in 
fact, manifested in the form of a duty to creditors, there has been little 
legislative recognition that directors owe duties to, or even need to take 
into account the interests of, persons other than the body of 
shareholders. The main exceptions are considered below. 
United Kingdom 
Since 198079 the Companies Act has included a provision to the effect 
that directors are required to have regard in the performance of their 
functions to the interests of the company's employees. Certain 
implications may be drawn from the fact that neither this provision, or 
the original draft provisions, contain any reference to a requirement to 
take into account the interests of creditors. It is arguable that the 
interests of creditors are excluded from consideration by implication 
and that directors who take into account the interests of creditors are in 
fact in breach of their duties to the company. 
New Zealand 
The New Zealand Companies Act contains a similar section which 
permits provision to be made for the welfare of the employees when a 
business ceases, whether or not it is in the best interests of the 
company. 99 Again no reference is made to creditors. 91 
Ghana 
The only legislation in which creditors' interests have been recognized 
in this way, albeit only to a limited extent, would appear to be the 
Ghanan Companies Code 1963 which requires that the interests of 
creditors be taken into account in the performance of the directors' 
fiduciary duties. S.203(3) provides that: 
"In considering whether a particular transaction or course of action is in 
the best interest of the company as a whole, a director, when appointed 
by or as a representative of a special class of members, employees, or 
creditors, may give special, but not exclusive, consideration to the 
79 	S.46 of the Companies Act (1980). The provision was first proposed in the 1973 
Companies Bill and again later in the 1978 Bill on the recommendation of a number of 
reports; Cmnd 6706, Ch. 8 para 38 and Cmnd 7037 para 5. It now appears as S.309 
of the Companies Act (1985). 
80 	S.15A(1)(g) and S.15A(2) of the Companies Act (1955). 
81 However see the recommendations of the New Zealand Law Reform Commission 
discussed in chapter 8, section 3.5., although note that the subsequent Companies Bill 
has not enthusiastically embraced these proposals. 
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interests of that class."[ My emphasis.] 
This absence of legislative endorsement of a duty to creditors, or even 
of the need to take into account the interests of creditors, foreshadows 
the concern at the desirability of the common law development. It is 
proposed to now turn to a consideration of the various practical and 
conceptual difficulties that have been identified as inherent in the 
common law duty. It will be observed that a fundamental concern is the 
incompatibility of the duty with traditional jurisprudence. Possible bases 
of reconciling the existence of the duty with this jurisprudence will be 
explored. 
5. 	Arguments Against a Duty to Creditors 
It has been argued that if judicial sentiments of the kind endorsing a 
duty to creditors had prevailed over the past century and a half, the 
limited liability company would never have got off the ground. 82 
Certainly, given the balance struck in the companies legislation 
between promoting enterprise and the protection of creditors, arguably 
this judicial creativity flies in the face of the intention of parliament. 83 On 
the other hand, it can be argued that the duty is clearly desirable from 
the standpoint of raising commercial morality, imposing minimum 
standards and recognising current ideals that directors should take into 
account the wider public interest. 
Whatever view is adopted it is clear that the duty presents many 
conceptual and practical problems. These raise the issue of whether 
the duty should be retained as an element of the company law of the 
future. It is therefore appropriate to consider these problems and 
whether they are capable of resolution. 
82 	See Sealy, "Directors' duties - an unnecessary gloss", [1988] Cambridge U 175. 
83 	See Giugni & Ryan, "Company Directors' spheres of responsibility: primary and 
secondary duties", [1988] NZLJ 437. Prentice identifies a number of ways in which the 
common law duty extends creditors rights over the legislative provisions. For example, 
directors may not claim a set off and shareholders cannot ratify the breach: (1990) 10 
Oxford J Legal Stud 265 at 276 -277. 
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5.1 	Practical difficulties with the duty 
Uncertainty associated with duty 
Probably the most identified problem is that it is uncertain when the 
duty to take into account the interests of creditors will arise. 84 
Accordingly a director of a company in financial difficulties cannot enter 
into a transaction confident that it will be valid and effective, if it is likely 
to leave the creditors lamenting should the company subsequently go 
into liquidation. 
To the extent that the issue of directors' duties to creditors is presently 
the subject of judicial development this criticism is valid. However, 
there is nothing new in such criticisms. Whenever the judiciary 
embarks upon new developments a degree of uncertainty must 
eventuate. This is the price of a dynamic legal system which 
recognises current social attitudes and attempts to reflect them in the 
law. 
A related criticism is that company directors are not always aware that 
a company is in financial difficulties, and may only discover this upon 
preparation of the financial accounts. Accordingly, they may be 
unaware that a duty to creditors has crystallised. On the other hand, it 
can be argued that directors have a duty to be acquainted with their 
company's financial health. 
Duty requires a difficult balancing act 
It has also been argued that the duty to take into account the interests 
of creditors requires a difficult balancing act by directors 85 and, 
presumably, a difficult review process for the judiciary. 86 The Bullock 
Report87 attempts to answer this objection by arguing that directors 
have managed to balance these interests so they should be required to 
balance them. However this argument avoids the issue. It is one thing 
84 	See Nash, "Directors' Duties to Creditors", [1987] Aust Accountant 62; Hill (1986) 60 
AU 525. Difficulties in identifying the point at which the prospect of insolvency 
becomes real enough to warrant the change of focus in the directors' attention are 
discussed in Finch, "Directors duties towards creditors", (1989) 10 Co Law 23-24 and 
Hawke, "Creditors' interests in solvent and insolvent companies, [1989] JnI of Bus L 
54. Jacobs cites this uncertainty as but one of many, "Duties to Creditors", (1988) 7 Lit 
310. Wishart argues that the difficulty here reflects the trade-off between the 
complexity of the definition of insolvency and the practicality of its application: "Models 
& theories of director's duties to creditors" (1991) 14 NZULR 323. 
85 See fn 56 in Gower Modern Company Law (1979) (4th edition) at p. 579, Stephens & 
Son; (1977) 40 Mod LR 226, 231; (1986) 4 C&SLJ 197, 199; (1982) 1 Canta LA 417, 
422. 
86 	It is argued that the accountability of directors would be compromised because they 
could justify their decisions as the result of the balancing exercise. See Watts, 
"Company Law", [1990] NZ Recent Law Review 190 at 194. Discussed further below. 
87 Cmnd 6706, Chapter 8, paragraph 39. 
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to say that directors do balance the interests of various classes. How 
well they balance these interests is an entirely different consideration. 
The increase in reported decisions in this context may well be evidence 
that the balancing act is creating difficulties. On the other hand, it is 
conceded that an argument to the effect that a duty is difficult to 
perform and so therefore need not be performed is hardly convincing. 
5.2 Conceptual difficulties with the duty 
Novel meaning of the term "company" 
The duty to creditors embraces a novel meaning of the term 
"company". The traditional view is that the company is equated to the 
shareholders. The new view characterises the company as an entity 
separate from its shareholders. The powers of this entity are vested in 
the directors who are required to exercise these powers in accordance 
with a wide range of considerations. Therefore according to this new 
view it is conceptually permissible to impose on directors an obligation 
to consider the interests of various parties including creditors. 88 
This divergence from the traditional view gives rise to the ratification 
issue. The principles of ratification are based on the identification of the 
company with the shareholders. The new movement has altered this 
underlying theory thereby giving rise to difficult questions as to the 
shareholders' power to ratify a breach of duty owed to creditors.88 
It has been argued that the metaphor of the company as a separate 
legal person has, thus, been pushed too far. Putting corporate 
personality in its correct perspective it is apparent that the shareholders 
and not the creditors have conferred powers on directors and so it 
should be to the shareholders that duties are owed. However the 
curious result of a breach of this duty is that it cannot be forgiven 
without the consent of the creditors yet they cannot enforce the duty 
except to the extent that the company acts on its own motion or 
through a liquidator. 90 
88 See Dawson (1984) 11 NZULR, 68 at 77. 
89 	See Dawson, ibid, and also see (1982) 56 All 189 at 190 and (1984) 2 C&SLJ 127. 
Grantham concedes the need for creditor protection but questions whether this radical 
change in what is meant by the company" is appropriate: The judicial extension of 
directors' duties to creditors" [1981] JnI of Bus L 1. 
90 	See Heydon (op. cit.). In his view the answer to this conceptual malaise is that no 
independent duty is owed to creditors. Mason J. in Walker v Wimborne was simply 
recognising that, in the exercise of their duties to a company, directors may properly 
have regard to the interests of outsiders such as employees and creditors. (Also see 
McPherson," Duties of directors to shareholders & creditors", Legal Research 
Foundation Seminar, Auckland 1989, 1) Recent cases have, by recognising an 
independent duty to creditors, moved from enforcing a duty to consider to imposing a 
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These conceptual criticisms can be summarised in the form of two 
questions: 
(i) If directors owe this duty to the company how can it be denied 
that a fully informed general meeting can excuse a breach of the 
duty? and, 
(ii) If on the other hand directors owe a duty to creditors why it is 
that the creditors are not entitled to sue in equity to enjoin breach 
of that duty? 31 
Certainly the existence of a duty to creditors appears contrary to 
principle and to long-established authority. Further the theory that a 
general meeting cannot excuse a breach of duty confers on outsiders 
(i.e. creditors) the right to interfere in the internal workings of the 
company. It would also place a creditor of a company in a more 
advantageous position than the creditor of a natural person. 92 
It is sought to address this conceptual difficulty in section 6 below. 
No homogeneous class of creditors 
Another problem with the cause of action for breach of the duty is 
deriving an appropriate remedy which will properly assist the relevant 
creditors. There is no true "class" of creditors but simply a number of 
competing entities, which in turn have an existing, future and continuing 
face. The duty is a too simply formulated concept to deal with all the 
various interests at issue. This issue is further explored in chapter 11 in 
the context of the legislative remedies.33 
duty to act. On the other hand Grantham has identified a conflict in the cases between 
whether the obligation is one to act in the best interests of the creditors or merely not 
to prejudice creditors by their actions. His reconciliation of the authorities supports the 
proscriptive rationalisation of the duty: "Directors Duties and insolvent companies", 
(1991) 54 Mod LR 576. 
91 	See Renard commenting on Heydon's article: Renard, "Commentary on Ch 5" in Finn 
(ed), Equity and Commercial Relations, at p 137, Law Book Co North Ryde NSW 
1987. 
92 See Renard, ibid, and also see Howard, Law of Commercial Companies, Law Book 
Co Ltd (1987) p.252. 
93 	See Sealy, op. cit., 12. 
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Problems with a duty arising upon insolvency 
A further deficiency is the place of the concept of "insolvency" in the 
application of the duty. Arguably the standards required of directors 
should not differ depending on the financial status of the company. The 
concept only gives rise to definitional issues and to difficult arguments 
where a company's financial position fluctuates such that it moves in 
and out of that state. 
This has been recognised by Sealy who has argued that as directors' 
decisions are taken with reference to the company as an ongoing 
business they should be judged by that broad standard, not by 
technicalities and coincidences of this kind. 94 He believes that the 
common law can only accommodate a limited duty if it is to remain 
inherently consistent. On the other hand legislation can be used to 
impose further liabilities on directors undeterred by any such 
constraints, with the judicial acknowledgment of a possible wider basis 
for directors' liability being a signal that legislative change is overdue. 
There is much strength in these comments. 
Difficult enforcement task required of the judiciary 
It is difficult to reconcile the duty towards creditors with the notion of a 
company as a vehicle to facilitate risk taking. To accommodate 
creditors' interests the judiciary must be prepared to throw down the 
shackles of the business judgment rule and enter the boardroom to 
examine the purpose of executive decisions. What the courts must 
ensure is that the risks embraced by the company fall within the range 
of legitimate business risks. 95 Furthermore the courts must be more 
readily prepared to examine the exercise of shareholders' powers, 
especially their power of ratification, as they are no longer the only 
interest groups involved. 
Sealy believes that in the exercise of these principles the courts should 
give effect to a number of policy considerations, namely that: 
(i) the action is a class action for the benefit of creditors generally. 
Any other policy would create impossible conflicts, especially for 
the liquidator, and would undermine the object of insolvency law, 
94 	Op. cit., 12-13 and see footnote 60 where Sealy identifies some of the various 
characterizations of "insolvency" used in the caselaw. 
95 	See Sealy, op. cit.. Baxt argues that this is what has been occurring in these cases 
and that perhaps this flexible and creative approach by the judiciary is preferable to 
rigid and stultifying legislation: (1986) 4 C&SU 197 at 199. 
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(ii) the priority must always be the salvation of the enterprise as a 
going concern. Hence compromise may be necessary and any 
pre-occupation with the interests of existing creditors would 
undermine this policy and promote short-term remedies at the 
expense of long-term prospects, and 	- 
(iii) any extravagant imposition of personal liability on directors may 
result in people with the necessary experience and ability being 
reluctant to fill non-executive directorships. 96 
These considerations illustrate a justifiable concern that the duty has 
been developed without proper regard to the underlying policy behind 
the corporations jurisprudence. Whilst the first point has been 
discussed previously and, indeed, it is argued that there is a merit in 
permitting individual actions, the second and third considerations are 
particularly poignant. It will be seen that recent developments in 
strengthening the position of creditors have, arguably, both 
discouraged the acceptance of directorships and promoted an 
environment which does not encourage attempts to trade out of 
insolvency. 
Ultimately Sealy echoes the response by Bedew to Dodd's proposa199 
that wider interests be recognised by corporate management, namely 
that it is unworkable. The concept of "duty" ceases to be justiciable. A 
concession in favour of a duty to take account of creditors' interests in 
a situation of doubtful solvency is only achievable if the judiciary is 
prepared to adopt a more interventionist role than has been traditional 
and to review directors' commercial and policy decisions. Any attempt 
to go further and establish the duty as owed to creditors clashes with 
established principles of company law and the underlying policy of 
insolvency law. 99 
Other difficulties 
Other difficulties associated with this duty include: 190 
(i) the procedural problems arising from the lack of nexus between 
the company to whom the duty is owed and the creditors of the 
96 	Op. cit. 
97 "For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees" (1932) 45 Harv LR 1365. 
98 "For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?" (1932) 45 Harv LR 1145 written in 
response to A.A. Berle Jnr "Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust" (1932) 45 Haw LR 
1049. Ultimately Dodd came to share Berle's view: (1942) 9 U Chic L Rev 538, at 
546-547. 
99 	Op. cit. 
100 See generally Wishart, "Models & theories of director's duties to creditors" (1991) 14 
NZULR 323. 
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company, being the persons protected by the duty, 
(ii) the lack of any general definition as to what is and is not ratifiable 
and as to at what time a breach of the duty becomes non-
ratifiable, 
(iii) the lack of identification as to whether all creditors are protected 
by the duty or only a class of them. Wishart suggests that the 
confusion here reflects an attempt by the courts to avoid over-
generalisation by tying any statement of the duty into the nature of 
the transactions at issue in a particular case. However any 
categorisation between types of creditors is flawed as no such 
categorisation attaches to the distribution of the proceeds of any 
action, 101 
(v) the lack of guidance as to what is required of directors to satisfy 
the duty, particular as the duty may vary in stringency with the 
degree of solvency of the company, and 
(vi) the lack of reconciliation of this common law duty with the 
statutory provisions. 
There is much to be said for these criticisms of the common law duty. It 
may be that the judiciary has embarked upon a course consistent with 
current commercial sentiments without proper regard for theoretical 
cohesion or general considerations. On the other hand, as has been 
foreshadowed, possibly a reconciliation with traditional principles can 
be maintained. 
6. 	Possible Bases of Reconciliation with Traditional Principles 
6.1 A flexible definition of membership and the transfer of risk 
Perhaps the true importance of this development is the recognition that 
at the instance of insolvency there is a shift in the interests that are at 
stake. In other words there is a transfer in risk. This is recognised by 
Wishart who supports the need for this duty in order to protect creditors 
from uncompensated risks. He argues that the need for this protection 
only arises where management and control of a company is not well 
separated, that is in the case of small tightly controlled companies. 
Wishart identifies the various models of the company in order to identify 
whether this duty can be rationalised. He acknowledges that the 
101 	Ibid. 
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traditional and modern legal models of the company are inadequate in 
their explanations of the effect of the shifting of risk between creditors 
and shareholders and hence are incapable of dealing with 
uncompensated transfers of risk. Thus there is no guidance of authority 
or principle for the judiciary. 
However he argues that, with some adaptation, the traditional theory of 
the company as the collective shareholders can assimilate this recent 
development. This requires that the distinction between shareholders 
and creditors be recognised as, in reality, no more than terminology as 
the capacities are the same in substance. On this basis, if the model 
views the company as the collective members then a mechanism to 
protect one group against uncompensated transfers of risk can be 
accommodated. Thus Wishart requires that the judiciary make the 
concept of membership explicit. If creditors are not members then 
uncompensated transfers ought to be precisely identified and 
proscribed. On the other hand if the creditors are members 
uncompensated transfers can be dealt with as fraud on the minority 
under a regime of managerial liability. 
In this way Wishart concludes that the existing principles of company 
law are adequate to the task of accommodating the development of the 
directors' duty to creditors. However, he would see it as preferable to 
regulate the prohibition of uncompensated transfers of risk perceiving 
the alternative of a flexible definition of membership as less desirable. 
It is argued below that a recognition that at the instance of insolvency 
the interests of the company and those of its creditors are to be 
assimilated, or stated differently, that the underlying corporate interests 
become the creditors, is the preferred basis of reconciliation of the duty 
with traditional concepts. Whilst this has obvious similarities with 
Wishart's analysis it avoids the need to acknowledge creditors as 
members of a solvent company. Furthermore, like Wishart, it will be 
argued that more appropriate mechanisms to regulate this risk transfer 
can and ought be implemented. 
Insight into alternative regulatory mechanisms and reform 
considerations 
An insight into the nature of these preferred mechanisms is provided by 
Wishart's suggestion that the debate is wrongly directed when it 
conceives the problem as one of mismanagement. In reality the 
problem is one of creditors bearing risks which they have not agreed to 
take. The transferors of that risk are the shareholders. 
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In the course of his analysis of the various models of the company 
Wishart acknowledges the draft Companies Act recommended by the 
New Zealand Law Reform Commission 102 pursuant to which no duty 
was to be owed by directors to creditors and the interests of creditors 
were to be subordinated to the best interests of the company and the 
benefit of existing shareholders. 103 A creditor recovery regime was to 
be provided in the form of standing to sue for a proposed breach of the 
company's constitution or the Act. In addition management was to owe 
a duty to the company not to take unreasonable risks with the solvency 
of the company. This solvency test was designed to prevent 
management taking the company into situations where either the funds 
were insufficient to meet liabilities or where the cash flow was 
inadequate. This proposal will be considered further in chapter 8 where 
it will be argued that, whilst probably too radical for legislative 
endorsement, 104 it provides an insight into the theoretical basis for any 
resultant legislation. 
An analysis of the cases supporting the existence of a duty to creditors 
reveals some factual similarities. The companies have been closely 
controlled proprietary companies, exhibiting an assimilation of 
ownership and management, and in financial difficulties at the time of 
the impugned transactions. The transactions all had the effect of 
placing company assets out of the reach of unsecured creditors. In 
each case the liquidation claw back provisions have been inadequate 
to deal with the transaction explaining why the courts have had 
recourse to establishing this new principle in an effort to supply the 
defect in the law. This also explains why these decisions leave so 
many critical issues unresolved as the courts have concerned 
themselves with reaching the correct result in the case before them, 
hampered by the conflicting conceptual and jurisdictional problems. 105 
The fact that the companies have all been small closely held 
companies suggests that, from the reform perspective, different 
considerations apply to small closely held companies than to other 
companies. 106 
102 Company Law Reform & Restatement, Report No. 9, June 1989, Wellington New 
Zealand. The Commission rejected the imposition of any duty owed directly to 
creditors: paras 217-220. Generally on the proposed New Zealand reforms see 
chapter 8. 
103 Id, para 218. 
104 The subsequent Companies Bill 1990 was ambivalent in its approach to directors' 
duties and retreated from the position adopted in the draft Act. The duty not to take 
unreasonable risks with the solvency of the company was replaced with a prohibition 
on reckless trading. The bill was referred to the Justice and Law Reform Select 
Committee and is yet to pass through Parliament. See the discussion in chapter 8. 
105 See Trethowan, "Directors' personal liability to creditors for company debts", (1992) 20 
ABLR 41, 50-51. 
106 This is also expressly supported by Wishart's analysis (op. cit.). 
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6.2 The schizoid company 
In virtually all the major judgments supporting the new movement 
reservations are expressed by the judiciary as to the desirability of 
stating a wide ranging principle without a thorough examination of the 
varying considerations. 107 Accordingly their Honours have been 
cautious not to be overly enthusiastic in their support for the interests of 
creditors. Thus the duty to take into account the interests of creditors is 
restricted to the insolvency context. 108  The fundamental principle that 
directors of a continuing company owe no duty to creditors remains 
unchallenged. 109 It is only in the context of insolvency that the rights of 
shareholders give way to those of creditors. At this stage in the 
company's existence the directors become in effect trustees for the 
interests of creditors because it is the creditors' investment that is at 
stake. Where the company is insolvent in the sense that the company 
is trading with the creditors' money then the company undertakes a 
significant metamorphosis. The interests of shareholders are relegated 
to those of the creditors. This is the price of obtaining limited liability. It 
is only fair that shareholders pay this price. If it has the effect of placing 
a creditor of a company in a more advantageous position than a 
creditor of a natural person then so be it. The existence of limited 
liability has always meant that such a creditor is in a less secure 
position. It would seem justifiable on equitable grounds that the creditor 
receives some advantage to offset against this detriment. 
Thus although it is conceptually correct that the interests of the 
company and shareholders are to be assimilated in the case of a 
continuing company, in the case of a company of doubtful solvency 
different considerations apply. The trusteeship remains the same but 
different beneficiaries are nominated. It is appropriate that at this stage 
extra weight be given to the interests of these new beneficiaries in the 
directors' process of decision. This also explains why a general 
meeting cannot excuse a breach. In the insolvency context it is to the 
creditors that the directors must look for exoneration. 
107 For example see the judgment of Richardson J. in Nicholsons case (supra) and that of 
Street C.J. in the Kinsela case (supra), especially at page 223. Hill (op. cit.) argues 
that a further factor curbing the application of these principles is the traditional self-
restraint and reluctance of the courts to interfere with, and pronounce upon, 
commercial decisions of directors. 
108 There is a view that these decisions have in fact narrowed the position stated in 
Walker v Wimborne (supra) which did not distinguish between insolvent and solvent 
companies: see the note by Hill in (1986) 60 All 525 at 527. 
109 Recently confirmed in Kuwait Asian Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd 
[1990] BCLC 868. 
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This is, indeed, inherently recognised by the obligations imposed on 
company officers by the companies legislation designed to protect the 
interests of creditors. Most of these obligations crystallise when a 
company becomes insolvent or approaches insolvency. Thus the 
legislation recognises a special relationship between creditors and the 
officers of insolvent corporations. 110  It is also a principle applied in 
certain United States jurisdictions. 111 
Given that the duty is of recent origin and is still undergoing refinement 
and acceptance this assists to explain why to date the courts have not 
had cause to consider whether to grant creditors an independent cause 
of action. The lack of an independent cause of action presents no 
conceptual difficulties in any event. To date actions for breach of this 
duty have been brought by the liquidator acting for the collective good 
of the creditors. In a similar way proceedings against a director for 
breach of his duties to the company per se must be brought on behalf 
of the company. Traditional directors' duties are owed to the company 
as a whole and not to individual shareholders. Similarly this duty is 
owed to the creditors as a whole and not to individual creditors. Thus 
the positions are the same except that a creditor has no concept of a 
derivative action on which to rely. 
In the restricted circumstances of insolvency, or near insolvency, the 
interests of creditors should be taken into account. It is the interests of 
creditors only however, not those of employees, customers, the public 
or the nation at large. There is no question of directors exercising their 
powers for the public good. To suggest that they are required to do so 
is to falsely present and extend the principles laid down in the recent 
cases beyond the scope envisaged by their authors. 
110 To the extent that certain requirements designed for the protection of creditors are 
imposed on solvent companies by the Corporations Law a fiduciary relationship 
between creditors and officers of solvent companies is recognised by the legislation. 
The officers of the company are in effect the trustees of the rights granted to creditors 
by these provisions. This aspect provides some scope to argue that directors are 
trustees for creditors' rights even where a solvent company is concerned. Cf. Baxt An 
Introduction to Company Law (4th edition) Law Book Co Ltd (1987), p.183; Baxt, 
(1986) 69 All 102 at 104. 
111 The rule applied in a number of American States is that "upon the insolvency of the 
ordinary private corporation a quasi trust relationship arises between its directors and 
creditors" (Whitfield v Kern 192 A 48 (1937); and see 19 Corpus Juris Secundum, 
Corporations, pars 837). The Supreme Court of the United States has approved of 
this principle. (Pepper v Litton 308 US 295 (1939)). Possibly the American doctrine of 
"unjust enrichment," currently gaining acceptance in Australia, also provides some 
justification for this view. 
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A company does have a legal personality separate from shareholders. 
Normally, however, the company's personality and that of its 
shareholders will be identical. In some situations a second personality 
will be discernible. A personality characterised by the interests of 
creditors. In truth companies are best perceived as schizoid. 
7. 	Conclusion 
It was observed in this chapter that traditionally directors have been 
regarded as owing a duty to their company to act in good faith. This 
has been characterised as a duty to act in the best interests of the 
shareholders of the company. Recent authority has supported the 
extension of this principle to encompass a duty to the creditors of the 
company, at least where the company is insolvent or of doubtful 
solvency. 
This development has been criticised by most commentators who 
favour a re-affirmation of the traditional, -conceptually attractive, 
position. It was argued, however, that many of these criticisms ignore 
the element of insolvency generally required by the supporting 
authorities as a pre-requisite for the existence of the duty. Proper 
regard to this feature allows these new developments to be rationalised 
with the traditional view. 
However, although these developments can be reconciled with 
traditional principles, practical and conceptual difficulties remain, mainly 
arising from the overly simple nature of the duty given the complexities 
involved and the uncertainty arising from the fact of its novel and recent 
origins. In particular, the duty poses substantial practical difficulties 
both for directors who must satisfy it and for the judiciary who must 
enforce it. Whether such a simply expressed principle is workable, 
particularly given the varying classes of creditors, must be doubtful. 
Furthermore, to the extent that it generates uncertainty for corporate 
management, there is a potential for the principle to have an adverse 
impact on business and the economy. 
On the other hand, the fact that the judiciary has considered it 
appropriate to establish the duty suggests that a need exists for the 
extension, in some circumstances, of liability to corporate officials for 
debts owed to creditors. Ultimately, it must be questioned whether 
developments of this significance should be left to the domain of the 
judiciary or whether this is more appropriately an area for legislative 
reform after consideration of all the ramifications. 
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Whilst it is, therefore, argued that the recovery mechanism afforded to 
creditors by this common law duty could be more appropriately 
provided in another guise this development assists in identifying 
underlying themes which must be addressed in any reform agenda. 
Firstly it identifies the insolvency of a company as the critical 
determinant of when creditors' interests become paramount. Secondly 
there is a recognition that there is a change in underlying interests, in 
effect the risks associated with the enterprise are transferred to the 
creditors, at the instance of insolvency. Thirdly the common feature of 
the cases supporting the development of the duty, namely that the 
companies at issue exhibited an assimilation of managerial and 
shareholder interests, suggests that the means of creditor protection 
and recovery may need to vary with the specifics of the corporate 
arrangement. Fourthly the criticisms of the common law development, 
that it is theoretically inconsistent with traditional jurisprudence, does 
not mesh with the existing legislative provisions directed at fraudulent 
and reckless trading and places a too greater onus on corporate 
management illustrates that a coherent and integrated approach to the 
development of a creditor recovery regime is required. Finally the 
uncertainty as to whether individual creditors have a cause of action for 
breach of the duty illustrates the need to resolve whether a creditor 
recovery regime ought be collective or otherwise. These considerations 
will be further examined in chapters 9 and 11. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE FIRST DEFAULTING OFFICER PROVISION 
- THE MISFEASANCE PROVISION 
"The Conscience of the company, as well as its management, is 
confided to its directors". 
Lord Ternpleman, 
Winkworth v Edward Baron Development Co Ltd [1987] 1 All ER 114 at 
118. 
1. 	Introduction 
Prior to the enactment of the fraudulent trading provision the 
obligations of corporate officials to corporate creditors was the domain 
of the common law. The companies legislation did, however, provide a 
summary procedure designed to expedite such actions. With the 
introduction of the fraudulent and reckless trading provisions this 
summary procedure lost its significance. 
In chapter 3 it was observed that the judiciary has recently advanced 
the proposition that in particular circumstances directors owe a duty to 
creditors. The courts have drawn a distinction between a solvent and 
an insolvent company. The duty to creditors only arises where the 
company is insolvent or where the officer concerned has "knowledge of 
a real risk of insolvency") It has been argued that there are no 
conceptual difficulties in the proposition that a duty to creditors is owed 
by the directors of an insolvent company. 2 Although the interests of• a 
company and its shareholders are normally to be assimilated, in the 
case of a company of doubtful solvency different considerations apply. 
Even though the trusteeship remains the same it could be said that 
different beneficiaries are nominated. In other words, in an insolvent 
company the directors are trustees for the creditors. 
The recent development of this common law duty has provided the 
summary procedure with renewed importance as it provides the 
mechanism by which the duty is to be enforced. 3 The development of 
1 	Grove v Flavel (1986) 43 SASR 410 at 421; (1986) 4 ACLC 654 at 663. 
2 	See chapter 3. 
3 	For example, it was relied upon by the liquidator in Kinsela & Anor v Russell Kinsela 
Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (1986) 4 NSWLR 722; (1986) 4 ACLC 215. 
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the provision establishing this procedure, commonly known as the 
"misfeasance provision" 4, will be examined in this chapter. 
Furthermore, the features of the current Australian provision will be 
explored in the context of their suitability for the enforcement of the 
duty owed to creditors. 
The current Australian misfeasance provision is contained in S.598 of 
the Corporations Law, repeating S.542 of the Companies Code. The 
operative section is sub-section 2 which reads as follows: 
"(2) Subject to sub-section (3), where, on application by the 
Commission or a prescribed person, the Court is satisfied that - 
(i) a person is guilty of fraud, negligence, default, breach of 
trust or breach of duty in relation to a corporation; and 
(ii) the corporation has suffered, or is likely to suffer, loss or 
damage as a result of the fraud, negligence, default, 
breach of trust or breach of duty, 
the Court may make such order or orders as it thinks appropriate 
against or in relation to the person (including either or both of the 
orders specified in sub-section (4)) and may so make an order 
against or in relation to a person notwithstanding that the person 
may have committed an offence in respect of the matter to which 
the order relates". 5 
The other four subsections specify who has locus standi, codify the 
rights of the defendant, specify the types of orders that may be made 
under the provision, and provide that applications pursuant to the 
section will not bar the institution of other proceedings, in particular 
criminal proceedings. 
The purpose of this provision is, today, 6 recognised as to provide a 
summary recovery procedure predicated on the need to realise the 
assets of a company and, as far as possible, to meet the claims of 
creditors expeditiously in order that a liquidation is conducted in an 
4 	The phrase "misfeasance provision" is the colloquialism by which the provision 
contained in the various companies legislation empowering the court to impose 
personal liability on delinquent officers has become known. This provision applies to a 
variety of forms of delinquency of which misfeasance has occupied most of the courts' 
time. 
5 	Cosmetic changes to this provision effected by the Corporate Law Reform Act 1992 
are noted in chapter 10, section 6.3. 
6 	As discussed below, this has not always been appreciated and at one time the 
judiciary flirted with giving the provision a much greater significance. 
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orderly and effective manner. 7 
Significance of provision 
It will be argued that the provision is significant for a number of 
reasons. Firstly it was initially interpreted as providing a general cause 
of action against misbehaving directors. Whilst this interpretation was 
subsequently displaced the concept provides an interesting reform 
possibility. 
Secondly, to the extent that the provision provides a summary 
procedure by which to enforce various causes of action against 
defaulting corporate management, it is a focal element in the creditor 
recovery mechanism provided by the common law duty. 8 Indeed to the 
extent that the impact of this duty is directly related to the ability of 
liquidators and creditors to enforce it, the provision provides an 
important element of the rights of creditors against defaulting corporate 
officers. Thus the adequacy of the provision from the perspective of the 
support it provides for the enforcement of this duty will be explored. 
Whilst it will be argued that the provision is generally adequate for this 
purpose there must be some doubt as to the appropriateness of the 
summary procedure in the difficult cases which typically arise in the 
enforcement of the common law duty. This serves to cast further doubt 
on the desirability of the common law duty as an element of a creditor 
recovery regime. 
2. 	Legislative Origins of S.598 
2.1 United Kingdom developments 
The provision has its origins in the Joint Stock Companies (Winding 
Up) Acts of 1844 and 1848. The stated purpose of this legislation was 
to address the need for legislation to facilitate the winding up of the 
affairs of companies unable to meet their pecuniary engagements. 8 
Accordingly it was surprising that absent from these Acts were 
provisions dealing with civil proceedings against defaulting officers by 
parties who had incurred losses by virtue of their dealings with 
insolvent companies. If such a party wished to pursue an action 
7 	Per the Companies and Securities Law Review Committee, Enforcement of the duties 
of directions and officers of a company by means of a statutory derivative action, 
Report No 12 (November 1990), at paragraph 272. 
8 	This provision is complemented by other provisions, for example those imposing a 
duty of co-operation with the liquidator and those empowering the liquidator to 
investigate dealings and conduct: see Oditah, "Misfeasance proceedings against 
company directors", [1992] LMCLQ 207. 
9 	7 & 8 Vict C.111 and 11 & 12 Vict C.45. 
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against the directors then it was necessary to utilise the normal court 
proceedings and commence the action by way of a bill. Normally such 
proceedings would be instigated by the liquidator or by the company 
members suing on behalf of the company. Thus the action had to be 
finalised before the liquidation of the company could be concluded with 
the result that the existence of these proceedings with their attendant 
pre-trial procedures and delays could significantly delay the liquidation. 
These considerations probably induced the enactment in the 
Companies Act 1862 (UK) of S.165, the first misfeasance provisionlo. 
This was, at the time, the only provision directed at defaulting officers. 
The section was amended by the Companies (Winding Up) Act 1890. 
These amendments included a number of extensions to the application 
of the provisions. They were, together with some subsequent minor 
amendments, consolidated by the Companies (Consolidation) Act 
1908. The resultant provision, S.215, was to remain on the statute 
books substantially unaltered until 1985. In that year the current United 
Kingdom provision was enacted, namely S.21.2 of the Insolvency Act 
1986. 
This provision makes some changes including the adoption of certain 
recommendations by the Jenkins Committee made 23 years 
previously. 11 That Committee had noted that the existing provision did 
not encompass proceedings for actionable negligence nor did it 
empower a court to make orders in respect to a receiver of a company. 
Both of these matters have been addressed. 
Further changes include the addition of the requirement that an 
applicant obtain the leave of the court before proceeding against the 
liquidator or administrator of a company. 12 Also a contributory must 
now obtain the leave of the court before making an application, 13 
10 	"165. Where, in the course of the winding-up of any company under this Act, it appears 
that any past or present director, manager, official or other liquidator, or any officer of 
such company, has misapplied or retained in his own hands or become liable or 
accountable for any monies of the company, or been guilty of any misfeasance or 
breach of trust in relation to the company, the Court may, on the application of any 
liquidator, or of any creditor or contributory of the company, notwithstanding that the 
offence is one for which the offender is criminally responsible, examine into the 
conduct of such director, manager, or other officer, and compel him to repay any 
monies so misapplied or retained, or for which he has become liable or accountable, 
together with Interest after such rate as the Court thinks just, or to contribute such 
sums of money to the assets of the company by way of compensation in respect of 
such misapplication, retainer, misfeasance, or breach of trust, as the court thinks just." 
11 	Cmnd. 1749. 
12 	ss (4). 
13 	ss (5). 
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although the section provides that an application, can be made by a 
contributory notwithstanding that he will not benefit from any order 
made, thereby reversing an established principle. 14 
2.2 Australian developments 
In Australia, the misfeasance provision also dates from the 1860's first 
appearing in Queensland in 1863 and being subsequently enacted by 
all the other States. 15 Its legislative development paralleled that of the 
United Kingdom provision until the implementation of the co-operative 
legislation where it appeared as S.305 of the Uniform Companies Acts 
(1961-1962). 16 
Although the Uniform Companies Acts contained many of the Jenkins 
Committee recommendations, surprisingly the misfeasance provision 
was not extended to encompass negligence proceedings. However, in 
1966, Victoria enacted the Companies (Defaulting Officers) Act which 
effected a number of major reforms to the defaulting officer provisions 
resulting in the replacement of S.305 with S.367B. These reforms 
included the restriction of locus standi to the Attorney General or any 
person authorised by him and the relaxation of the requirement that the 
company be in the course of being wound up. The provision was now 
to apply to companies which fell within the terms of S.367C, that is, to 
companies in various forms of financial difficulties. This category 
included companies which had ceased to carry on business or were 
unable to pay their debts, the provision specifying circumstances in 
which these requirements would be deemed satisfied. In particular a 
company would be deemed unable to pay its debts where execution 
14 	Traditionally a contributory did not have locus standi unless he had a direct pecuniary 
interest in the success of the application: Bentinck v Fenn (1887) 12 App Cas 652; 
Gibson's Executor v Gibson [1978] S C 197 at 203-204; Re B Johnson & Co (Builders) 
Ltd [1955] Ch 634 at 786. 
15 	Qld. S.166 (1863), Vic. S.149 (1864), S.A. S.151 (1864), Tas. S.200 (1869), N.S.W. 
S.216 (1874), W.A. S.181 (1893). 
16 	"(1) If in the course of the winding up of a company it appears that a person who has 
taken part in the formation or promotion of the company or any past or present 
liquidator or officer has misapplied or retained or become liable or accountable for any 
money or property of the company or been guilty of any misfeasance or breach of trust 
in relation to the company, the Court may, on the application of the liquidator or of any 
creditor or contributory, examine into the conduct of that person liquidator, or officer 
and compel him to repay or restore the money or property or any part thereof with 
interest at such rate as the Court thinks just or to contribute such sum to the assets of 
the company by way of compensation in respect of the misapplication, retainer, 
misfeasance, or breach of trust as the Court thinks just." Ss.(2) is considered below. 
Ss.(3) provided that the section applied notwithstanding that the offender was also 
criminally liable. The section is based on S.227 of the Companies Act 1958 (Vic.) with 
Ss. (2) being taken from S.308 of the Companies Act 1936 (N.S.W.). 
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proceedings were returned unsatisfied in whole or in part. 17 
During the 1970's this provision was the subject of various 
amendments, the most significant being the adoption by all States, 
except Tasmania, of the Jenkins Committee recommendation 18 that the 
provision be extended to provide a summary procedure for negligence 
actions. This was effected by replacing the word "misfeasance" with 
"negligence, default, breach of duty". 19 
This initiative was also coupled with the extension of the category of 
persons having automatic locus standi by the introduction of the 
concept of a "prescribed person". Those prescribed included 
liquidators, contributories and official managers but not creditors. 20 
Thus there was a partial return to the position that existed under and 
prior to the Uniform Companies Acts. 
It is difficult to discern the precise legislative policy underlying the 
repeal of the traditional misfeasance provision in S.305 and its 
replacement with S.367B, particularly the change in the standing of 
creditors. 21 The extension of the category of persons with locus standi 
did remove an inconsistency which existed between the misfeasance 
provision and fraudulent and reckless trading provisions. Under the 
latter, liquidators and similar officers had always had automatic locus 
standi and the provisions specifically allowed contributories or creditors 
locus standi provided they had the consent of the Commission. 
Arguably, all of these parties could have been authorised by the 
Commission to commence proceedings under S.367B prior to the 
amendments, but nevertheless prima facie an anomaly existed. 
Unfortunately, in relation to creditors the anomaly was maintained. 
17 	No. 7501. Identical amendments were enacted in West Australia (No. 98/1969), 
Queensland (No. 8/1971) and South Australia (No. 52 1971/72). The amendments 
were also enacted in New South Wales (No. 61/1971) but with the inclusion of a sub-
section empowering the court to award costs against any person making an 
application without reasonable cause. In all States, reference to the Attorney General 
(or crown law officer) was subsequently replaced by reference to the Corporate Affairs 
Commission (aid No. 71/1975; W.A. No. 100/1975; Vic. No. 8787; S.A. No. 54/1979; 
N.S.W. No. 61/1971). 
18 Supra. 
19 Effected by the second set of amendments referred to in footnote 12. In N.S.W. the 
amendment was effected by No. 20/1973. Cf. S. 212(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986 
(UK) The W.A. amendment was incomplete: contrast S.367B (1)(b) and (1)(d). 
20 	Ibid. 
21 	O'Donovan and McPherson - The Law of Company Liquidation (3rd edition), Law Book 
Co Ltd 1987, p.362. 
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2.3 The features of S.598 
The Companies Code replaced S.367B with S.542, which was copied 
to the Corporations Law as S.598. Changes initiated by this provision 
included: 
(i) The removal of the requirement that the company concerned be 
insolvent or experiencing financial difficulties. 
(ii) The separation of the power to conduct an examination, if it 
previously existed, from the provisions relating to awarding 
compensation orders and its enactment as a separate provision. 
A similar amendment would seem to have been envisaged by 
the New South Wales legislature in 1973 but subsequent 
amendments in New South Wales ignored this innovation. 23 
(iii) The abolition of the requirement that the persons against whom 
the court may make orders are to have "taken part in the 
formation, promotion, administration, management or winding-
up" of the company. 
(iv) The extension of the relevant acts of default to include fraud 
together with the deletion of the alternative of establishing the 
retention or misapplication of company money or property or 
other accountability. 
(v) The legislative acknowledgment of a requirement that the 
company have suffered or be likely to suffer loss or damage. 
(vi) The specification of the types of orders that the court may award. 
These include injunctive type orders and it would seem that the 
court's discretion has been extended beyond that provided by 
S.367B. On the other hand S.367B empowered the court to 
award interest, whereas S.598 is silent on this point. 
(vii) The deletion of the provisions as to unfair or unjust payments or 
transfers to officers and as to awards of costs against applicants. 
(viii) The specification that the onus of proof required is that the court 
be "satisfied" as to the elements contained in the provision. This 
would seem to add nothing because the ambiguous phrases, "If 
... it appears ..." and "Where it appears to the (applicant) ..." 
22 See below. 
23 See S.7(b)(iv) No. 20/1973 and Schedule 14 of No. 1/1976. 
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contained in the earlier provisions has always been interpreted 
as requiring the court to be satisfied on the balance of 
probabilities. 24 
(ix) The removal of automatic locus standi being granted to 
contributories. 
2.4 The relevance of the section 
It is apparent from the development described above that the 
legislature has over the past century and a quarter gradually extended 
the scope of this provision. It is , therefore, initially surprising to note 
that notwithstanding this enlargement of the provision, the most 
significant feature of the case law in recent times is the rarity with 
which it has been relied upon. A feature of the law reports of the 
Chancery and Equity division of the late nineteenth century is the 
number of misfeasance provision cases reported. Today they are 
unusual indeed, 25 the reason probably being the availability of the 
reckless and fraudulent trading provisions. 
The absence of these latter provisions well into the twentieth century 26 
reflected the fact that the misfeasance provision was seen as the 
panacea for all the ills arising from directors' malfeasance. As it was 
the only provision dealing with defaulting officers there were many 
attempts by applicants to stretch its application. Generally these 
attempts were resisted by the courts. However, they illustrated a need 
which, had the provision been held to cater for, would have obviated 
the need for the subsequent enactment of the reckless and fraudulent 
trading provisions. It is arguable that had the courts accepted that, in 
the insolvency context, a trustee relationship exists between the 
directors and creditors, then an adequate creditor recovery regime 
would have existed without the need for legislative intervention. 
24 For a discussion of the problems presented by this terminology see Wren v Lyndon 
[1972] ALC 40-050; and also see Re Boyagarra Pty Ltd (in lig.); Evans v Dean & Ors 7 
ACLR 612 at 613. 
25 A reversal in this trend may be expected with the development of the duty owed to 
creditors. 
26 The first fraudulent trading provision was S.75 of the Companies Act 1928 (UK), first 
appearing in Australia as S.275 Companies Act 1938 (Vic.). The first reckless trading 
provisions was S.303(3) of the Uniform Companies Acts (1961-62). 
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3. 	Procedural Provision only or Cause of Action? 
Probably the most significant debate over the scope of the provision 
concerned whether the provision merely provided a summary 
procedure whereby actions against officers based on an existing cause 
of action could be speedily brought or whether it provided a new 
statutory cause of action for default. This issue was first considered by 
JesseIs M.R. in In re Canadian Land Reclaiming and Colonizing 
Company; sub nom Coventry and Dixons case in 1880.27 The Master 
of the Rolls upheld a summons by a liquidator against two persons who 
had knowingly acted as directors without holding the appropriate share 
qualification. His Lordship considered this to be "as plain a case of 
misfeasance or misconduct as you can possibly state" 28 and had no 
hesitation in finding them liable under the misfeasance provision. 
The English Court of Appea1 28 overturned this decision on the basis 
that the provision did not create any new liability and for the section to 
apply the liquidator had to show something which would have 
constituted a cause of action by the company. James L.J. explained his 
divergence from the view of the Master of the Rolls on the basis that 
JesseIs M.R. was not "construing the Act but legislating for the purpose 
of putting a stop to a proceeding which is no doubt wrong ... ".° 
Similarly, in the words of Bramwell J., the directors had only committed 
"misfeasance in the abstract" 31 whereas what was required was 
actionable misfeasance. 
The English Court of Appeal had cause to reconsider this decision in In 
re Anglo-French Co-Operative Society; Ex parte Pelly in 1882. 32 In this 
case the summons was upheld on the basis that there was clearly a 
misapplication of company funds amounting to a breach of trust, and 
thus Coventry and Dixons case could be distinguished. Nevertheless, it 
is interesting to note that of the three members of the Court of Appeal, 
Cotton L.J. expressed approval of the principle established in that 
case, Jessels M.R. was silent on the issue, and Brett L.J. delivered a 
stinging attack on the decision stating that he was "extremely sorry" for 
the restrictive interpretation placed on the provision by that case 
because he had: 
27 (1880) 14 Ch D 660, 668. 
28 Id, 664. 
29 (1880) 14 Ch D 668. 
30 . 1d, 669. 
31 Id, 672. 
32 (1882) 2 Ch D 492, 499. 
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"always thought that that section was the most salutary section in the 
whole of the Act and one intended to meet ... in the very widest terms, 
transactions which have become a perfect scandal in the getting up of 
companies in this country." 33 
Nevertheless, his Lordship felt himself bound by the earlier authority. 34 
New amendments, old arguments 
Whilst this appeared to settle the issue to the effect that the provision 
was merely a procedural section 35 the issue recently resurfaced in 
Australia in another guise. 
Whilst it is arguable that the summary procedure provided by the 
misfeasance provision is not appropriate as a vehicle by which to 
conduct negligence proceedings 36 the Jenkins Committee nevertheless 
recommended that the provision be amended to include negligence, 
and subsequently legislative changes were effected by most 
jurisdictions. The Australian amendments gave rise to some difficult 
questions as to the effective commencement date of the amendment. 
An analysis of the earlier caselaw, together with the Jenkins 
Committee recommendation, renders the purpose of these 
amendments plain, viz, to bring within the scope of the summary 
proceedings claims founded in negligence. 37 However, in Kimberley 
Mineral Holdings (In Liquidation) v Triguboff38 it was argued that the 
amendment created new liabilities and accordingly should be 
33 	Id, 505. 
34 The interpretation of the misfeasance provision as not giving rise to an independent 
cause of action is indicative of nineteenth century formalism and has parallels in the 
interpretation of other legislation. For example the provisions of the English Judicature 
Act 1873 dealing with the jurisdiction of the courts to grant interlocutory injunctions 
were interpreted as merely confirming the pre-existing jurisdiction of the courts and not 
extending that jurisdiction. See especially North London Railway Co v Great Northern 
Railway Co (1883) 11 QB D 30 where the Court maintained the necessity for there to 
be an existing cause of action before injunctive relief could be entertained taking the 
view that the Act dealt only with procedure, not jurisdiction. Again Jessel M.R. took a 
more liberal view opining that the jurisdiction of granting injunctions was practically 
unlimited: Beddow v Beddow (1878) 9 Ch D 89 at 93. Generally see Tilbury, Civil 
Remedies, Butterworths Sydney 1990 at pp 303-305 and the authorities and 
references he cites there. 
35 Also see In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company Limited [1925] 1 Ch D 407; 
Because the provision is procedural only then the limitation period for the purposes of 
the Statute of Limitations commences from the date the cause of action arose and not 
from the date of the winding-up. (In re JE Hurdley & Son Ltd (in Lig) [1941] NZLR 686, 
711; Re Maney & Sons De Laxe Service Station Ltd [1969] NZLR 116 and Official 
Assignee v Fuller [1981] 2 NZLR 110.) 
36 	Oditah, Op. cit. 212 and see the discussion in section 4.1.2 below. 
37 	See section 4.1.2 below. 
38 [1978] ACLC 40-412; 4 ACLR 851; [1980] 1 NSWLR 210. 
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construed prospectively as applying only to such events as occurred 
after it came into operation and not retrospectively as would have been 
the case if the provision remained procedural. The essence of the 
argument was that company officers are now to be liable inter alia for 
negligence whereas previously they were liable only for misfeasance or 
breach of trust. 
Needham J. rejected the proposition that by using the word negligence 
the legislature was creating a new subject matter of liability. This could 
not be inferred from the section and in fact there were indications to the 
contrary. 39 
This decision was followed by the Full Court of South Australia in Re 
Claridge House Ltd (in liq); Mount v Tomlinson & Anor; Small v 
Burton.40 It had been argued in that case that the amendment had 
been effected to overrule the decision in Re B Johnson & Co (Builders) 
Ltd which held inter alia that a case of common law negligence was not 
within the section. It was submitted that accordingly the word 
"negligence" in S.367B meant common law negligence such that the 
section should be treated as dealing with the substantive law. This 
interpretation of negligence was rejected in favour of a construction 
that it meant negligent acts of a director of the company for which he 
has always been liable. 
These decisions are in accordance with the purpose behind the 
amendment as explained by the Jenkins Committee. Although the 
intention of the amendments was to displace the decision in Re B 
Johnson & Co (Builders) Ltd the effect of that is not to bring all 
common law negligence actions within the scope of the provision but 
only such negligence actions as the substantive law allows against 
di rectors.41 
39 	Furthermore, in his Honour's view, the proposition that negligence was, prior to the 
enactment of the amendment, unknown in the relationship of a company and its 
directors was false. Directors who breached the standard of care immortalised by 
Romer J. in In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company committed acts properly 
characterised as negligence which have long been the subject of a liability to the 
company. 
40 (1980) 6 ACLR 81. 
41 	Some would argue that the interpretation of the term 'negligence' by the courts in 
Triguboffs and Tomlinsons cases was too narrow: Baxt 54 AU 229 at 231. O'Donovan 
states that the result of these cases is that the amendment did not affect the principle 
that mere negligence did not suffice to attract liability unless the act or omission was 
one, which independently of the misfeasance provision, would constitute a breach of 
duty (op. cit., 362). Also see Oditah (op. cit., 212-213) who also doubts whether the 
amendment has the effect of including 'mere negligence' within the purview of the 
provision. 
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Thus again this was an attempt to give the misfeasance provision an 
effect on the substantive law. This time, however, the argument was 
advanced by directors in an effort to defend claims against them rather 
than by those seeking redress.42 
Thus it is now beyond doubt that the provision does not affect the 
substantive law but provides a summary procedure, the significance of 
which is that a matter can be resolved speedily without recourse to 
pleadings and pre-trial procedure but with the simple expedience of an 
application for directions if necessary. It will be observed below that 
this has given rise to the argument that the procedure is only available 
in simple cases, and to considerable discussion as to the procedure 
which should be adopted and as to the availability or otherwise of third 
party proceedings and set offs. 
The need for this summary procedure is to prevent liquidations from 
being unduly delayed whilst the liquidator pursues an action against 
defaulting officers. It has been recently illustrated that no such action is 
available once the liquidation has concluded, 43 and in any event a 
liquidation could not be settled until outstanding actions against 
company officers are resolved. 
The significance of the interpretation of the provision rejected in 
Coventry and Dixons case cannot be understated. Had the view of 
JesseIs M.R. prevailed then the provision would have constituted a 
statutory cause of action against defaulting officers and the pressures 
on the legislature which gave rise to the enactment of the reckless and 
fraudulent trading provisions during the twentieth century may not have 
eventuated. Creditors would have been able to proceed against 
company officers for misfeasance or breach of duty even in the 
absence of a direct duty being owed to them. Further, this cause of 
action would have been vested in them individually, a state of affairs 
which the recently developed directors' duty to creditors is yet to 
acknowledge. It would seem that this interpretation could have 
prevailed had his Honour, in his capacity as Master of the Rolls, simply 
constituted the Appeal Court differently.44 
The finding that the provision is procedural only presented a great blow 
to opponents of the limited company concept who perceived the 
42 	This probably illustrates the shift in the balance that had taken place during the 
preceding century as evidenced by the legislative amendments effected by Parliament 
and the more stringent approach to directors duties demonstrated by the judiciary. 
43 Re Claridge House Ltd (in Liq); Mount v Tomlinson & Anor (1980) 6 ACLR 81. 
44 
	
	Had the Court of Appeal comprised of Jesse! M.R. and Brett L.J. their interpretation of 
the provision would have prevailed. 
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companies legislation as the "Rogues' charter". Now the avenue for 
some control over abuses of the corporate form had been severely 
curtailed. However, if the general law duties of company officials to the 
public, contributories and creditors in particular, could be extended, 
then together with a liberal interpretation of the requirements to be 
satisfied in order for the misfeasance provision procedure to be 
available, such developments could provide the necessary control over 
defaulting officers. 
Indeed, developments in directors' duties were forthcoming. 45 
However, the focus of this duty was restricted to misconduct or 
negligence, vis-a-vis contributories. Directors were seen as owing no 
duties to creditors. They could loosely be characterized as trustees of 
the property of contributories, as was observed in chapter 3, but it was 
not until very recently that they were recognized as trustees of the 
property of creditors, albeit in the limited context of a near insolvent 
company. 
Thus the general law has been slow to recognize any obligations on 
the part of directors towards creditors. Now that a duty has been 
recognised the question arises as to whether the current misfeasance 
provision is an adequate vehicle by which to enforce the duty. In order 
to examine this question it is proposed to analyse the elements 
required to be satisfied for the section to apply together with any other 
restrictions or special considerations associated with it. 
4. 	The Features of the S.598 Proceedings and the Duty to 
Creditors 
4.1 What causes of action may be brought by misfeasance 
summons? 
4.1.1 Clear application to duty to creditors 
The courts, having established that the provision was procedural only, 
rendered it necessary for an applicant to show a cause of action in 
order for the provision to be applicable. The provision traditionally 
required proof of a cause of action amounting to: 
(i) 	a misapplication or retention or liability or accountability of or for 
any money or property of the company, or 
45 	The seminal authority is In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company Limited [1925] 1 
Ch 407. 
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(ii) 	a misfeasance or breach of trust. 
There have been no reported decisions dealing solely with this first 
category and rather its relevance has generally been as an aid to the 
interpretation of the second category. In any event, the first category 
does not appear in S.598. 
The second category has, on the other hand, given rise to considerable 
judicial comment, in particular as to the meaning of the term 
"misfeasance". As observed above the word "misfeasance" has been 
replaced with the words "negligence, default, breach of duty". 46 The 
significance of this shall be discussed shortly. 
As to the term "breach of trust", 47 it too has received little judicial 
attention except as an aid in the interpretation of the word 
"misfeasance". 48 In S.212 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) the phrase 
"breach of trust" has been replaced by "breach of any fiduciary or other 
duty". The terms "trust" and "fiduciary" would seem interchangeable 
and the reference to "other duty" would seem to be intended to bring 
proceedings for negligence within the ambit of the provision. 
S.598 has also added the category of fraud. This was arguably 
covered by the provision in any respect although there are no reported 
decisions dealing with the issue.49 
Clearly proceedings for breach of the duty to creditors are within the 
jurisdiction of the provision as currently defined. It is, however, 
proposed to briefly explore whether this would have been the case 
under the traditional form of the provision and also to consider the 
potential scope of the current Australian provision. 
4.1.2 "Misfeasance" defined 
In chapter 3 some contention as to the source of the duty to creditors 
46 	See the discussion in section 2.2. 
47 Cf. S.423(1) of the South African Companies Act which uses the expression "breach of 
faith or trust". 
48 	Murphy J., of the Victorian Supreme Court, gave some indication as to what is meant 
by the term when he stated in Re Insurance Associates[1974] ACLC 40-124 : "It does 
seem therefore to me that directors act in breach of trust qua property and moneys of 
the company which is in their hands or under their control if they apply such property or 
money in a manner which is beyond the powers of the company." 
49 Although see Southern Cross Commodities Pty Ltd (in liq) v Ewing (1987) 5 ACLC 
1110; "Whilst [S.367B] provides a remedy at law, it speaks in the language of equity ... 
it contemplates ... liabilities in equity ... [and] that transactions caught by it may well be 
fraudulent". (p.1124). 
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was identified. Whilst the prevailing view would appear to be that its 
source is in the fiduciary duties owed by company directors to their 
companies there is an opposing view that it is sourced in torts law 
principles, in particular the tort of negligence. 
Whilst it would appear, from the analysis below, that proceedings for 
breach of this duty could readily have been brought under the 
traditional misfeasance provision given the prevalent view of the 
source of the action, if, on the other hand, the action in properly 
sourced in negligence the application of the provision is more 
problematical. Ultimately the issue is one as to the meaning of the term 
"misfeasance". 
"Misfeasance" can be defined as the improper performance of a lawful 
act. 50 Thus, its scope is very broad and soon after the enactment of the 
first misfeasance provision the courts were required to define the term 
with greater precision. In Coventry and Dixons case the Court held that 
the word in the section meant misfeasance in the nature of a breach of 
trust, resulting in some actual loss to the company. This was soon 
taken to be the settled position. 51 
Why the courts decided to restrict the interpretation of the term in such 
a manner is not initially apparent until it is recognised that in many of 
these early cases the courts were forging a general statement of 
liability for directors. If there was no cause of action apparent upon an 
application under the misfeasance provision, then it was unnecessary 
to define the term. However, many of the earlier decisions either 
ignored the fact that the misfeasance provision did not provide a cause 
of action or confused the two steps, viz. (i) determining whether the 
claim was one for misfeasance and (ii) determining whether a cause of 
action existed. Hence the term misfeasance became restricted to a 
misfeasance in the nature of a breach of trust because this was 
effectively the limitation placed upon a company's cause of action for 
wrongdoing against directors. 52 
This may also serve to explain why the draftsman initially restricted the 
provision to actions in the nature of misfeasance (assuming that the 
narrow interpretation of this term is correct) and did not include 
negligence within the category of wrongful acts to which the provision 
50 	The Dictionary of English Law (Vol. 2) I - J, by Earl Jowitt, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
1959 at p. 1179. 
51 The judgment of Lord MacNaghten in Bentinck v Fenn (1887) 12 App Cas 652 at 669 
is often cited as stating the settled position. 
52 Apart from fraud, the main causes of action enjoyed by creditors were for ultra vires 
acts or for breach of warranty of authority; Halsbury (4th edition) p.301-302. See 
chapter 2. 
Page 113 
Chapter 4 
The Misfeasance Provision 
applied. It may be that the draftsman of 1862 simply could not 
envisage proceedings for negligence being brought against directors. 
Application to negligence proceedings 
Early caselaw 
The cause of action against directors was initially allied to the 
assimilation of the position of the director with that of a trustee. Soon 
the courts began to emphasize the points of distinction between the 
two capacities 53 and gradually a cause of action in negligence against 
directors was forged. This gave rise to the issue of whether the court 
had jurisdiction to hear negligence proceedings on an application 
under the misfeasance provision. 
The early caselaw discloses a dispute as to whether all negligence 
actions were comprehended by the provision or only those involving 
gross negligence in the nature of a breach of trust. For example, in In 
re Railway and General Light Improvement Company; sub nom 
Marzettis case54 Brett L.J. refused to accept a distinction between 
negligence and gross negligence. Any degree of negligence was 
actionable under the misfeasance provision. 55 A purpcirted 
rationalization of the decisions as to the scope of the misfeasance 
provision was attempted In re Kingston Cotton Mill Company (No. 2). 56 
In that case the English Court of Appeal held that the critical test of 
53 	In particular, directors are required to risk company property, whereas trustees are 
under an obligation to keep trust property safe. See Re International Vending 
Machines Pty Limited and the Companies Act [1962] NSWR 1408 at 1419-1420. 
54 (1879-80) 28 WR 541. 
55 Marzettis case was followed in In re Faure Electric Accumulator Company (1889) 40 
Ch D 141. The important point for present purposes is that the Court in that case 
considered that it had jurisdiction to consider a cause of action founded in gross 
negligence under a misfeasance summons. Also see Lord Hatherley in Overend & 
Gurney Company v Gibb (1870) 5 Law Rep H L 487 and Kekewich J. in In re the 
Liverpool Household Stores Association (Limited) (1890) 59 L J Ch 616, but cf. Brett 
L.J. in Marzettis case (1879-80) 28 WR 541. There are also some observations in the 
judgment of Romer J. in In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company which could be 
interpreted as implying that negligence proceedings could be pursued upon a 
misfeasance summons. Further support for this view is also apparent from the 
judgment of Vaughan-Williams J. in In re New Mashonaland Exploration Company 
[1892] 3 Ch 577 at 585 in which his Lordship stated that whilst It has been held that 
directors are not within the section unless they have been guilty of a misfeasance in 
the nature of a breach of trust clearly if directors are guilty of such negligence that it 
could not be said that in doing what they did they attempted to perform their duty as 
directors, then such directors are guilty of misfeasance. 
56 [1896] 2 Ch 279; This case was interpreted by Evershed M.R. in In re B Johnson & Co 
[1955] Ch 634 as not deciding that any breach of duty which did not involve a 
misapplication of assets was outside the section but rather, the converse, namely that 
where there has been a breach of duty which did in fact result in a misapplication of 
- company property, then such a transaction was within the ambit of the section. Also 
see Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock & ors [1967] 1 WLR 1168 at 1173- 
1174. 
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whether the section would apply was whether there had been a 
misapplication of company assets. This was justified by reference to 
the object of the provision which was to enable the liquidator to recover 
any assets of the company improperly dealt with by an officer. 
Notwithstanding these observations, Maugham J. in In re Etic 
Limited,57 after analyzing many the earlier decisions, stated that the 
provision was limited to cases where there had been something in the 
nature of breach of duty which included a misfeasance or a breach of 
trust in the strict sense. The provision did not authorise a summons 
grounded on misfeasance in the nature of negligence. This decision 
was affirmed in the latest English case on the subject of Re B Johnson 
& Co Builders Limited.58 
Australian cases 
The seminal Australian case on the issue is the High Court Decision in 
Couve v J Pierre Couve Limited (In Liquidation) and Another58 where 
the Court held that a fraudulent preference amounted to a 
misfeasance. The High Court expressly followed the English decisions 
in Coventry and Dixons case, Bentinck v Fenn and In re Etic Limited, 
preferring the narrow meaning of the term "misfeasance". 
The views expressed in Couves case and In Re B Johnson & Co 
(Builders) Limited have been consistently applied in subsequent 
Australian cases. For example, the Full Court of New South Wales 
affirmed these authorities in Hurstville Finance Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) 
v Franklin and Anothe/68 as did the High Court in Walker v Wimboume 
and Others81 where the Court circumvented the requirement by 
characterizing the section as requiring a breach of duty but then taking 
an expansive view of the duty to act in the best interests of the 
57 [1928] Ch 861. 
58 	[1955] Ch 634. Sir R. Evershed M.R. stated: 'There is no such distinct wrongful act 
known to law as misfeasance ... it is not every kind of wrongful act so done that is 
comprehended by the section. At one end of the scale it may, I think, be taken as 
prima facie clear that a wrongful act involving misapplication of property in the hands of 
the person charged would be covered by its terms. At the other end of the scale a 
claim based exclusively on common law negligence, an ordinary claim for damages for 
negligence simply, would not be covered by the section. Nor is such a claim brought 
within the section by the mere expedient of adding epithets to the negligence charged 
calling it 'gross' or 'deliberate'. Nor by that expedient without more can what in truth is 
mere negligence be converted into something else, namely, breach of trust. In 
between the two extremes I have mentioned, there is obviously a large range of 
conduct which may (or may not) be within the section. I shall follow others in not 
attempting any precise definition of what does or does not fall within it." 
59 	(1933) 49 CLR 486; also see Re Yorke (Stationers) Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [1965] 
NSWLR 446. 
60 (1968) 70 SR (NSW) 350 at 361. 
61 	(1976) 50 ALJR 446; also see Re Boyagarra et al (1982-83) 7 ACLR 612. 
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company. 62 
Application to nonfeasance 
Whether the misfeasance provision authorises a summons to be 
issued grounded in negligence also arose in a serious of decisions in 
which nonfeasance amounting to negligence was alleged. 63 
The first case on point was the 1878 decision of JesseIs M.R. in In re 
Forest of Dean Coal Mining Company64 where his Lordship rejected a 
summons issued against a director for failing to take steps to recover 
money incorrectly paid by the company. His Lordship held that he did 
not believe that the section authorised the court to inquire whether a 
man had or had not properly exercised his discretion in such a case as 
was before him. Rather the section only applied to what his Lordship 
termed fairly plain and ordinary cases of misconduct and was not 
intended to go beyond what was the settled law on the subject before 
the statute was passed. Whilst the contexts are clearly different, this 
decision by his Lordship is somewhat surprising given the approach he 
adopted and views expressed two years later in Coventry and Dixons 
case. 65 
The decision was followed by Fty L.J. in In re Wedgwood Coal and Iron 
Company66 where his Lordship made the observation that the 
legislature plainly did not refer to cases of mere nonfeasance excepting 
those where there had been, in fact, a breach of trust. 67 
62 Also see Re Tropic Isle Limited (supra) where the Full Court of Queensland held that 
mere imprudent investment amounting to common law negligence without more could 
not be pursued upon a misfeasance summons. On the other hand in In re Australasian 
Venezolana Pty Ltd; Olsson v Vogel; Olsson v Best [1962] 4 FLR 60 Eggleston J. of 
the Supreme Court of the A.C.T. would seem to be have been prepared to make 
orders pursuant to a misfeasance summons against a director charged with 
negligence had the liquidator proved that certain monies paid away were irrecoverable. 
No consideration of the authorities was undertaken and the case is dwarfed by the 
weight of authority cited above. 
63 Marzettis case (1879-80) 28 WR 541 and the Mashonaland Exploration case [1892] 3 
Ch 577 would support the proposition that the provision encompasses nonfeasance 
whereas the authorities against the extension of the provision to cover negligence 
must by implication deny the application of the provision to nonfeasance. 
64 (1878) 10 Ch 450. 
65 See the discussion in section 3 above. 
66 (1882) 47 LT 612; followed in In re The Liverpool Household Stores Association 
(Limited) (1890) 59 LJ Ch 616. 
67 Thus in In re Cardiff Savings Bank [1892] 2 Ch 100 it was argued that the failure to 
attend meetings by a president of a bank amounted to a breach of his duties which 
ought to have been performed at those meetings and so there was nonfeasance 
amounting to a breach of trust. The argument was rejected on the basis that there was 
no evidence to indicate that the president knew that the duties of the proper 
management of the bank were not being fulfilled. Thus, for nonfeasance to amount to 
a breach of trust it would seem that knowledge of the default must be brought home to 
the officer concerned. 
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Thus, if the duty is properly sourced in common law negligence there 
must be some doubt as to whether actions against directors for failing 
to take into account the interests of creditors could have been brought 
under the misfeasance provision as it was traditionally drafted. On the 
other hand, it could be argued that such actions are in the nature of a 
breach of trust and so within the exceptional category of negligence 
proceedings that could have been brought by misfeasance summons. 
In any event, as stated previously, such proceedings are clearly within 
the category of the causes of action contemplated by the current 
Australian misfeasance provision. In fact this provision is cast 
particularly broadly and it is to a consideration of the width of its 
application that it is now proposed to turn. 
4.1.3 Jurisdiction of current provision - application to any 
"default" 
Until recently there have been very few cases under S.598 and its 
immediate predecessor probably due to the availability of the 
alternative, and arguably, more extensive statutory causes of action, 
such as those contained in the reckless and fraudulent trading 
provisions. As previously observed, with the recent development of a 
duty of care owned by directors to creditors the provision is again 
gaining popularity. 68 
Another possible avenue for extension in the application of the 
provision was opened by the decision in Re lndopal Pty Ltch9 where 
the Court adopted a very wide interpretation of the word "default". The 
case involved, inter alia, an application by the liquidator under the 
misfeasance provision seeking orders that directors submit a report as 
to the affairs of the company as required by the legislation. The Court 
held that the failure to submit the report amounted to a "default" within 
the meaning of S.598. Furthermore, the company was likely to suffer 
loss as a result of such default by reason that in the absence of a 
proper report as to the affairs of the company the liquidator would 
probably have to seek an order for an examination of one or more of 
68 The Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs observed in their 
Report on the social and fiduciary duties and obligations of company directors 
(November 1989) that the fiduciary duty continued to attract litigation notwithstanding 
the availability of the statutory remedies. This was attributed to the broader and more 
flexible nature of this duty and to the attraction of equitable remedies over those 
available under the legislation (paras 5.58 to 5.62). This prognosis is supported by the 
decisions in Wright v Frisina (1983) 7 ACLR 532 and Re Buchanan Enterprises Pty Ltd 
(No. 3) (1983) 7 ACLR 532 where, in each case, directors were found liable on a 
summons issued under S.367B alleging a breach of the duty to creditors. 
69 (1987) 5 ACLC 278. 
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the officers of the company in order to obtain the information which 
should have been provided by the report. Such an examination would 
involve considerable expense for the company. 
Thus it would appear that the word "default" in S.598 encompasses 
any failure to comply with the Corporations Law. This is a vast 
extension from the earlier requirement of misfeasance amounting to a 
breach of trust. Now any breach of duty, however insignificant, will 
suffice. 
4.2 The requirement of loss 
In addition to proving the requisite wrongful conduct by the respondent 
it is also necessary, pursuant to S.598(2)(b), to prove that the company 
has suffered or is likely to suffer loss or damage as a result of this 
conduct. 
Requirement originally a judicial gloss 
Whilst this loss element was not, until recently, an express requirement 
of the provision, nevertheless the courts have traditionally required the 
applicant to show loss probably because the provision authorises 
orders of a compensatory nature and in order to make such orders the 
court requires evidence of loss. 
There are many obiter pronouncements in the early decisions dealing 
with the provision referring to the need to show loss but the seminal 
authority is the case of Bentinck v Fenn.70 In that case a summons 
against a director for failing to disclose an interest in an asset 
purchased on the company's behalf at a price far exceeding its value 
was dismissed on the basis, inter alia, that no evidence that the alleged 
breach of duty resulted in loss to the assets of the company had been 
adduced. 
This decision was expressly approved by Kekewich J. in In re the 
Liverpool Household Stores Association (Ltd) where his Lordship 
neatly summarised the position as follows: 
"... the complainant is bound to prove a loss occasioned by the acts 
complained of, loss to himself if he be a creditor or a contributory, loss 
to the company, and, through the company, to the creditors or 
contributories if he be the liquidator." 71 
70 Supra. 
71 	(1890) 59 L.1 Ch 616. 
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The requirement had been adopted in numerous Australian 
decisions.72 
When is a loss incurred? 
Whilst circumstances where company funds have been dissipated 
without the acquisition of any asset of equivalent value have readily 
satisfied this loss requirement, circumstances where an asset of some 
form has been acquired or where the "loss" is in the nature of foregone 
profit have proved more problematic. 
Circumstances where it has been argued that no loss had been 
incurred because the company had simply exchanged one asset for 
another are illustrated by the case of Re Insurance Associates. 73 The 
respondent to the summons had arranged a loan from his company to 
a third person to enable that person to purchase from the respondent 
shares in the company at an exorbitant price. The respondent argued 
that the company had not suffered a loss because the company now 
owned a book debt, albeit illegally created, and the asset represented 
by this book debt was equal to the cash advanced. 
Murphy J. rejected this argument holding that it was necessary to look 
at the real money or property position of the company, not simply at 
book entries. It was fallacious to equate a tangible asset represented 
by cash in the bank with an asset represented by an unsecured loan 
for a like amount. 
Whilst this decision is consistent with a line of authority74 the recent 
decision in Re Derek Randall Enterprises Ltd 5 must be taken as 
inconsistent with it. In that case it was held that a company suffered no 
loss when a director who had received a secret commission paid this 
money into a blocked account to secure a guarantee that he had given 
in respect of the company's overdrc.ft. The English Court of Appeal was 
concerned to avoid double recovery attendant on ordering payment to 
the company of the secret profit. However it is clear that what the 
company "received" by way of the payment into the blocked account 
72 	For example, In re Inland Motors Limited (1931) 34 WALR 104 discussed in a 
casenote in the AU (1932) at p. 347; In re JE Hurdley & Son Limited (In Liquidation) 
[1941] NZLR 686; Re Tropic Isle Limited [1967] Qd R 193. 
73 Supra. 
74 Re Canadian Oil Works Corp; Hays case (1875) LR 10 Ch App 593; Re Caerphilly 
Colliery Co; Pearsons case (1877) 5 Ch D 336; Re West Jewell Tin Mining Co; 
Westons case (1879) 10 Ch D 579; Re North Australian Territory Co; Archers case 
[1892] 1 Ch 322; Ex parte PeIly (supra); Re Country Marine Insurance Co; Rances 
case (1870) LR 6 Ch App 104 and Re Carriage Co-operative Supply Assn (1884) 27 
Ch D 322. 
75 [1990] BCC 749. 
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was not the same as the payment of money representing the 
commission. Notably the decision has been the subject of critical 
comment.76 
An example of a profits foregone case is provided by In re North 
Australian Territory Co: sub nom Archers case,77 where a director who 
had derived a secret profit from an agreement with a promoter argued 
that the company had suffered no loss from his alleged breach of duty. 
The English Court of Appeal disagreed on the basis that the failure by 
the director to account to the company for the profit amounted to a loss 
to the company. The fact that the company had been kept out of that 
which it had a right to receive allowed the Court to distinguish Bentinck 
v Fenn and hold the director liable. 
Reasonable commercial decisions not to be reopened 
It would appear that whether the company has properly incurred a loss 
is a commercial decision in which the courts are hesitant to become 
involved. 
In Wilson v Gilbert & Anothern a branch manager of an insurance 
company had committed misfeasance by issuing guarantee bonds 
contrary to his instructions. The company had been required to pay out 
on a number of these bonds or had acknowledged its liability to pay. 
The High Court upheld a summons against the branch manager upon 
finding that the bonds were binding on the company and thereby 
constituted a loss. 
However, Barwick C.J., McTiernan and Owen JJ. concurring, indicated 
that even if the bonds were not binding it could not be said that the 
company had suffered no loss simply because had it disputed liability 
and fought the case against it upon the bonds to the final Court of 
Appeal it would have been held not to have been liable. In their 
Honours' opinion it might be that a decision to ratify the manager's acts 
in executing the bonds might in all the circumstances be reasonable 
and the resultant liability a consequence of the misfeasance. 
Thus their Honours would seem to be upholding a business judgment 
test in that it is not for the court to decide whether the loss was properly 
incurred or not, at least on the facts before it. No doubt it is possible to 
envisage the boundaries of this principle, and hence their Honours' 
reference to the standard of reasonableness. It might be that the point 
of inquiry is not "has loss been suffered?" but rather "has loss been 
76 	Oditah, op. cit. 222-26. 
77 [1892] 1 Ch 322. 
78 (1965-66) 39 ALJR 348. 
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suffered and if so was it reasonably incurred?". 
Requirement now stated and applied liberally 
As observed earlier, S.598 expressly codifies the need to prove loss. 
The provision, however, liberalises the requirement by providing that 
prospective loss is sufficient. Thus, in Re lndopal Pty Ltd79 anticipated 
legal expenses if the orders applied for pursuant to S.598 were not 
granted, satisfied the loss requirement. 
This case is also extraordinary in that the only anticipated loss to the 
company was legal expenses. This liberal application of the 
requirement was necessary because as the provision now authorises 
injunctive type orders it may well be that no loss save for legal 
expenses to enforce an obligation (by alternative means to using 
S.598) could in many circumstances be anticipated where injunctive 
type orders are sought. 
Thus it would appear that, whilst some difficulties have arisen, the loss 
requirement has typically been applied from a realistic commercial 
standpoint. 80 Furthermore, it has seldom presented a limitation on the 
availability of the misfeasance procedure and it would appear that 
there is even less likelihood of it providing any such limitation given the 
liberal codification of the loss requirement contained in S.598. 
4.3 Locus stand i 
Legislative history 
S.165 authorised proceedings to be commenced by the liquidator, a 
creditor or contributory of the company. With the addition of the official 
receiver this is still the position in the United Kingdom today. 81 
In Australia, however, the legislature has often altered the category of 
potential applicants. The Uniform Companies legislation restated the 
original position but in the 1966 Victorian amendments locus standi 
was restricted to the Attorney General or any person authorised by 
him.82 During the 1970's the concept of a prescribed person was 
introduced. Such persons included a liquidator, a contributory, an 
official manager or a person authorised by the Corporate Affairs 
79 (1987) 5 ACLC 278. 
80 	Some would call it a broad view: Oditah, op. cit. 213. 
81 	S.212(3) Insolvency Act 1986; Ss.(5) requires a contributory to obtain the leave of the 
court before commencing proceedings. Cf. In re B Johnson & Co (Builders) Ltd [1955] 
2 All ER 775. 
82 The reference to the Attorney General was subsequently replaced by a reference to 
the Corporate Affairs Commission. 
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Commission. A notable exclusion from the grant of automatic locus 
standi was creditors. This position has been adopted by S.598 which 
also excludes contributories as automatic applicants. 83 
These recent exclusions in Australia are surprising but it is to be 
observed that such parties may still be eligible if they can persuade the 
Australian Securities Commission to authorize proceedings. 84 
Certainly one of the most striking features of the original misfeasance 
provision was that it authorised a creditor to commence proceedings 
under it. There are few reported decisions of creditors wishing to utilise 
this provision 86 probably because there were few causes of action 
available to creditors against directors. 86 
It has not been until the recent development of the duty owed by 
directors to creditors that the significance of creditors having locus 
standi becomes apparent. On the other hand, whilst there is 
considerable authority to the effect that a liquidator may bring 
proceedings for breach, there is little authority in support of the 
existence of cause of action available to individual creditors. 87 
Furthermore there is authority to the effect that rights personal to a 
creditor, or indeed a contributory, cannot be enforced under the 
misfeasance provision. 88 
Particular circumstances 
It was established in In re National Funds Assurance Company 69 that a 
liquidator had locus standi to bring an application under the 
misfeasance provision in his own right and it was unnecessary to 
consider whether he brought such an application in his capacity as the 
83 The concept of "prescribed person" is now incorporated into a new concept of "eligible 
applicant" introduced by the Corporate Law Reform Act (1992) discussed in chapter 
10. 
84 	S.598(1) includes within the definition of a "prescribed person", persons authorized by 
the Commission. The amendments to the provision effected by the Corporate Law 
Reform Act (1992), has not altered this aspect. 
85 	In In re British Guardian Life Assurance Company (1880) 14 Ch D 335 a policy holder 
of an insurance company was held to have locus standi in the sense that he may be a 
creditor. Also see Hermann v Charny [1976] 1 NSWLR 261. 
86 The section would appear to confer on creditors the power to institute proceedings for 
wrongs done to the company but, not surprisingly, this power was seldom exercised; 
Re Exchange Banking Co (1882) 21 Ch D 519; Re Oxford Benefit and Investment 
Society (1886) 35 Ch D 502. Also see above. 
87 See Nicholson & Ors v Permakraft (N.Z.) Ltd (in Liq.) (1985) 3 ACLC 453 per Cooke J. 
at p.460, and Hooker Investments Pty Ltd v Email Ltd & Ors 10 ACLR 443. 
88 Re Hill's Waterfall Estate Co [1896] 1 Ch 947; Contrast, however, the wording of S.598 
with the earlier provisions. Arguably the court has power to direct awards in favour of 
individual creditors although the requirement in subsection (2) that the misfeasance be 
"in relation to a corporation" and that "the corporation has suffered ... loss or damage" 
would imply that any award is to be in favour of the corporation. 
89 (1878) 10 Ch D 118,124 
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representative of the company or of the creditors. Furthermore, in 
Couve v Pierre Couve Ltd (In Liquidation) and Another the High Court 
rejected an argument that because the general body of creditors would 
obtain no advantage from misfeasance proceedings, the liquidator 
being actuated by a desire to benefit a secured creditor, the 
proceedings must fail. The Court emphasised that the motive of the 
liquidator in bringing proceedings was irrelevant. 
It has been held that a contributory does not have locus standi unless 
he has a direct pecuniary interest in the success of the application. 90 
Obviously this requirement could not meaningfully be extended to 
liquidators. However, it is possible to envisage circumstances where a 
creditor, should he have a cause of action in the nature of a 
representative action, could be met with a defence relying upon an 
extension of this principle, viz, where the debt owed to a secured 
creditor by the company exceeded the fullest possible return to the 
company from the applicant unsecured creditor's claim. 
It would appear from the judgment of Fullager J. in Re 67 Budd Street 
Pty Ltd and Ors; The Commonwealth of Australia v O'Reilly91 that no 
action or prosecution may proceed against company officers once the 
winding up of the company has been completed because, at least in a 
formal sense, such proceedings are brought for the benefit of the 
company on the authority of Coxon v Gors192 . This would only normally 
be an issue where the Australian Securties Commission has 
commenced proceedings and in this context the decision in Re 
Klintworth Homes Pty Ltdg3 may assist the Commission, although that 
case was expressly disapproved of by Fullager J. Alternatively the 
Commission may succeed in obtaining orders avoiding a dissolution as 
the Federal Commissioner for Taxation was able to do in the Re 67 
Budd Street Pty Ltd case. 
Thus it would appear that recent developments in Australia may have 
fettered a creditor's standing to commence misfeasance proceedings. 94 
However, given the present state of development of the directors' duty 
to creditors in not providing a personal cause of action to creditors this 
90 Supra. 
91 	(1984) 2 ACLC 190. 
92 	(1891) 2 Ch 73. 
93 (1982) 1 ACLC 237; [1982] ACLR 599. 
94 The Companies and Securities Law Review Committee would have recommended the 
amendment of this provision "to make it clear that the recovery procedure is available 
to a ... creditor" but given their recommendation that creditors have standing to apply 
for leave to commence a derivative action this amendment was considered 
unnecessary. See Enforcement of the duties of directors and officers of a company by 
means of a statutory derivative action, Report No 12 (November 1990) at paragraphs 
266 to 275 and Discussion paper No 11 (July 1990). 
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does not present an immediate problem. As long as liquidators 
continue to enjoy the relatively unrestricted right to commence 
misfeasance proceedings, the current Australian provision provides an 
adequate procedural device given the available causes of action. 
4.4 Potential respondents 
S.598 authorizes the court to make orders against any person who has 
been found to be delinquent towards the company. 
This would appear to have been an innovation which, on the face of it, 
may have enlarged the purview of the provision. Notably all previous 
misfeasance provisions, including the current United Kingdom 
provision, required that some connection between the respondent and 
the company be established. 65 However, at least in Australia in recent 
years, the wide terms in which this requirement was expressed 
rendered it easily satisfied. 96 For example, in O'Toole v Mitcharnw the 
Court held that the description of potential respondents specified in 
S.367B included, but was not restricted to, the previous categories. 
The change in language indicated, in the view of the Court, that so far 
from intending to confine the section to the earlier categories, 
parliament intended to broaden the category of persons affected. 
Accordingly, the argument that S.367B(1) was restricted in operation to 
officers or former officers of the company and so did not encompass a 
liquidator appointed by the court or creditors was rejected. 
A few decisions based on the early provisions had found some 
exclusions. 98 Liberal interpretations, even of the restrictive S.165, were, 
95 	Initially S.165 of the Companies Act 1862 envisaged two categories of respondents: (i) 
any past or present director, manager, official or other liquidator; and (ii) any officer. In 
1890 a third category was added: (iii) any person who has taken part in the formation 
or promotion of the company. (S.10 Companies (Winding Up) Act 1890 (UK)). These 
categories have been adopted by all subsequent United Kingdom misfeasance 
provisions, although S.212(4) Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) requires that the leave of the 
court be obtained before proceedings are brought against a person who has acted as 
liquidator or administrator of the company and had his release. 
In Australia the three categories were referred to in the original misfeasance 
provisions, but were reduced to two in the 1958 Victorian legislation, the blueprint for 
the Uniform Companies Acts. The 1966 Victorian amendments, adopted in turn by all 
the States, except Tasmania, witnessed the reduction of the requirement to the 
following terms: "any person who has taken part in the formation, promotion, 
administration, management or winding up". 
96 	Contrast the interpretation of S.423(1) of the South African Companies Act. A judicial 
manager has been held not to be an "officer" for the purposes of the provision: Rennie 
No v Holzman 1989 (3) SA 706. 
97 [1978] ACLR 30-053; 3 ACLC 646. 
98 In Re B Johnson & Co (Builders) Ltd it was held that a receiver manager appointed 
pursuant to a debenture trust deed was not a manager within the terms of the first 
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however, the norm. For example in In re Morvah Consols Tin Mining 
Co: sub nom McKays case99 it was held that it was only necessary that 
the respondent had been an officer at the time when the wrongful act 
was begun to be committed and he need not still be an officer upon its 
completion. 10° 
For the purposes of proceedings based on breach of the duty to 
creditors the scope of potential respondents would appear to always 
have been sufficient as the duty has, to date, been limited in its 
application to directors and any conceivable extension is likely to be 
restricted to the general category of corporate management. This is 
now beyond doubt given that S.598 is simply expressed to apply to any 
person. 101 
4.5 Other legislative qualifications on the application of the 
provision 
S.165 was included in the winding up section of the Companies Act 
1862 and its application was expressly restricted to companies in the 
course of being wound up. This restriction has been continued through 
to S.212 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
Similarly, in Australia, until the Victorian amendments of 1966, it was 
necessary to prove that the company was in the course of being wound 
up. In the 1966 legislation, the concept of "a company to which this 
section applies" originated. This phrase was defined in S.374E. Again 
the fundamental criterion was that the company be terminating or in 
financial difficulties. Nevertheless, the category of potential companies 
category (see fn 92) because he was not concerned to manage for the benefit of the 
company but was concerned to realise the debenture holders' security. The powers of 
management endowed on a receiver were considered only incidental to and solely for 
the purposes of his receivership. Furthermore, in both Feltom's Executors case Law 
Rep 1 Eq 219 and In re British Guardian Life Assurance Co (1880) 14 Ch D 335 it was 
held that the executors of a deceased director could not be proceeded against under 
the misfeasance provision as originally worded. However, in Re Boyagarra Pty Ltd (In 
Liquidation): Evans v Dean and others it was held that the wider terminology adopted 
in S.367B was sufficient to enable an estate to be proceeded against. 
99 (1868) 2 Ch D 1. 
100 The 1890 amendment would have caught such an officer, but by virtue of a slight 
change in terminology in the 1908 Consolidating Act, which was carried through until 
the enactment of the Insolvency Act, this decision took on more significance. The 1908 
terminology was adopted in Australia, but since the enactment of the 1958 Victorian 
provision the legislation has expressly applied to any past officers. (The 1890 provision 
caught " ... any past or present director, manager, liquidator, or other officer ...". 
S.215(1) of the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 changed this terminology to " 
any past or present director, manager or liquidator, or any officer ... ". Arguably the 
1908 provision would not catch past officers other than those particularized.) 
101 See Oditah, op. cit. 216. 
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was substantially broadened by the inclusion of those companies 
which had ceased to carry on business or were unable to pay their 
debts. The section also provided for circumstances in which a 
company would be deemed to satisfy either of these requirements. In 
particular, S.374E(2)(b) provided that it would be deemed to be unable 
to pay its debts if execution or other process issued on a judgment 
decree or order of any court in favour of a creditor of the company was 
returned unsatisfied in whole or in part. 
This major legislative limitation is completely abandoned in S.598 
which applies to "any company". Given that the duty to creditors in its 
present form only arises in an insolvency context, the existence or 
otherwise of this limitation on the application of the misfeasance 
provision is of little significance. 
4.6 Judicial qualifications on the application of the provision - 
simple cases only? 
The judiciary also flirted with the issue of whether a gloss should be 
placed on the availability of the summary procedure provided by the 
misfeasance provision. This issue arose as a result of the lack of pre-
trial procedures in summary proceedings resulting in the inability of the 
respondent to discover the case against him and of the parties to 
define the points at issue prior to the hearing. This was to be 
contrasted with the procedure available upon the issue of a bill where 
pleadings, discovery, interrogatories and directions summons would 
ensure that the parties could define the issues in dispute and 
thoroughly prepare their cases prior to the hearing. 
Misfeasance summons procedure limited to simple cases 
In a number of very early decisions the courts resolved this problem by 
limiting the application of the misfeasance summons procedure to 
simple cases. In In re Royal Hotel Co of Great Yarmouth 102 Lord 
Romilly M.R. disposed of an application under S.165 by stating that 
unless the case against a director or officer be clearly and distinctly 
made out and there is no question of law to be determined, then the 
section had no application. His Lordship considered it too dangerous to 
attempt to proceed under this section where there was really a 
question to be tried. He justified this conclusion from an examination of 
the procedure which would be adopted upon a misfeasance hearing 
which he argued was unsuitable for complicated cases. 
102 (1867) 4 Law Rep Eq 244. 
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His Lordship also relied on the earlier decision in In re the Bank of 
Gibraltar and Malta 103 which acknowledged that the court had a 
discretion as to the cases in which it would put in force the powers 
conferred by the section. 
In the following year his Lordship took the opportunity to restate his 
view in In re the Brighton Brewery Co: sub nom Hunts case. 104 He 
stated the principle regulating the discretion of the court in the following 
terms: 
"... [the court] must call directors and officers to account in all cases of 
a simple character and not in cases where from the peculiar nature of 
the facts and questions which arise justice can only be fairly done by 
bill and answer. I admit that this leaves the matter very much at large 
as it must be solely from a consideration of the peculiar facts of each 
case that the Court can act." 
Court to exercise discretion to issue directions 
The issue came for the consideration of the English Court of Appeal in 
In re Mercantile Trading Co: sub nom Stringers case 105 in 1869. 
Selwyn L.J. observed that the issue had been adjudicated upon more 
or less ever since the passing of the first winding up Act in 1848 where 
the power was expressed in a very much less stringent and 
comprehensive form than under the 1862 Act. The reason for the 
tightening of these provisions could be traced to observations made by 
Turner L.J. who considered that such proceedings were, if not 
unlawful, at all events, inexpedient. 
His Lordship then observed that the provision was expressed in such a 
way as to give the court discretion to make directions as to the conduct 
of proceedings so as to ensure that the respondents had full 
knowledge of the case to be brought against them and the fullest 
opportunity to defend themselves. Accordingly, they could not be said 
to be in any way disadvantaged from their position had a bill been filed. 
His Lordship stated that it would be doing something entirely 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, so general as they were, if 
he were to introduce any such qualification as that purported to be laid 
down in the Royal Hotel Co of Great Yarmouth case. Should such a 
qualification be introduced then the person charged would be induced 
to endeavour to make out that there was some question to be tried or 
that the matter was not so straight forward as it was represented to be 
and there would be very few cases in which such an attempt might not 
103 (1868-69) 1 Law Rep Ch Ap 69 
104 (1868) 37 LI Ch 278 at 279. 
105 (1867) 4 Law Rep Ch Ap 475. Also see Rances case (1870) 6 Ch App 104. 
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be made without some reasonable hope of success. The result would 
be to occasion the necessity for a double mode of proceedings and 
unnecessary expense and delay. 
Giffard L.J. concurred adding that the provision was introduced in order 
to prevent the doubling up of proceedings and effect a complete 
winding up, and accordingly it would be rare for circumstances to arise 
in which the jurisdiction ought not to be exercised. 106 If a narrow 
construction were placed upon the Act it would only be to the 
disadvantage of the public. 
Misfeasance provision cases characterized by difficult procedural 
issues 
Nevertheless, and probably as a result of this conclusion, the decisions 
under the misfeasance provisions have been characterized by difficult 
procedural issues. It would seem that complicated cases do not lend 
themselves readily to a summary jurisdiction but are best dealt with 
according to the tried and tested pre-trial procedures available under 
the bill or writ system. 
Such considerations gave rise to the issue in the United Kingdom of a 
practice note in 1921 requiring every summons to be brought before 
the registrar before the filing of supporting affidavits. Should the 
registrar find the summons to be really in the nature of a witness action 
likely to involve issues of fact which ought to be tried by oral evidence, 
no affidavits were to be filed. Where there was any kind of 
complication, each party was to be required to deliver points of claim 
and of defence in the nature of pleadings so that the parties and the 
court should know what issues were to be tried. 107 
In In re Vestal Hosiery Com) Lawrence J. scathingly attacked the 
procedure often adopted by counsel whereby voluminous affidavits 
were filed and nobody except counsel concerned knew what issues 
they would raise. In his Lordship's view, a view which he stated was 
shared by his fellow brethren, this was nothing worse than a scandal 
on the procedure of the courts and one which lead to probable 
injustice, certainly waste of time and increased costs. 
These comments and the issue of the practice note were a direct result 
of the decision not to impose a gloss on the types of proceedings 
which could be brought by misfeasance summons. As will be observed 
106 Supra, 494. 
107 (1921) 66 Sol Jo 157; [1921] WN 356. 
108 [1922] 91 U Ch 627; also see the observations made by Astbury J. reported in the 
Practice Note (Supra) and those of Neville J. in Re AT Carter & Co (unreported). 
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in section 4.8, a further result of this broad application of the 
misfeasance provision has been the necessity for the court to consider 
a number of procedural questions, such as whether set-offs, cross 
claims and third party proceedings should be entertained on an 
application by way of misfeasance summons, and to convene 
directions hearings. In the result complicated cases typically have 
given rise to the summary procedure ultimately, after directions 
hearings, being characterised by procedures typical of the bill or writ 
system. Accordingly it must be doubted whether applications under this 
provision are an appropriate mechanism by which to commence such 
cases. 
4.7 The powers of the court 
4.7.1 Generally 
Where the requirements of the section were proved to the satisfaction 
of the courtim then S.165 empowered the court to examine into the 
conduct of the respondent and compel him to repay any monies (or 
property)i 10  improperly retained together with interest or to compensate 
the companyill to the extent the court thought just. These powers are 
more or less repeated by S.212(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986. They 
were also adopted by the Australian legislation, the wording used 
remaining virtually identical to that used in S.165 until the enactment of 
the 1966 Victorian amendments. In these amendments rather than 
empower the court to make contribution orders in favour of the 
company by way of compensation the court was empowered to order 
that the respondent pay to the company "such sum by way of damages 
... as the court thinks just". 112 
This trend towards broadening the statement of the courts' powers has 
been continued in S.598 which empowers the court to may make such 
orders as it thinks "appropriate" in relation to the respondent and to 
109 (1922) 91 U Ch 627. 
110 S.165 (UK 1862) only referred to wrongful conduct in respect to monies of the 
company and hence restricted the courts' powers to the making of orders as to the 
payment of monies. S.10 (UK 1890) added a reference to property of the company. 
S.215 (UK 1908) extended the courts' powers to making orders for the repayment or 
restoration of money or property wrongfully obtained, "or any part thereof". 
111 Any property or money recovered by means of the proceedings must be returned to 
the company; Thomas Franklin & Sons Pty Ltd v Cameron (1935) 36 SR (NSW) 286 at 
300; Re Asiatic Electric Co Pty Ltd (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 361. 
112 This phrase was interpreted in Kimberley Mineral Holdings (in Liq) v Triguboff as 
empowering the court to grant equitable relief and not envisaging common law 
damages. The expression was considered to be a most inapt description of damages 
at common law. 
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make the orders irrespective of the fact that the person may have 
committed an offence. Some guidance as to the type of orders that 
could be made is provided in subsection 4. 113 
Of potential significance, from an individual creditor's perspective, the 
court is not restricted by S.598 to directing awards solely in favour of 
the company. Rather the court has an unfettered power to specify the 
beneficiary of any award, in contrast to earlier versions of the provision. 
Of course, on the current state of the authorities, a breach of the duty 
to creditors is not actionable by an individual creditor either in a 
personal or a representative capacity. 
4.7.2 The power of examination 
S.598 contains no reference to the power of the court to examine 
respondents. However, S.598(3), by codifying the basic rights of a 
respondent to a summons, would appear to require that the court 
should conduct adversarial proceedings prior to making any orders. 
This provision is the only fetter placed on the court's discretion. It 
states that the court has no power to make any orders unless the 
respondent is given the opportunity to exercise his rights there 
specified. 
Some doubt as to the exact procedure to adopt upon a misfeasance 
summons and, in particular, as to the status of the power of 
examination contained in the provision had been generated as a result 
of earlier amendments which enacted a specific power to conduct an 
examination, contained in S.367A, and changes to the misfeasance 
provision which appeared to have the effect of restricting the courts' 
powers under that section to the awarding of compensation orders 
after an examination held pursuant to the terms of the misfeasance 
provision only. 114  However, subsequent amendments 115 had the effect 
of making the powers to examine and make orders disjunctive. That is, 
the courts were empowered to examine into the conduct of the 
respondent or to make compensation orders or to do both. 
The nature of this examination power and, in particular, its relationship 
with the general examination power contained in S.367A, a 
predecessor to S.597, has been considered in two Australian cases. In 
Noble v Susta116 it was held that an application for examination 
113 Discussed below. 
114 First effected in the 1966 Victorian amendments. 
115 ad. No. 71/1975; W.A. No. 100/1975; Vic. No. 8787/1975; N.S.W. No. 1/1976; S.A. 
No. 54/1979. 
116 3 ACLR 391. 
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pursuant to S.367B of a person already examined under S.367A was 
not an abuse of process as the two sections were not alternatives but 
rather, complementary. The classes of persons to whom the sections 
applied were not the same, although overlapping, and the conduct 
called in question by S.367A exhibited a more general kind of default 
than that called in question by S.367B. Furthermore, the purpose of 
obtaining an order under s.367A was to have the conduct and dealings 
of company officers examined, the notes from the examination being 
admissible in subsequent legal proceedings, not necessarily confined 
to proceedings under S.367B. The purpose of an examination under 
S.367B was to obtain an order for the payment of money and thus the 
purview of such an examination was dictated by the orders sought. 
This right of recovery given by S.367B contrasted significantly with the 
absence of any right given by S.367A. 
In Re Marra Developments Ltd and the Companies Act (No 4) 117 the 
issue before the Court was whether S.367B empowered the applicant 
to act as inquisitor or whether the applicant had to establish in the 
ordinary course of adversial proceedings his entitlement to the relief 
sought. Needham J. held that the applicant had to satisfy the court that 
the respondent was guilty of one of the descriptions of conduct set out 
in the provision and in examining the conduct of the respondent the 
applicant was not to act as an inquisitor. This was in contrast to the 
procedure upon an examination under S.367A which was inquisitorial 
as evidenced by the fact that the section contained detailed provisions 
as to how the examination was to be conducted. In other words, 
S.367B did not provide for examinations in the abstract as did S.367A, 
but rather the reference to the courts' power to examine was simply a 
reference to the need for normal adversarial proceedings in order to 
determine whether the orders should be granted. 
Thus the power to examine contained in the earlier forms of the 
misfeasance provision added nothing to the powers of the court, but 
simply left it beyond doubt that the courts should only make the orders 
sought after first presiding over adversarial proceedings and that this 
was so notwithstanding the disjunctive format of the power to examine 
and the power to make orders 118 and dicta expressed in certain English 
cases. 119 As stated above, this position would appear to be expressly 
117 4 ACLR 889. Also see Wright v Frisina (1983) 1 ACLC 716. 
118 For a similar conclusion see O'Donovan (op. cit.) at p.348: "The principal purpose of 
this section appears to be to extend traditional procedures beyond the field of winding 
up; cf. Re John Sanderson & Co Pty Ltd (1985) 1 ACLR 79 at 84". 
119 There is some dicta to the effect that the section created a separate power of inquiry 
contrary to the Australian conclusion. In In re the Bank of Gibraltar and Malta the Court 
posed the question before it as to whether it should exercise the summary jurisdiction 
which the statute gave it by sending the case into chambers with a view to 
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endorsed in S.598. 
4.7.3 The power to make orders 
S.598 confers a very general power on the courts to make such orders 
as thought appropriate. In sub-section 4 the Act seeks to provide the 
courts with some guidance by stating that the courts may make orders 
directing a person to pay money or transfer property to the company or 
pay to the company an amount corresponding to any loss suffered. 
However, the section makes it clear that the courts' discretion is not 
restricted to these types of orders. 12° Furthermore, whilst two unique 
Australian sub-sections defining aspects of the powers of the court to 
make orders have appeared in past provisions, neither of these two 
provisions appear in S.598. 121 
investigating the conduct of the company officers. In the result the Court decided 
against this course and rather gave leave to the petitioners to file a bill in the name of 
the company on the basis that the matter would be much better resolved by the issue 
of a bill than by an inquiry under the summary jurisdiction. Such inquiries were in the 
experience of their Lordships attended with enormous -expense, and in any event there 
was a greater difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory decision under such proceedings 
than when the questions were distinctly raised in a suit between the parties. Thus it 
would seem that the provision was initially intended to bestow a separate power of 
inquiry although it is not clear from this case as to the nature of this inquiry. It may be 
that the court would simply conduct adversarial proceedings in chambers. The report 
of the decision in the Bank of Gibraltar and Malta case does not disclose whether the 
officers had already been examined in such a manner upon the hearing of the petition 
although it would appear that this would have been unlikely. 
120 In Re Indopal Pty Ltd (1987) 5 ACLC 278 the Court made injunctive type orders. It 
would appear that the courts' discretion has never been restricted to such orders. In In 
re Bank of Gibraltar and Malta (1865-66) 1 Law Rep Ch Ap 69 the Court made an 
order upon a misfeasance summons giving the petitioners liberty to use the name of 
the company in proceedings commenced by bill subject only to indemnifying the 
company for costs. This was on the basis that there was insufficient evidence justifying 
the making of compensation orders but sufficient to lay ground for an inquiry. However, 
in the circumstances, the Court thought it appropriate to give leave to issue a bill rather 
than conduct an examination. This decision was followed in In re Dominion Portland 
Cement Co Ltd (No. 2) [1919] NZLR 478. Also in the Re Marra Developments case 
Needham J. indicated that if no substantive order was sought by an applicant under 
S.367B he could see no reason why the court should not make a declaration to the 
effect that the respondent had been guilty of wrongful conduct where such was proved. 
Clearly his Honour did not consider the power in the court to make orders under 
S.367B to be restricted to those in the nature of compensation. Whether it authorized 
the making of injunctive type orders was, however, not considered. 
121 The first originated as S.308(2) Companies Act 1936 (NSW). This sub-section read as 
follows: "This section shall extend to and in respect of the receipt of any money or 
property by any director of the company during the two years preceding the 
commencement of the winding up, whether by way of salary or otherwise, appearing to 
the court to be unfair or unjust to other members of the company." Although this 
provision was not previously enacted in any of the other States it appeared as sub-
section(2) in the Uniform Companies Acts with the replacement of the term "director" 
with "officer". It was retained by the 1966 Victorian amendments but with the deletion 
of the two year restriction and the extension of the term "officer to include a former 
officer. Furthermore, the provision was to apply if the receipt was unfair or unjust "to 
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Discretion exists not to grant relief or to only grant limited relief 
The discretion of the court is not only as to the amount of relief it will 
grant but also as to whether it will grant relief or not. 122 This is in 
contrast to where proceedings are brought by way of an action where 
judgment must be in accordance with the legal rights established. This 
is illustrated by the decision in In re Sunlight Incandescent Gas Lamp 
Co (Ltd)123 where the Court exercised its discretion by not making the 
orders sought on the basis that most of the shareholders did not want 
the money and would return it if paid to them. 
This decision was approved of in In re Home and Colonial Insurance 
Co LtcP 24 where the Court, having observed that the provision did not 
allow the respondent liquidator to claim a set-off or cross claim against 
the company, nor apply for security for costs or discovery, stated that 
the draftsman obviously had in mind the possibility that circumstances 
might arise which would make it unjust and inequitable to require 
payment of the total amount which the company might perhaps recover 
in an action. The Court was of the view that such circumstances 
existed on the facts before it and accordingly the order that was made 
had the effect that only the creditors would be compensated and not 
the shareholders who had accepted their loss honourably and would 
be unlikely to desire to make a liquidator liable for having, though in 
ignorance, acted honestly on their behalf. 
In Re Morecambe Bowling Ltd125 it was held that this discretion 
extended to apportioning the sum awarded between co-defendants in 
such a way and with such priority of liability as the court thought fit, 
whereas in Flitcrofts case joint and several liability was ordered. The 
limits of this discretion were, however, attained in In re Centrifugal 
the company or its members". This provision in any of its forms has never been 
judicially considered. Thus, whether it effected an extension or restriction of the courts' 
powers remains unclear although an extension is implied in the argument that has 
been advanced that the introduction of this provision meant that it ceased to be 
possible to say that the section was completely procedural in effect; Id, 354 (at fn.87). 
The other unique provision first appeared as S.367B(4) in New South Wales in 1971. It 
read as follows: "Where the court is satisfied that an application was made under this 
section without reasonable cause it may order the whole or any part of the costs 
incurred by the person against whom the order was sought to be paid by the 
applicant." It was subsequently enacted in all the other States except Tasmania (Vic. 
No. 8787/1975; S.A. No. 54/1979; W.A. No. 100/1975; Old. No. 71/1975). The judicial 
treatment of the provision is considered below. 
122 Also see S.535. 
123 (1899-1900) 16 TLR 535. 
124 [1930] 1 Ch 102; also see Re VGM Holdings [1942] Ch 235 and Re Alexandra Palace 
Co (1882) 21 Ch D 149. 
125 [1969] 1 All ER 753; [1969] 1 WLR 133; 113 Sol Jo 104. 
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Butter Co Ltdi 26 where the Court held that it was doubtful whether it 
had jurisdiction to set aside a contract but even if it did then the 
jurisdiction was discretionary and would not be exercised on the facts 
before the Court. 
Recently in Re Purpoint Ltdiv the amount of compensation ordered 
was limited to the amount necessary to meet the company's liabilities 
other than a debt owned to a co-director and another guaranteed by 
the director himself. The decision in this case is also important for 
highlighting the possible overlap between a misfeasance application 
and a claim for wrongful/reckless trading. 128 Oditah argues that this 
overlap is, however, more apparent than real as a liquidator would not 
typically risk a speculative claim under the misfeasance provision in 
preference to proceedings for wrongful or reckless trading. 129 
The only Australian case to consider this discretion in any detail is Re 
International Vending Machines Pty Limited and the Companies Act 
where Jacobs J. observed that he had a discretion, at least in regard to 
the amount which he could order to be repaid, citing Re Home and 
Colonial Insurance Co Limited as his authority. On the facts his Honour 
was not prepared to exercise this discretion in favour of the defaulting, 
although arguably bona fide, directors. They had not established 
evidence to justify such an exercise of discretion and in any event had 
themselves benefited from their defaults and were therefore not 
deserving of special treatment. 
The courts' powers to make orders would therefore appear sufficiently 
broad to adequately enable them to adjudicate upon applications 
alleging breach of the duty to creditors. 
4.7.4 The power to order costs 
Against a liquidator personally 
Most of the cases in which the courts' discretion under the 
misfeasance provision has been discussed involve the question of cost 
awards, in particular against the liquidator. It has been held in 
numerous cases that an application by a liquidator under the 
misfeasance provision is made in his personal capacity and not in his 
capacity as representative of the company. Accordingly, any costs 
awarded against the liquidator must be borne personally by him, 
although the court has the jurisdiction to order that he be indemnified 
126 [1913] 1 Ch 188. 
127 [1991] BCC 121. 
128 Also see Re DKG Contractors Ltd [1990] BCC 903. 
129 Op. cit., 218. 
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out of the assets of the company. 13° 
This point was not immediately appreciated by the courts. In In re W 
Powell & Sons131 Romer J. observed that the court had jurisdiction to 
order a liquidator to personally pay costs where it was considered just 
and further that it would not hesitate to exercise this discretion. In 
considering whether the discretion should be exercised an important 
factor was whether an application for security for costs had been 
opposed by the liquidator. 
Furthermore, in In re Raynes Park Golf Club Ltd; Ex parte Official 
Receiverm the Court stated that as such an order is tantamount to a 
declaration that the liquidator had been guilty of misconduct, there 
should be evidence to support it. 
These decisions can only be reconciled with the authorities which hold 
that an application under the misfeasance section is made by a 
liquidator in his personal capacity if the courts are indirectly referring to 
their discretion whether or not to grant an indemnity out of the assets of 
the company. The decisions reflect an attempt by the courts to control 
abuses by liquidators and official receivers of the misfeasance 
provision. The courts will also prevent liquidators from taking any 
proceedings which appear useless or vexatious 1 a3 and have held that 
an official receiver who is indemnified against costs ought not to allow 
an application to be made unless he is satisfied as to the propriety of 
the application. 134 
On the other hand, attempts to require liquidators to provide security 
for costs have generally met with failure notwithstanding expressions of 
misgiving by the courts. There is considerable authority against the 
making of such orders except where a liquidator is appealing or the 
circumstances are exceptional. The fact that personal orders as to 
costs may be made is often cited as a justification for not granting 
security. 135 
On an initial reading it would seem that the position stated in In re W 
Powell & Sons and the supporting authorities, namely that the threat of 
130 This is consistent with the general position: Re Speedfix Building Products Pty Ltd (In 
liq) (1987) 5 ACLC 866. 
131 [1896] 1 Ch 681; affirmed in In re Strand Wood Company Ltd [1909] 2 Ch 1. Also see 
Re Western Counties [1897] 1 Ch 617, 632. 
132 [1899] 1 QB 961. 
133 Re Exchange Banking Co, sub nom Flitcrofts case (1882) 21 Ch D 519. 
134 See In re Anglo-Sardinian Antimony Co (1894) 38 Sol Jo 682. 
135 In re Strand Wood Company Limited [1904] 2 Ch 1; In re New Zealand Gum-Machine 
Co Ltd (In Liq) [1927] NZLR 100; Re Pavelic Investments Pty Ltd 8 ACLR 417. 
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personal liability for costs is a sanction that can be imposed on 
liquidators, is supported by the amendment introduced into the New 
South Wales provision in 1971 by S. 367B(4) and subsequently 
enacted in all the other States except Tasmania. 136 However, in the 
only case to consider this provision, Re Asiatic Electric Co Pty Ltd (In 
Liquidation) and the Companies Act, 137 Street C.J. interpreted the 
provision against the background of the traditional view that liquidators 
are personally liable for costs in any event. As a result, his Honour 
admitted great difficulty in interpreting the provision. He concluded that 
the provision must have the effect of limiting the recovery of costs from 
the unsuccessful applicant of a misfeasance summons to cases where 
the application is made without reasonable cause. That is, his Honour 
read the provision, with reluctance, as displacing, at least so far as 
concerns a successful respondent and unsuccessful applicant, the 
ordinary discretion both statutory and otherwise exercisable by the 
court in litigious proceedings under S.367B. His Honour observed that 
it may even be possible that the provision covers the whole field of 
costs in litigation identifiable with S.367B, that is to say, a successful 
applicant might not recover costs. 138 
His Honour noted problems presented by this interpretation of the 
provision and stated that in his view it was regrettable that the 
provision be so excessively protective of liquidators with a virtual 
disregard for the ordinary rights or a party, against whom a liquidator 
fails, to expect to have his costs paid. It was difficult to perceive the 
legislative policy underlying this departure from ordinary time honoured 
principles of civil litigation, involving as it did a risk of grave injustice to 
expose a person to the risk of costly civil litigation of claims against him 
without preserving to him the ordinary expectation of having his costs 
paid if those claims fail. 
Had Street C.J. accepted the view that a liquidator sues in his 
representative capacity and adopted the decision in In re W Powell and 
Sons and supporting authorities then the provision would have 
presented no difficulty. In such a case the provision could be read as 
clearly authorising personal cost awards against an unreasonable 
applicant, notwithstanding that the word "personally" does not appear 
at the end of the section. 
136 Supra. 
137 [1973] 1 NSWLR 603. 
138 This decision was cited by Needham J. in Kimberley Mineral Holdings Ltd (in Liq) v 
Triguboff & Ors [1980] 1 NSWLR 210 as authority for the proposition that S.367B(4) 
may have introduced a new standard for the exercise of the courts discretion as to 
costs. No comment as to the veracity or otherwise of the decision was ventured, but on 
the assumption that it was correct it was held that it did not follow that the whole of 
s.367B should be construed prospectively as breaking new ground. 
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Street C.J., however, totally ignored these authorities and rather relied 
on his earlier judgment in Re Buena Vista Motors Pty Ltd (In 
Liquidation) and the Companies Act i 39 where he had reviewed S.305 
and suggested that the provision required reconsideration. In 
particular, his Honour observed that as the usual applicant in such a 
summons was the liquidator rather than the company itself, an 
unfortunate consequence in costs could result in the event of the 
liquidator failing as indeed happened in that case where the costs were 
ordered against the liquidator who was to be indemnified out of the 
assets of the company to the extent possible. His Honour further 
observed that the fact that the proceedings were brought by the 
liquidator personally and not as representative of the company had a 
dual significance. On the one hand it explained why no security for 
costs will be granted on the basis that the company is insolvent and 
secondly, it explained why the respondent may not propound cross 
actions or set-offs that might be available to him against a company in 
the course of being wound up. 
His Honour recommended that the provision be amended to enable the 
application to be made in the name of the company. Such an 
amendment would allow security to be granted and enable cross 
actions. More importantly, it would encourage liquidators to use this 
section with its attendant procedural advantages and relative 
cheapness. 
His Honour's decision in the Re Asiatic Electric Company case was a 
clear consequence of following this earlier decision. The interpretation 
of S.367B(4) was approached from the basis that the legislative 
reconsideration of S.305 might have been as a result of his earlier 
recommendation and therefore designed to limit the circumstances in 
which cost awards would be made against applicants. This was so 
notwithstanding that, as his Honour conceded, the amendments were 
not directed effectively to his comments. Nevertheless, it was on this 
basis that he considered the earlier case as a vital guide to the 
interpretation of S.367B upon the question of costs. 
However, the question remains that if the legislature were acting on his 
recommendation then why was the recommended amendment not 
adopted? Furthermore, why did the legislature use in S.367B(4) the 
term "reasonable cause" which is more in tune with the decision in In 
re W Powell and Sons and the like cases. The criticism by his Honour 
of the implications of his own interpretation of the provision supports 
139 [1971] 1 NSWLR 72. 
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these doubts. 
Does a liquidator sue in a personal or representative capacity? 
The significance of these considerations is that some doubt must exist 
as to the accuracy of the Buena Vista decision and of the authorities 
which state that an application by a liquidator under the misfeasance 
provision is made in his personal capacity. A perusal of the cost orders 
made in other decisions in which a liquidator has failed does not 
advance the matter much further. Most of these decisions are 
inconclusive except for In re Etic Limitedm where the award was made 
personally against the liquidator but he was given an indemnity out of 
assets of the company. 
The cases which consider the granting of security for costs, 
notwithstanding their purported rationalization by his Honour in the 
Buena Vista case, would tend to support the view that the liquidator 
sues on behalf of the company. 141 Furthermore the normal position is 
that the liquidator acts in his representative capacity. 142 Although in In 
re National Funds Assurance Co the Court stated that a liquidator had 
locus standi to bring an application in his own right and that it was 
unnecessary to decide whether he had brought the application in a 
representative capacity, the case did not go as far as saying that he did 
not bring the application in a representative capacity. Furthermore, it 
seems absurd to argue that the liquidator brings an action in his 
personal capacity because what possible motive would he have to 
bring proceedings for misfeasance against the company except as a 
representative of the company. 
S.598 and the duty to creditors 
S.598 sheds no light on the issue. The provision simply uses the 
phrase "on application by". Thus it must be considered unsettled 
whether a costs award under the provision against an unsuccessful 
liquidator is against the liquidator personally or against the company. 
The existence of proceedings for a breach of duty to creditors does not 
fit easily with the view that the liquidator brings proceedings as a 
representative of the company. Although the generally accepted view 
is that the origins of the duty are in the duty of good faith owed to the 
company, it is difficult to conceptualize that proceedings for breach of 
the duty are brought on behalf of the company, rather than on behalf of 
140 [1928] Ch 861. 
141 See in particular Cozens-Hardy L.J. at p.4 in In re Strand Wood Co Ltd [1909] 2 Ch 1. 
142 A liquidator is the agent of the company and is not acting in his personal capacity: 
Knowles v Scott [1891] 1 Ch 717; Warrender Estates Ltd v Simpson (1933) 33 SR 
(NSW) 390; Thomas Franklin & Sons Ltd v Cameron (1935) 36 SR (NSW) 286. 
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the creditors, and so the company is prima facie liable for costs. 
On the other hand, if the view is adopted that prima facie the liquidator 
is personally liable for costs, then it is difficult to accept that anyone 
other than the creditors should indemnify the liquidator. However, given 
that the company is most probably insolvent in such circumstances, 
then, in as much as the company is operating on funds supplied by 
creditors and it is required to indemnify the liquidator, the creditors will 
be indirectly indemnifying the liquidator in any event. Thus, although 
conceptually the status of a liquidator proceeding for a breach of the 
duty to creditors presents difficulties, it would seem that, at least where 
the company is hopelessly insolvent, the costs of an unsuccessful 
application would be borne appropriately by the creditors. In fact, in 
such situations, the creditors will most likely end up bearing the costs 
of all unsuccessful misfeasance summons. 
4.8 Procedure upon a misfeasance summons 
4.8.1 Generally 
The courts have a general discretion as to the procedure to be adopted 
upon the filing of a misfeasance summons. In most jurisdictions 
procedural rules exist but generally these only provide for the manner 
in which the application is to be brought, service of process, supporting 
affidavits and directions hearings. 143 Apart from the occasional issue of 
practice notes or rulings the only guidance on procedural aspects 
associated with misfeasance summons is that discernible from the 
authorities. 144 
Where there are no issues of fact and the matter is relatively simple, 
the general practice is to allow evidence by affidavit. 
The procedure to be adopted where issues of fact are concerned was 
considered by Jacobs J. in Re International Vending Machines Pty Ltd. 
His Honour recommended that points of claim and points of defence be 
filed on the basis that they would be treated as the pleadings upon 
which the issues should be determined. The matter should then 
proceed in the normal adversarial manner. This statement of procedure 
143 For example see Companies Winding Up Rules 1932 (Tas.) Rules 53 and 54; Rules of 
the Supreme Court 1965 (Tas.) Part VI (Rules to Prescribe and Regulate the 
Procedure and Practice of the Court in the Exercise of its jurisdiction under the 
Companies Act 1962) Rules 45 (t), 46 and 47; Rules of the Supreme Court 
(Companies Transitional Provisions) 1982 (Tas.). 
144 On procedure generally see O'Donovan (op. cit.) pp.360-362. 
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was cited with approval in Re Insurance Associates Pty Ltd (In Liq). 145 
It would seem that in such a situation, affidavits should not be filed but 
rather the issues of fact should be determined by oral evidence. 146 
If either party requires the adoption of any pre-trial procedures such as 
discovery or interrogatories then these matters can be determined by 
the parties at a directions hearing. 
4.8.2 Set-offs, cross claims and third party proceedings 
The more difficult issue which arises is whether set-offs, cross claims 
and third party proceedings are authorised upon the filing of a 
misfeasance summons. Anderson J. in Re John Bruce Home World 
Pty Ltd (In Liq)147 stated the general position as follows: 
"The purpose of s.367B is ... to assist a liquidator in the prompt winding 
up of an insolvent company and the method provided is a summary 
method without the usual trappings of a full scale action. Any 
complication of the simple procedure which may delay the 
determination of the issues raised and of the winding up of the 
company is to be avoided if possible and the prospect of contingent 
liabilities of other persons as third parties is not the liquidator's 
concern. ... The liquidator is in a special statutory position and is 
entitled to call the tune." 
Thus, in that case his Honour refused to stay proceedings or require 
the liquidator to bring third party proceedings as no substantial benefits 
would accrue in the winding up of the company from such a course of 
action. 
Third party proceedings 
It was first decided in In re Land Securities Company in 1895148 that no 
third party procedure was available upon a misfeasance summons. 
This was affirmed in In re A Singer & Co (Hat Manufacturers) Ltd', 
the Court observing that a winding up court had no jurisdiction to settle 
disputes between persons who were, for the purpose of those 
disputes, altogether outside the winding up because such disputes 
were entirely irrelevant to the winding up. 
145 [1975] VA 776; (1975-76) 1 ACLR 74. 
146 Supra. 
147 (1982) 1 ACLC 200 at 201-203. 
148 (1895) 2 Mans 127. 
149 [1943] 1 Ch 121; Also see Re Shilena Hosiery Co Ltd [1979] 2 All ER 6, and In re B 
Johnson & Co (Builders) Limited (supra), 781. 
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This, however, does not prevent a party to a summons claiming 
indemnities from other parties to the proceedings. In Re Morecambe 
Bowling Ltdi 50 such indemnities were granted as it was held that all the 
parties were already subject to the jurisdiction of the court and there 
was no question of settling a dispute between persons, one of whom 
was outside the winding up. 
Cross claims and set-offs 
Similarly, it would seem that no cross claims or set-offs will be 
entertained upon proceedings under a misfeasance summons. 151 
Street C.J. in the Buena Vista Motors case 152 observed that the reason 
for this was that a misfeasance summons is not brought on behalf of 
the company and so it is not open to the respondent to claim cross 
actions or set-offs against the company. His Honour recommended 
that the provision be amended to enable applications to be made in the 
name of the company with the consequence of importing a right in the 
respondent to propound cross actions or set-offs, a right, which in his 
Honour's view, would be desirable. 
Nevertheless, there is well established authority that even if this 
amendment were effected the provision may still not authorise a right 
to set-off. In Pellys case153 it was held that as a consequence of the 
decision in Coventry and Dixons case, 154 which held that the provision 
was procedural only, then in the absence of an express or implied right 
of set-off, none was available. 
The discretionary character of the relief provided by the misfeasance 
provision can, however, result in a de facto set off. For example, in 
Toowoomba Welding Works Pty Ltd (No. 2) 155 certain amounts owed to 
the respondents by the company were deducted from the loss 
assessed to the company. The rule against set-off was also subverted 
in Re Derek Randall Enterprises Ltd where the director was able to 
treat a secret commission as having been effectively paid back to the 
company. 156 
150 [1969] 1 All ER 753. 
151 Oditah examines the various justifications that have been postulated for this rule. He 
concludes that the want of mutuality of dealings and considerations based on policy, 
rather than the summary nature of remedy, provide the strongest rationale for the rule: 
op. cit., 220-222. 
152 Supra. 
153 Supra. 
154 Supra. 
155 [1969] Qd R 337. 
156 [1990] BCC 749. Contrast Guiness Pty Ltd v Saunders [1990] 2 AC 663. Noted by 
Birks, [1990] LMCLQ 330 and Beatson and Prentice, (1990) 106 LQ Rev 365. 
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There are some indications from the judgment of Maugham J. in In re 
Etic Limited157 that the absence of a right of set-off justified his decision 
not to make an order against the respondent. Having found that no 
misfeasance or breach of trust had been proved, the claim being 
simply for the repayment of a debt, he referred to Pellys case and 
stated that the fact that there is no right of set-off is an indication that 
the courts have considered that the jurisdiction is a special one and is 
confined to claims by the company against the officer where it would 
not be right for the officer to be entitled to set up a right of set-off. 
Accordingly, as this was an appropriate case for the respondent to 
have an opportunity to defend the matter in an action in which there 
were proper proceedings and to which he was to entitled to a set-off or 
counter claim then no orders would be made upon a misfeasance 
summons. 
To the extent that these observations can be interpreted as meaning 
that the court should not hear a matter on a summons where a set-off 
is alleged, they are clearly inconsistent with the bulk of authority. The 
scope of the provision is not limited in this way and the better 
interpretation of his Lordship's comments is that he was merely 
attempting to distinguish a claim in the nature of a breach of contract 
for which a misfeasance summons is inappropriate from a claim in the 
nature of a breach of trust where a set-off or cross claim would be most 
unlikely. 
Implications for proceedings for breach of the duty to creditors 
The absence of these procedural devices must cast doubt on the 
appropriateness of the misfeasance proceedings as a mechanism by 
which to conduct actions for breach of the duty to creditors. Such 
actions, to the extent that they are based on the existence of debts, 
typically arising from trading, present the type of scenario in which 
cross claims and set-offs are likely to arise, for example on the basis 
that goods had been returned or were defective. Similarly third party 
proceedings might conceivably arise where the goods are in the 
possession of other parties. 
To trust that justice will ultimately be achieved by some form of judicial 
connivance designed to avoid the limitations of the summary procedure 
is, it is argued, totally unsatisfactory. Rather the parties should be free 
to pursue the full extent of their rights and claims and this can only be 
done if the proceedings take the traditional form. 
157 Supra. 
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This conclusion is supported by the further limitations of the summary 
proceedings where difficult issues of fact arise. As was observed 
above, typically, in such circumstances, directions hearings will be held 
with the result that many of the trappings of the traditional form of 
proceedings will be ordered. Far from saving time and expense over 
the traditional form of proceedings the result may be that the summary 
proceedings ultimately take up more court time and are more 
expensive. These observations are particularly apt where proceedings 
for breach of the duty to creditors are concerned given the need to 
establish insolvency, that the duty has arisen in relation to the 
particular creditor or creditors and that it has been breached, all in the 
context of the uncertainty identified in chapter 3 as to the precise scope 
of the duty. 
In these circumstances there is some merit in the view, which as was 
observed in section 4.6 was initially supported by the judiciary, that the 
summary procedure ought only be available in simple cases. If such a 
qualification applied it could be expected that the procedure would 
seldom be available to support actions for breach of the duty to 
creditors. 
5. 	Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the features of the current misfeasance 
provision, S.598, in the context of the recently developed duty owed by 
directors to creditors. The legislative extension of the provision over the 
last century and a quarter was identified as co-existing with a decline in 
reliance upon the provision. This anomaly could be explained on the 
basis that the misfeasance provision was initially the only defaulting 
officer provision whereas subsequently the reckless and fraudulent 
trading provisions were to supply an avenue of redress arguably 
superior to that offered by the misfeasance provision. However, it was 
observed that the forces that led to the enactment of those provisions 
very nearly induced the judiciary to give the original misfeasance 
provision scope which would have obviated the need for subsequent 
legislative intervention of this nature. 
It was further observed that the trend away from reliance on the 
misfeasance provisions has been recently arrested by virtue of the 
development of a duty to creditors. Furthermore the impact of this duty 
is dependent on the availability and effectiveness of the summary 
procedure offered by S.598. Thus the legislative development which 
gave rise to the current provision now takes on considerable 
significance. 
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The features of S.598 were then examined in detail. It can be 
concluded that where a breach of duty to creditors is alleged then: 
(i) that cause of action is within the parameters of S.598. 
(ii) it will be necessary to establish "loss" but the trend is towards a 
liberal application of this requirement. 
(iii) a liquidator will have locus standi to bring an application under 
S.598 but in the event that the duty is extended to allow an 
individual creditor a cause of action then no automatic locus 
standi is assured but locus standi is possible with the 
authorization of the Australian Securities Commission. It is not 
clear whether a creditor could pursue a cause of action, other 
than in the nature of a representative action, under this provision 
although the court would appear to have the power to direct 
awards in favour of a creditor. 
(iv) an application may be made directed at any person against 
whom an appropriate cause of action exists. 
(v) S.598 does not require that the company concerned need be 
experiencing financial difficulties but •at this stage in the 
development of the duty this would appear to be an element of 
the cause of action. 
(vi) the complexity or otherwise of the case would not appear to be 
relevant to the availability or otherwise the summary procedure 
offered by S.598. 
(vii) S.598 would appear to envisage adversarial proceedings and 
does not empower an inquisitional examination of a respondent. 
There are no fetters on the courts' discretion as to the manner or 
the amount of relief it may grant nor even as to whether it will 
grant relief or not. It is unsettled as to the exact nature of cost 
awards made against liquidators, viz, whether the liquidator may 
be personally liable or not. 
• (viii) the general absence of pre-trial procedures and detailed rules of 
court has given rise to difficult procedural issues where complex 
cases have been litigated under the misfeasance provision. 
There are dicta and judicial rulings recommending the filing of 
points of claim and defence, reliance on oral evidence and the 
use of directions hearings in complex cases. No third party 
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proceedings, cross claims or set-offs will be entertained. 
Even in the absence of evidence of a breach of duty to creditors, this 
provision is an essential element in the liquidator's armory against 
delinquent directors. 158 There have been innumerable instances where 
proceedings have been instigated under the section to recover from 
corporate officers for various misdemeanours against their company. 159 
With the extension of the general duties and obligations imposed on 
these officers the potential for such redress also increases. 169 This may 
prove to be an important avenue in the future by which creditors, via 
the liquidator, may seek redress from defaulting officers. 161 
Difficulties with the procedure as part of a creditors' recovery regime 
Although it can be argued that the provision is generally adequate to 
support the enforcement of the common law duty, there must be some 
doubt as to the appropriateness of the summary procedure in the types 
of cases typical of the enforcement of this duty given that these cases 
are likely to be complex, deal with substantive issues, involve issues of 
fact and, possibly, a number of parties. In particular, the absence of 
third party proceedings, cross claims and set-offs impacts on the ability 
of the procedure to ensure a just result. Furthermore, the absence of 
automatic pre-trial procedures and the consequential need for 
directions hearings, renders it more time consuming, expensive and 
difficult for an applicant to adduce the evidence necessary to establish 
both the insolvency of the company and a failure by the directors to 
consider the interests of the creditors. Whilst this is less of a concern 
upon an application by a liquidator who has access to the company's 
records if, as will be argued in chapter 1 1 , a creditor recovery regime 
ought permit individual creditors a cause of action then the 
inadequacies of the summary procedure in assisting creditor applicants 
serves to cast further doubt on the desirability of the common law duty 
as an element of a creditor recovery regime. 
158 Baxt suggests that recent cases illustrate a willingness to allow the liquidator to pursue 
former directors of companies which have gone under, therefore endorsing the use of 
S.542 in the pursuit of corporate funds from directors to satisfy creditors' rights: Baxt, 
An Introduction to Company Law (4th edition), Law Book Co Ltd (1987) p.212. 
159 For a comprehensive statement of these instances see Boyle & Sykes, Gore-Browne 
on Companies (43rd edition), Jordan & Sons Ltd 1977. 
160 See section 4.1.3 above. The preference sections may prove to be of particular 
significance. 
161 The South African Court of Appeal has recently commented that the peculiar nature of 
the remedy provided by the misfeasance provision and the fact that it makes drastic 
inroads upon the normal procedure of enforcement of claims justified a restrictive 
interpretation of the provision (Rennie NO v Holzman 1989 (3) SA 706, following 
Lipschitz and Another NNO v Wolpert and Abrahams 1977 (2) SA 732). Whether this 
sentiment will be embraced by the Australian judiciary remains to be seen. 
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Whilst creditors might be able to avail themselves of the traditional 
court procedures to enforce the duty, assuming that it provides them 
with a cause of action, it must be doubted whether this would be 
desirable or practical for other than the largest claims. In chapter 11 
the arguments against providing individual creditors with a cause of 
action will be discussed. These include the cost, the difficulties of 
proof, the undesirability of a multiplicity of actions and the unfairness 
arising from the fact that the first creditors to successfully recover might 
do so at the expense of other creditors thereby usurping the statutory 
scheme of distribution. Whilst it will be argued that some of these 
arguments are misguided and others may be accommodated by 
reserving a recovery action to creditors of larger companies with 
creditors of smaller closely held companies being protected by other 
avenues, these problems are exacerbated by a regime which 
envisages creditors enforcing the common law duty through standard 
legal proceedings. In particular the uncertainty associated with the 
common law duty renders it a less satisfactory avenue for recovery 
than a statutory scheme with defined elements and defences, 
presumptions and statutory guidance as to the quantum of damages. 
It is to a consideration of the legislative and judicial development of the 
other provisions comprising this statutory creditor recovery scheme 
that it is now proposed to turn. 
A general statutory cause of action? 
Prior to doing so however, it is of note that it was also observed that 
the provision was initially interpreted as providing a general cause of 
action against misbehaving directors. Whilst this interpretation was 
subsequently displaced the concept provides an interesting reform 
possibility. In chapters 9 and lithe  possibility of adopting a reform 
agenda either centred on the misfeasance procedure as a basis for 
enforcing a code of ethics/conduct or on a general cause of action in 
the nature of that initially read into the misfeasance provision will be 
briefly explored. It will be argued that such an approach, whilst having 
the advantage of flexibility and adaptability, effectively abrogates to the 
judiciary, or those charged with setting a code of ethics and acceptable 
conduct, parliament's responsibility. Rather some legislative guidance 
is necessary. To some extent these competing principles are 
accommodated by the regime proposed for group companies. It is in 
this context that adaptability and flexibility is most critical and a more 
general provision, incorporating some statutory guidance for the 
judiciary and the corporate community, can be justified. However in the 
case of the typical trading company where the nature of the problem to 
be resolved can be more precisely identified, a more detailed statutory 
scheme is appropriate. 
Page 146 
Chapter 5 
Legislative Development 
1. Introduction 
2. Legislative Development in the United Kingdom 
2.1 	The first defaulting officer provision - the misfeasance 
provision 
2.2 The fraudulent trading provision 
2.2.1 The Greene Committee 
2.2.2 Legislative origins - S.75(1) Companies Act 1928 
2.2.3 The Jenkins Committee recommendations 
2.2.4 The Cork Committee recommendations 
2.2.5 Companies Act 1985 and Insolvency Act 1986 
2.3 The wrongful trading provision 
2.3.1 Insolvency Acts of 1985 and 1986 
2.3.2 Comparison of proposed and actual legislation 
2.3.3 Analysis of the wrongful trading provision 
3. Legislative Development in South Africa 
4. Legislative Development in New Zealand 
5. Legislative Development in Australia 
5.1 	Initial assimilation with the United Kingdom 
5.2 The birth of a nation - the Uniform Companies Acts 
(1961-62) 
Page 147 
Chapter 5 
Legislative Development 
5.2.1 The offence of reckless trading 
5.2.2 Drafting difficulties 
5.2.3 Extension to a civil liability 
5.3 Companies (Defaulting Officers) Act 1966 (Vict.) 
5.3.1 The first comprehensive defaulting officer regime 
5.3.2 Subsequent amendments to this regime 
5.4 Companies Code 
5.4.1 A new defaulting officer regime 
5.4.2 Comparison with preceding provisions 
5.5 A national companies scheme - the Corporations Law 
5.6 	Difficulties with the legislation 
5.6.1 Generally 
5.6.2 Co-existence of criminal and civil liabilities 
5.6.3 Discrete nature of the Australian reckless trading 
provisions 
5.7 Corporate Law Reform Act 1992 
6. 	Conclusion 
Page 148 
Chapter 5 
Legislative Development 
CHAPTER 5 
THE LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRAUDULENT 
AND RECKLESS TRADING PROVISIONS 
"I have no right to add to the requirements of the statute, nor to take 
from the requirements thus enacted. The sole guide must be the 
statute itself." 
Lord Halsbuty L.C., 
Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22 at 29. 
1. 	Introduction 
The failings of both the common law and the misfeasance provision to 
provide an adequate mechanism to enable creditors to recover from 
delinquent corporate management was the catalyst for a history of 
legislative activity. This legislation, known as the defaulting officer 
provisions, typically has embraced two provisions pursuant to which 
creditors may recover from corporate management. The first of these 
applies where a fraud has been committed against the creditors and, 
accordingly, is known as the fraudulent trading provision. The second 
deals with managerial liability where a company has incurred debts in 
circumstances where these debts are unlikely to be paid, and can be 
variously described as a reckless, insolvent or wrongful trading 
provision. 
These provisions provide the lynchpin of the recovery regime available 
to creditors. Thus it is appropriate to examine the development of these 
provisions from the perspective of identifying both the theoretical base 
for a creditor recovery regime and the most appropriate manner in 
which to express the legislation. This examination will be divided into a 
consideration of the legislative development of the provisions followed 
by an analysis of their judicial treatment, with particular reference to the 
Australian provisions pre-dating the 1993 reforms. The new provisions 
are considered separately in chapter 10. 
It is proposed in this chapter to consider this legislative development, 
extending from the origins of the provisions in the United Kingdom and 
Australia to their adoption in New Zealand and South Africa. It will be 
argued that the Australian legislation, in particular, has exhibited 
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theoretical and practical deficiencies. Many of these relate to the 
central issue of whether individual creditors ought be provided with a 
cause of action or whether a collective regime ought apply. 
Initially the United Kingdom legislature led the field in the development 
of its defaulting officer regime with the Australian States, New Zealand 
and South Africa, simply adopting the United Kingdom initiatives. Only 
in recent times have these latter jurisdictions ventured independently 
into this area. Accordingly it is appropriate to commence this analysis 
with an examination of the legislative development of the defaulting 
officer regime in the United Kingdom. Recent departures from the 
United Kingdom approach in South Africa, New Zealand and Australia 
will then be considered. 
2. 	Legislative Development in the United Kingdom 
2.1 The first defaulting officer provision 
- the misfeasance provision 
The Limited Liability Act 1855 naively either did not contemplate the 
potential for fraud and improper dealings offered by the corporate form 
or assumed that the equitable jurisdiction of the court would provide 
sufficient protection. The Act contained no provisions imposing liability 
on directors, nor did its successor the Joint Stock Companies Act 
1856. 
Even the Companies Act 1862 did not appear to recognize that an 
owner/officer of a company might be able to abuse the privilege of 
limited liability. Although the Act introduced into the corporate scheme 
elements of bankruptcy law and specified offences with which 
company officers could be charged, but for one exception there was no 
provision for defaulting officers. 
The exception was the misfeasance provision considered in the 
previous chapter. It was there observed that both the legislative and 
judicial development of this provision generally favoured its extension. 
However, the provision has remained procedural only in its effect, 
supplying no cause of action against delinquent officers. 
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2.2 The fraudulent trading provision 
2.2.1 The Greene Committee 
The first provision to supply a new cause of action against defaulting 
officers was, as it became known, the fraudulent trading provision. 
This provision was enacted on the recommendation of the Greene 
Committee. 1 This Committee had been established in 1925 in response 
to public comment arising from the collapse of several companies in 
suspicious circumstances. There was a perception in the community 
that the common law remedies were inadequate. 
The Committee, in its report, extolled the virtues of limited liability and 
rejected any suggestion of restructuring its availability merely in order 
to prevent abuse. Such restrictions would be undesirable as they 
"would seriously hamper the activities of honest men and would 
inevitably react upon the commerce and prosperity of the country." 2 
Rather the Committee favoured the introduction of the fraudulent 
trading provision, together with some other minor reforms, as a means 
of controlling corporate abuse. 
Provision drafted with particular scenario in mind 
This provision was principally directed to the situation where a person 
in control of a private company on the verge of liquidation, who held a 
floating charge over the assets of the company, filled up this security 
by means of goods obtained on credit and then appointed a receiver. 
In such circumstances the Committee was of the opinion that the 
person concerned should not be able to hide behind the cloak of 
limited liability and that the court should be empowered to charge any 
sum, for which he was found to be liable, upon any debt due to him 
from the company or upon any charge held by him, or his nominees, 
over its assets. 
The limitations inherent within the provision reflect that the above 
scenario was clearly in the Committee's mind when drafting the 
provision. In particular it explains the following limitations: 
(i) why the application of the provision was confined to a company 
in the course of winding up. 
(ii) why the requisite intent to defraud was required to be directed at 
creditors. 
1 	Report of the Company Law Amendment Committee 1926 (Cmnd 2657). 
2 	Paragraph 61. 
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(iii) 	why the application of the provision was restricted to directors. 
Notwithstanding these limitations the provision also contained features 
giving it a potentially wide application. For example, as will be observed 
below, the provision required that the impeached director be carrying 
on business with either an intent to defraud creditors (whether of the 
company or not) or for any fraudulent purpose. The effect of the phrase 
"or for any fraudulent purpose" potentially expanded the range of 
victims beyond persons who are creditors so as to include anyone. 3 
2.2.2 Legislative origins - S.75(1) Companies Act 1928 
This recommendation was enacted as S.75(1) of the Companies Act 
1928. The provision provided that: 
"If in the course of a winding-up it appears that any business of the 
company has been carried on with intent to defraud creditors of the 
company or creditors of any other person or for any fraudulent 
purpose, the court, on the application of the official receiver or the 
liquidator, or any creditor or contributory of the company, may, if it 
thinks proper so to do, declare that any of the directors, whether past 
or present, of the company who were knowingly parties to the carrying 
on of the business in the manner aforesaid shall be personally 
responsible, without any limitation of liability, for all or any of the debts 
or other liabilities of the company as the court may direct." 
In addition to this civil liability, subsection (3) provided that every 
director4 who "was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business" 
in such a manner had committed an offence and was liable to 
imprisonment for up to one year. 
In support of this new cause of action the courts were empowered to 
make any liability a charge on any debt or obligation due from the 
company to the defaulting officer and to declare that a person liable 
under the civil provision or guilty of the offence should not be 
concerned in the management of a company for up to five years. 5 
The only amendment to this provision over the next 50 years was to be 
effected by S.101(1) of the Companies Act 1947 in response to the 
3 	See the discussion in chapter 6, section 3.3. 
4 	Subsection (5) extended the definition of the term "director" to encompass de facto 
directors. 
5 	S.75(2) and S.75(4). 
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recommendations of the Cohen Committee. 6 This amendment 
removed the limitation on the application of the provisions to directors. 
Henceforth the court could declare any person to be personally liable 
or convict such person of fraudulent trading irrespective of whether the 
person was a director or not. 
The Consolidating Act 1948 was to also effect some changes to the 
format of the provision. The fraudulent trading aspects of the previous 
S.275 were to become the subject matter of S.332 while the 
subsections dealing with the prohibition on being concerned in the 
management of companies were removed and made the subject of a 
separate provision. 8 
2.2.3 The Jenkins Committee recommendations 
In 1962 the Jenkins Committee9 recommended radical reforms to the 
fraudulent trading and associated provisions in response to the 
"widespread criticism that the Companies Act as a whole did not deal 
adequately with the situation arising from fraud or incompetence on the 
part of the directors". 18 Most of these reforms were not adopted in the 
United Kingdom until 1985. 11 
The most radical of the Jenkins Committee recommendations was that 
S.332(1) should be extended to make those who have carried on the 
business of a company in a reckless manner personally liable. This 
recommendation was directly adopted in South Africa and probably 
6 	Report of the Company Law Committee 1945 (Cmnd 6659). 
7 	This Act also altered the maximum penalty that could be imposed upon a person 
convicted of fraudulent trading. The potential term of imprisonment was increased 
from one to two years and the court was also granted the power to impose a fine, not 
exceeding five hundred pounds, as an alternative or additional penalty. 
8 	S.33 in the 1947 Act and S.188 in the 1948 Act. 
9 	Report of the Company Law Committee, London June 1962 (Cmnd 1749). 
10 Paragraph 497. 
11 	However in the early 1980s the criminal offence of fraudulent trading received some 
attention. First by virtue of S.80 of the Companies Act 1980 the penalties were 
increased to a maximum of 7 years imprisonment together with a fine of up to £1,000. 
This amendment was implemented in response to criticism by a number of prominent 
judges. Then S.96 of the Companies Act 1981 extended the application of the 
provision to provide criminal penalties for fraudulent trading whether or not the 
company had been or was in the course of being wound up. This was in accordance 
with the recommendations of the Jenkins Committee. This Committee stressed that 
the provision of additional powers itself would achieve nothing unless the Department 
of Trade was prepared to invoke them. [Para 500] It is well documented that the 
Department was reticent to take such proceedings. See the detailed critique of the 
system by Tom Hadden in chapter IV of The Control of Company Fraud, a PEP 
pamphlet (1968). The courts are clearly aware of the problem. See Wallersteiner v 
Moir [1974] 3 All ER 217 and Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] 1 All ER 849 noted by 
Farrar and Lowe in (1975) 38 Mod LA 455. 
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influenced the State legislators in Australia, and later the New Zealand 
legislature. It was not adopted in the United Kingdom but influenced 
the Cork Committee recommendations, which were acted upon. 
2.2.4 The Cork Committee recommendations 
The Cork Committee Report12 of 1982 commenced by echoing the 
views of the Greene, Cohen and Jenkins Committees as to the 
undesirability of imposing restrictions which would hamper the activities 
of honest men and place fetters on business enterprise. However, it 
acknowledged at the same time the general public dissatisfaction with 
the manner in which the law dealt with directors of insolvent 
companies. The Committee concluded that this public disquiet was 
fully justified and urgent attention to this area was required. Specifically 
in relation to S.332 the Committee stated that it was "convinced that 
the time has come for a radical reappraisal of the section". 13 
The recommended reappraisal was the introduction of the concept of 
"wrongful trading" to supplement the existing provisions. Specifically 
the Committee recommended that S.332 be repealed so far as it 
provided a civil remedy and be replaced by a new section under which 
civil personal liability could arise without proof of fraud or dishonesty 
and without requiring the criminal standard of proof. The concept of 
fraudulent trading was to be retained to describe conduct which would 
amount to a criminal offence. 
Wrongful trading 
Wrongful trading was to include fraudulent trading and trading in 
circumstances where a company, being insolvent or unable to pay its 
debts as they fell due, incurred liabilities without a reasonable prospect 
of meeting them in full. A person who was a party to the carrying on of 
such trading was to be made personally liable for the debts of the 
company if he knew or ought to have known that the trading was 
wrongful. 
When ascertaining the nature and extent of the enquires that the 
officer ought to make the test was to be what would a reasonable 
businessman have done in all the circumstances. Thus the proposal 
would replace the existing subjective provision with an objective one. In 
determining whether there was a reasonable prospect of the company 
meeting its liabilities and, if not, whether the director ought to have 
known this, the standard applied would be that of the ordinary 
12 Report of the Cork Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice 1982 (Cmnd 8558). 
13 Paragraph 1760. 
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reasonable man. 
The Committee considered that the remedy of wrongful trading should 
only be exercisable within the framework of situations analogous to 
liquidation. 
Other features of the proposal included: 
(i) the inclusion of a relief provision, 
(ii) an extended definition of "officer", 
(iii) a wide discretion in the court in regard to the beneficiaries of any 
award, and 
(iv) a power in the court to make anticipatory declarations as to 
relief. 
Disqualified and inadequate directors 
The Committee also recommended the imposition of personal liability 
on persons who became concerned in the management of companies 
whilst disqualified from so acting. Furthermore any officer who acted in 
accordance with the instructions of a person known to be disqualified 
would run the risk of being the subject of a declaration as to personal 
liability. 
A further recommendation was that personal liability be imposed on 
persons who were involved in the affairs of an insolvent company 
where they had been recently involved with a similar failure. 
White Paper on Insolvency Law 
Subsequently the Government issued the White Paper on Insolvency 
LaW4 which generally adopted the Committee's recommendations on 
wrongful trading and on the imposition of personal liability on 
disqualified persons continuing to be concerned with companies. The 
proposal in relation to directors involved in more than one corporate 
failure was however perceived as being too far reaching and likely to 
deter the risking of venture capita1. 15 
14 Cmnd 9175. 
15 Paras 52 to 56. 
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2.2.5 Companies Act 1985 and Insolvency Act 1986 
In response to these recommendations the Insolvency Act 1985, 
subsequently consolidated in to the Insolvency Act 1986, and the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 were enacted. Also 
during 1985 a Companies Consolidation Act was enacted which also 
effected a number of minor reforms. 
The major initiatives in relation to the fraudulent trading provision 16 
achieved by this plethora of legislation included: 
(i) the separation of the criminal and civil liabilities for fraudulent 
trading, 17 
(ii) the restriction of standing to make applications under the 
fraudulent trading provision to the liquidator together with a 
requirement that any contributions ordered be in favour of the 
company18 , and 
(iii) the conferring of power on the courts to order that any debt owed 
by the company to an officer impeached under the fraudulent 
trading provision should rank in priority after all the other debts of 
the company. 19 
The fraudulent trading provision is now contained in S.213 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986. That provision provides: 
16 The wrongful trading provision is considered below. The other recommendations 
relating to the disqualification of persons from being involved in the management of a 
company were also enacted (Ss. 12, 13, 14 and 18). In particular, S.18 imposed 
personal liability for the debts of the relevant company on persons contravening such 
orders. Furthermore personal liability was also extended to persons taking instructions 
from those known to be disqualified, although not all the recommendations were 
adopted, for instance, there were no provisions giving effect to the imposition of 
automatic personal liability. Furthermore S.16 of the Insolvency Act 1985 empowered 
a court which made a declaration under either the wrongful or fraudulent trading 
provisions, to also make a disqualification order against a defaulting officer. 
Subsequently these provisions were combined with those contained in the Companies 
Act 1985 into the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
17 S.458 of the Companies Act 1985 and S.213 of the Insolvency Act 1986 respectively. 
A number of new offences are contained in Chapter X of the Insolvency Act 
(Malpractice before and during liquidation) including "Fraud in anticipation of winding-
up" (S.206) and "Transactions in fraud of creditors" (S.207). No personal liability for 
corporate obligations is provided for by these provisions however. 
18 	By S.109 and schedule 6, paragraph 6(1) Insolvency Act 1985. 
19 	By S.109 and schedule 6, paragraph 6(3) Insolvency Act 1985. 
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"213 Fraudulent trading 
(1) If in the course of the winding up of a company it appears that 
any business of the company has been carried on with intent to 
defraud creditors of the company or creditors of any other 
person, or for any fraudulent purpose, the following has effect. 
(2) The court, on the application of the liquidator may declare that 
any persons who were knowingly parties to the carrying of the 
business in the manner above-mentioned are to be liable to 
make such contributions (if any) to the company's assets as the 
court thinks proper." 
From the perspective of creditors this new provision is a double edged 
sword. Individual creditors are no longer provided with standing and 
any funds recovered are to be paid to the company (and then probably 
to secured creditors). At least one commentator has applauded the 
amendment requiring the proceeds of an action to be paid to the 
company and available for the benefit of all the creditors although 
questioning the restriction of locus standi. It has been argued that there 
may well be instances where a creditor may take a different view than 
the liquidator and is prepared to risk his own funds for the benefit of the 
creditors in general. Such philanthropy ought not be inhibited. 20 
This matter, and the features and application generally of the current 
fraudulent trading provision, will be further considered in section 5.6 
below and in chapters 6 and 9. 
2.3 The wrongful trading provision 
2.3.1 Insolvency Acts of 1985 and 1986 
As observed above, both the Cork Committee and the subsequent 
White Paper on Insolvency Law recommended the introduction of a 
wrongful trading provision. The resultant provision, which first 
appeared as S.15 of the Insolvency Act 1985, now appears as S.214 of 
the 1986 Act. Subsections (1) and (2) provide: 
"214 Wrongful trading 
(1) 	... if in the course of the winding up of a company it appears that 
subsection (2) of this section applies in relation to a person who 
20 	Rajak, "Company directors - the end of an era? - 1", (1989) 139 New LJ 1374. 
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is or has been a director of the company, the court, on the 
application of the liquidator, may declare that that person is to be 
liable to make such contribution (if any) to the company's assets 
as the court thinks proper. 
(2) 	This subsection applies in relation to a person if - 
(a) the company has gone into insolvent liquidation, 
(b) at some time before the commencement of the winding up 
of the company, that person knew or ought to have 
concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the 
company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation, and 
(c) that person was a director of the company at that time..." 
Other aspects of the provision include a power granted to the courts to 
relieve a person who had taken appropriate steps in an attempt to 
minimize loss to the creditors, a statement defining with greater 
particularity the nature of the test to be applied, a definition of 
"insolvent liquidation", a statement to the effect that "director" includes 
"shadow director" and an acknowledgment that the section is without 
prejudice to the fraudulent trading provision. 
Procedural aspects in relation to both S.213 and S.214 are contained 
in S.215. This provision repeats provisions previously appearing in the 
fraudulent trading provision contained in S.630 of the Companies Act 
1985 as amended by the Insolvency Act 1985. 21 
2.3.2 Comparison of proposed and actual legislationn 
The wrongful trading provision differs significantly from the draft clause 
proposed by the Cork Committee. In particular: 
(i) only the liquidator can apply for orders pursuant to the provision. 
(ii) any orders made by the court are restricted to orders that 
contribution be made to the company's assets. 
(iii) there are no provisions enabling the court to make anticipatory 
declarations granting relief. 23 
21 	Modified by the Building Societies Act 1986, S.90, Sch 15. 
22 Also see Sealy & Milman, Annotated Guide to the 1986 Insolvency Legislation (2nd 
Ed), at 229-232. 
23 See Para 52 of the White Paper. 
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(iv) the application of the provision is restricted to the situation where 
the relevant conduct is discovered in the course of the winding 
up of the company and not to situations analogous to liquidation 
generally. 
(v) the relief provision defines the circumstances in which relief will 
be given whereas the draft clause simply referred the court to 
the circumstances of the case. 24 
(vi) the provision is hinged on an expectation of the company going 
into insolvent liquidation rather than the incurring of debts in 
circumstances where the company is insolvent or unable to pay 
its debts. 
(vii) the provision refers to directors (including shadow directors) 
whereas the draft provision imposed liability on persons party to 
the carrying on of the business of the company. 25 
As will be observed below, the changes to restrict locus standi to 
liquidators and to require that compensation be directed to the 
company are particularly significant in the context of creditors' recovery 
rights. 
2.3.3 Analysis of the wrongful trading provision 
The provision would appear to contain a number of features worthy of 
closer consideration: 
(i) 
	
A subjective and objective test 
The provision includes both a subjective and objective test with 
the result that a director cannot plead ignorance of the 
company's affairs to argue that he did not know that it was 
insolvent.26 Directors are presumed to possess a certain 
minimum standard of competence and knowledge of the 
company's financial affairs. However the subjective element of 
the test will mean that the knowledge and skill required from a 
director of a company in a modest of line of business will be 
different from that required of a director of a more sophisticated 
company.27 Furthermore a director with particularly relevant 
24 	Ibid. 
25 	It is surprising that the provision is expressed to only apply to directors, this aspect 
having been deleted from the fraudulent trading provision in 1947. 
26 Oditah, "Wrongful Trading", [1990] LMCLQ 205 at 212. 
27 	Prentice, "Creditor's interests and director's duties", 10 Oxford J Legal Stud 265 at 
269. 
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knowledge or expertise may be subject to a more stringent test. 28 
Whilst the flexibility and generality of this test is advantageous in 
that the provision can be sensibly applied to the variety of 
corporate types, viz small family companies, medium trading 
cRncerns and group companies, it does generate some 
uncertainty in application making it difficult for business people to 
know what is expected of them. 29 
(ii) The defence of minimizing creditor loss 
The defence of taking every step to minimise loss to creditors is 
particularly demanding and raises the issue of whether the steps 
required to be taken must actually provide the creditors with 
legal protection. 39 In particular there is some doubt as to whether 
this defence would be available where the directors had merely 
secured a letter of comfort from an associated company which, 
beyond their control, later resiled from its moral undertaking? 31 
Arguably, because a company's board of directors will comprise 
persons of varying standards of competence it is unclear as to 
what practical steps directors ought take in order to raise this 
defence. If a particular director is at odds with the rest of the 
board as to the company's financial health he has a variety of 
options including to resign, arrange to have the company put into 
administration or advise the creditors of his views. 32 
(iii) Quantum of compensation 
The amount of any contribution to be ordered would, prima facie, 
equate to the loss caused to the creditors by the directors. This 
could then be reduced and/or apportioned between the various 
directors at the discretion of the court taking into account relative 
blameworthiness and any other relevant considerations. 33 
Notably S.214 was recently applied in Re Purpoint Ltd to 
render a director liable for a company's debts. Due to the lack of 
records the Court was required to determine what liabilities had 
been incurred in the relevant period for the purpose of fixing the 
28 	Rajak, "Wrongful trading", (1989) 139 New LI 1458 at 1459. 
29 	Ibid. 
30 	Prentice, op. cit. 268-269 and see Prentice, "Fraudulent Trading: Parent Company's 
liability for the debts of its subsidiary", (1987) 103 LQ Rev 11. 
31 	Prentice (1987) 103 LO Rev 11 at 13 and see Doyle, "Anomalies in the Wrongful 
trading provisions", (1992) 13 Co Law 96 at 99. 
32 	Doyle, Id, 98-99. 
33 	Prentice, op. cit. , 270-271. 
34 [1991] BCLC 491. 
Page 160 
Chapter 5 
Legislative Development 
director's liability. Ultimately this liability was not to exceed such 
amount as necessary to recoup the loss to the company arising 
from the moment the director ought to have reasonably expected 
that insolvent liquidation was unavoidable. 
(iv) Application of compensation monies 
The leading case, to date, of any significance for the 
interpretation of S.214 is Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd 
(No 2). 35 The case concerned a fruit importer which fell upon 
hard times and ultimately became totally dependent on a 
substantial bank overdraft to finance its activities. Draft accounts 
submitted to the company by its auditors in January 1987 
showed that the company was insolvent. Attempts to work out a 
solution for the company failed and it went into liquidation in 
October 1987. 
Ultimately the liquidator's application under S.214 was 
successful. Whilst the Court appeared to assume that the 
contribution would attach to a charge over the assets of the 
company it is not clear that this is correct. Most commentators 
have argued that the contributed funds ought be available for 
distribution to the unsecured creditors only and that, furthermore, 
all creditors and not just those the victims of the wrongful trading 
should share equally. Certainly, in Re Purpoint Ltd36 it was 
emphasised that all of the creditors were to benefit from the 
compensation awarded, the Court holding that it had no 
jurisdiction to direct payment to a particular class of creditors, 
such as the victims of the wrongful trading. This result is seen as 
more pragmatic, fairer37 and in tune with the philosophy of the 
provision to increase the protection of trade creditors generally. 38 
On the other hand it is to be conceded that as banks are the 
main financiers of wrongful trading actions there is an argument 
that fairness requires that whatever is recovered go to feed their 
charge. 39 
35 [1989] BCLC 520. 
36 [1991] BCLC 491. 
37 	Prentice, op. cit. , 271-273. 
38 Sealy, "Insolvent Company - Wrongful trading", [1989] CU 375 at 377. Also see: 
Halls, is a wrongful trading award caught by the floating change? - the liquidator's 
view", (1989) 5 Ins LF 34. 
39 Oditah, [1990] LMCLQ 205 at 215-222. However he ultimately rejects this argument 
preferring the view that the general creditors are to benefit. On the subsidiary issue of 
whether the victims of the wrongful trading or all the general creditors should share in 
the proceeds he also supports a pan i passu distribution. 
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(v) Who are shadow directors? 
Directors and shadow directors may be liable under S.214. The 
definition of shadow director has raised the possibility that 
advisers40 and, more importantly, banks taking a concern in the 
running of a debtor's insolvent business or, indeed, other 
creditors might be liable for wrongful trading. In Re A Company 
(No 005009 of 1987)41 the Court suggested that a bank may be 
a shadow director for the purposes of S.214 where the company 
is managed in accordance with the recommendations of the 
bank. Subsequent decisions have met this comment with a 
mixed response42 although most commentators have endorsed 
the proposition. 43 
Most significant is the prospect of a parent company being held 
to be a shadow director in relation to an insolvent subsidiary. In 
Re Augustus Barnett & Son Ltd 14 a parent company was found 
not to be liable for fraudulent trading as it was not carrying on the 
business of its subsidiary. Prentice has analysed this case from 
the perspective of the wrongful trading provisions and concludes 
that the facts where unclear as to whether a conclusion that the 
company was a shadow director could be formed. To the extent 
that it is arguable that the decision would have been no different 
under the wrongful trading provisions he argues that this 
supports the criticisms of the state of the law in relation to the 
liability of a parent company for the debts of its subsidiaries. 45 
On the other hand, it is arguable that a majority shareholder who 
makes demands of the board of directors with the threat of their 
dismissal for failing to comply could fall within the definition of a 
shadow director. 46 
(vi) Unavailabilty of general defence 
The general defence contained in the companies legislation 
40 See Osborne, "Conduct unbecoming a company director", [1991] Accountancy Age, 
19 Sept, p.18. 
41 	[1989] BCLC 13. 
42 Supported in Re McBacon Ltd [1990] BCLC 273. Doubted in Kuwait Asia EC Bank v 
National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd [1990] BCLC 868 (PC). 
43 	For example see: Oditah, "Wrongful trading", [1990] LMCLQ 205 and Doyle, "Defining 
the shadow director", (1992) 136 SJ 494. 
44 [1986] BCLC 170. 
45 	Prentice, op. cit. , 14. Also see Prentice, "Insolvency and the Group", in Goode (ed), 
Group Trading and the Lending banker (1988) and Goode, Principles of Corporate 
Insolvency Law (1990) at 197. See generally chapter 7. 
46 See Doyle, "Defining the shadow director", (1992) 136 SJ 494. Whilst Doyle argues 
that it is not inconceivable that a parent company could be deemed to be a shadow 
director he concedes that this would be unlikely. 
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permitting a court to excuse a director where it appears that he 
has acted honestly and reasonably 47 would not appear to be 
available to a director impeached under S.214. 48 
This short analysis of the wrongful trading provision illustrates that 
whilst it may provide a useful means of recovery for creditors from 
abuse of the privilege of limited liability the provision does contain 
drafting inadequacies. 48 In particular, whilst its broad provisions enable 
the provision to be sensibly applied across the range of circumstances 
in which the corporate form is utilised this generality in turn generates 
uncertainty in application. 
Furthermore the lack of guidance as to the identity of the exact 
beneficiaries of any recoveries is a concern. Whilst it would appear that 
the philosophy behind the provision supports an application of any 
recoveries equally across the general body of creditors it may be that 
such an approach, together with the restriction of locus standi to the 
liquidator, will ultimately limit the usefulness of the provision. 88 
3. 	Legislative Development in South Africa 
Until 1973 the South African legislation merely repeated the United 
Kingdom position. S.184 and S.185 of the Companies Act 1926 
provided a summary action against defaulting officers and, since 1939, 
personal liability for fraudulent trading respectively. 
The Companies Act 1973 replaced those provisions with S.423 and 
S.424. These new provisions were slightly re-drafted versions of the 
originals designed to embrace the recommendations of the Jenkins 
Committee. These recommendations had themselves been adopted by 
the Van Wyk de Vries Commission of Enquiry. The Commission, whilst 
acknowledging the far reaching implications of importing into S.185 the 
concept of recklessness, concluded that its introduction was justified. 
S.424 extended the offence and civil liability to reckless trading. This 
was effected simply by inserting the words "recklessly or" before "with 
intent to defraud" in the section. The effect of this simple amendment is 
considered in chapter 8. 
47 S.727 Companies Act 1985 (United Kingdom); S.1318 Corporations Law (Aust). 
48 Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd [1989] BCLC 13. This view is supported, but on 
a different basis by Bradgate & Howells, "No excuse for wrongful trading", [1990] JnI of 
Bus L 249. But see DKG Contractors Ltd [1990] BCC 903. 
49 	For a similar conclusion: Oditah, op. cit., 222. 
50 	Discussed further in chapters 9 to 11. 
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The misfeasance provision, S.423(1), provides a summary action for 
breach of "faith" as well as trust. There has been no judicial 
consideration of this innovation. It may provide, in accordance with the 
Jenkins Committee recommendations, an attempt to extend the 
summary procedure provided for by that provision to actions for 
negligence. 
4. Legislative Development in New Zealand 
The New Zealand legislature has also been active in enacting 
defaulting officer provisions. Initially the United Kingdom approach was 
adopted and the equivalent provisions repeated in the Companies Act 
1933. These provisions were also to appear in the Companies Act 
1955 as S.320 (fraudulent trading) and S.321 (misfeasance) which 
were identical to S.332 and S.333 respectively of the 1948 United 
Kingdom Act. 
However by virtue of the Companies Amendment Act 1980 a major 
departure was effected. This Act amended the misfeasance provision 
by bringing a receiver within its scope and extending its application to 
actions for "default or breach of duty". In this way the Jenkins 
Committee recommendation in relation to the extension of the 
provision to encompass negligence proceedings was adopted. 
Furthermore amendments were made to the fraudulent trading 
provision which were a combination of the Australian and South African 
innovations. These developments are examined in chapter 8. 
It is also observed in chapter 8 that these general defaulting officer 
provisions have also been supplemented by a special winding-up 
provision only applicable to private companies registered under a 
unique part of the New Zealand companies legislation. This provision 
contains features of both a fraudulent and reckless trading provision. 
5. Legislative Development in Australia 
5.1 Initial assimilation with the United Kingdom 
The most active legislatures in relation to defaulting officers have been 
the States of Australia, especially Victoria. The following historical 
account will, at least initially, concentrate on developments in that State 
because these have been the most innovative and served as the 
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yardstick for the other States. 
Initially the States merely adopted the United Kingdom legislation, 
although there was a tendency to slightly vary the provisions and add 
inconsequential amendments for reasons not readily ascertainable. 
The core of the sections would typically be unaltered but it was 
common practice to add subsections. 51 
The first Victorian Companies Act appeared in 1864. This Act was a 
direct copy of the United Kingdom 1862 Act. It included S.149 which 
was equivalent to United Kingdom S.165, the misfeasance provision. 52 
In 1931 the Queensland Companies Act became the first Australian 
legislation to contain a fraudulent trading provision when, by virtue of 
S.284, it repeated S.275 of the 1929 United Kingdom Act. The other 
Australian jurisdictions were soon to follow.53 Again the misfeasance 
provision repeated the United Kingdom equivalent. 54 
5.2 The birth of a nation - the Uniform Companies Acts 
(1961-62) 
5.2.1 The offence of reckless trading 
The 1958 Victorian Companies Act was to substantially reproduce the 
1948 United Kingdom Act including S.332 and S.333 which appeared 
as S.226 (fraudulent trading) and S.227 (misfeasance) of the Victorian 
Act. This Act was to form the basis for the Uniform Companies Acts of 
1961/1962, a move designed to remove inconvenience to the business 
community caused by varying legislative requirements across the 
States. The relevant provisions were S.304 and S.305 which repeated 
S.226 and S.227 respectively. 
Whilst this attempt to rationalize corporate law across Australia was to 
be short-lived it did, at least, have one legacy for it appears that it 
51 	S.308 of the Companies Act (NSW) (1936) retained a subsection which had been 
dropped by all the other States, but retained in the U.K. until 1985, to the effect that 
orders made under this provision were deemed to be final judgments. Also the NSW 
provision contained a special provision (ss(2)) which was to be incorporated in to the 
Co-operative legislation of 1961-62 as S.305(2). See section 4.7.3 of chapter 4 for a 
discussion of this subsection. 
52 	In fact the provision first appeared in Australia as S.166 of the Queensland Companies 
Act 1863. In Victoria the provision reappeared as S.152 of the 1890 Act, S.213 of the 
1910 Act, S.215 of the 1915 Act and S.213 of the 1928 Act. In these enactments it 
appeared in the same format at S.215 of the 1908 Act [United Kingdom]. 
53 
	
	South Australia (1934-35) S.290, Victoria (1938) S.275, New South Wales (1936) 
S.307, West Australia (1943) S.281, Tasmania (1959) S.237. 
54 	Q'land - S.285, W.A.- S.282, S.A.- S.291, Tas - S.238, Vict. - S.276, N.S.W. - S.308. 
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induced the legislators to abandon their United Kingdom shackles and 
give Australian company law a separate identity. In particular, S.303(3) 
of the Uniform Companies legislation was a most innovative addition to 
the legislation. 55 It provided that: 
"If in the course of the winding up of a company it appears that an 
officer of the company who was knowingly a party to the contracting of 
a debt provable in the winding up had, at the time when the debt was 
contracted, no reasonable or probable ground of expectation, after 
taking into consideration the other liabilities, if any, of the company at 
the time, of the company being able to pay the debt, the officer is guilty 
of an offence against this Act." 
5.2.2 Drafting difficulties 
Unfortunately this provision was found to contain drafting defects. In 
Wren v Lyndon56 the Court was asked to rule on the wording of 
S.303(3) in order to ascertain whether prosecutions under the provision 
had been brought within time. Redapple J., in the course of quashing 
the convictions on the grounds that the prosecutions were out of time, 
time running from the date on which the debts were incurred, referred 
to the imprecise wording of S.303(3). In particular he considered that 
the words "If it appears" caused difficulties. The section did not specify 
to whom it must appear and in his Honour's view the provision could 
not be construed literally otherwise it might be said that the mere 
appearance to some person that the conduct had taken place would, 
without more, complete the offence. 
His Honour noted that S.303(3) was "the unfortunate product of an 
uneasy union of certain provisions of previous enactments relating to 
the winding up of companies and the bankruptcy of individuals". 57 
Regrettably, in his Honour's opinion, it did not inherit some of the 
characteristics of its putative parents, the provisions of which were 
reasonably clear. 
5.2.3 Extension to a civil liability 
Furthermore, to the extent that the provision did not impose personal 
liability for reckless trading and merely created an offence it was a 
curious application of the Jenkins Committee recommendations which 
55 Compare the Jenkins Committee recommendation on reckless trading handed down 
about the same time (see section 2.2.3 above). Notably S.303(3) enacted an offence 
provision not a civil liability provision. 
56 (1972) CLC 27,383. 
57 	Op. cit., 27,385. 
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suggested the creation of a civil liability but not an offence. Similarly, 
the failure by the legislature to extend S.305, the misfeasance 
provision, in accordance with the Jenkins Committee recommendations 
was surprising. 
In any event within 5 years Tasmania, West Australia69, South 
Australia60 and New South Wales 61 had amended their legislation to 
include a civil liability for reckless trading. This was effected by 
inserting a subsection (1A) into S.304 which provided that: 
"Where a person has been convicted of an offence under subsection 
(3) of section three hundred and three in relation to the contracting of - 
such a debt as is referred to in that subsection the Court, on the 
application of the liquidator or any creditor or contributory of the 
company, may, if it thinks proper so to do, declare that the person shall 
be personally responsible without any limitation of liability for the 
payment of the whole or any part of that debt." 
5.3 Companies (Defaulting Officers) Act 1966 (Vict.) 
5.3.1 The first comprehensive defaulting officer regime 
Victoria was not to lag behind for long and in 1966 the Companies 
(Defaulting Officers) Act was enacted. 62 Although this legislation 
offended the attempted rationalization of corporate law in Australia it 
marked an important era for Australian company law, an era 
characterized by a recognition that the abuses of limited liability by 
company officials would not be tolerated. 
This legislation repealed the defaulting officer provisions contained in 
S.300 to S.305 and replaced them with more comprehensive 
provisions. 
The misfeasance provision, S.305, was replaced by S.367B. This 
provision restricted proceedings under the provision to actions by the 
Attorney-General or a person authorized by the Attorney-General but 
removed a 2 year restriction on the power to make orders concerning 
money or property received by an officer in circumstances which 
58 No. 28/1966. 
59 1964 
60 No. 52/1964. 
61 	No. 20/1964; In each instance S.304(2) was also amended to extend the powers 
granted to a court under that provision where orders as to reckless trading were being 
made. 
62 No. 7501/1966. 
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appeared to have been unfair or unjust. Furthermore the requirement 
that the company be in the course of being wound up was relaxed to 
merely require proof of financial difficulties. 63 
The reckless and fraudulent trading provisions, S.303(3) and S.304, 
were replaced by S.374C and S.374D. These provisions were coupled 
with S.374E, an interpretation section, which repeated the extension of 
the provisions to companies experiencing financial difficulties and also 
extended locus standi to bring civil proceedings by recognizing that 
depending upon the reason why the company fell within the definition 
of a "company to which this section applies", different persons should 
have the appropriate standing. It was notable however that, unlike the 
previous provisions, contributories and creditors had to obtain 
authorization to bring civil proceedings. 
S.374C was the offence provision, rendering it an offence to recklessly 
or fraudulently trade. These provisions were effectively the same as 
the former offences contained in S.303(3) and S.304(4). 
S.374D was the counterpart, imposing personal liability on persons 
convicted of the offences. Subsection (1) stated as follows: 
"Where a person has been convicted of an offence under subsection 
(1) or subsection (2) of section 3740, the Court on the application of 
the appropriate officer or, with the consent of the Commission, any 
creditor or contributory of the company may, if it thinks proper to do so, 
declare that the person is personally responsible without any limitation 
of liability - 
(a) in the case of a conviction under subsection (1) of section 374C, 
for the payment to the company of an amount equal to the whole 
of the debt in respect of which the conviction was made, or such 
part thereof as the Court thinks fit; and 
(b) in the case of a conviction under subsection (2) of section 3740, 
for the payment to the company of the amount required to satisfy 
all or any of the debts of the company as the Court directs." 
The remaining subsections of S.374D repeated the other provisions of 
S.304. 
63 	Discussed further in chapter 4 at section 2.2. 
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These amendments were in due course enacted in all the other States, 
except Tasmania. 64 
Civil and criminal inter-relationship established 
The essential change effected by this new regime was the addition of 
the prerequisite of a conviction for the imposition of civil liability for 
fraudulent trading. Originally the fraudulent trading civil and criminal 
liabilities were independent of each other. It was not until the 
enactment of a civil liability for reckless trading that the notion of a civil 
liability dependent on a criminal conviction first appeared. In fact this 
was the only element required to be satisfied in order to make out the 
civil cause of action. The legislature left it entirely to the discretion of 
the court to determine whether an applicant should satisfy the court of 
any other factors. With the enactment of S.374C and S.374D the 
prerequisite of a criminal conviction was extended to the civil liability for 
fraudulent trading with a similar broad discretion vested in the court. No 
rationale for this change, nor for the existence of the feature generally, 
was offered nor is readily ascertainable. 
This inter-relationship between the civil and criminal aspects of the 
provisions is further considered in section 5.5.2 in the context of the 
most recent legislation. It will be observed that this feature has 
generated considerable difficulties. 
Furthermore, in chapter 6 the exercise of the discretion vested in the 
courts is examined from the perspective of whether any further 
elements have been incorporated into the provision by way of judicial 
gloss. 
5.3.2 Subsequent amendments to this regime 
Most of the subsequent amendments to the provisions were cosmetic 
and effected to the definition sections. The more important included the 
amendment of S.367B to substitute "negligence, default, breach of 
duty" for "misfeasance" 65 and the introduction of the concept of a 
"prescribed person" for the purpose of bringing proceedings. 66 With the 
introduction of this concept certain persons were automatically 
authorized to apply for orders. Those authorized included liquidators, 
official managers and contributories. 
64 	W.A. (No. 98/1969), Q'Land (No. 8/1971), S.A. (No. 52/1971/72), N.S.W. (No. 
61/1971). 
65 -W.A. (No. 100/1975), Q'Land (No. 71/1975), S.A. (No. 54/1979), N.S.W. (No. 
20/1973), Vict (No. 8787). 
66 	Op. cit. 
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S.374D was amended in all States by the insertion of a subsection (1A) 
specifying prescribed persons with standing to bring proceedings. This 
provision simply repeated the earlier position but left it open for the 
category to be easily extended in the future. 67 
Amendments unique to specific States 
There was also some amendments particular to individual States. The 
more notable of these were: 
(i) Certain New South Wales amendments tidied up the provisions 
by removing from S.367B the power to order an examination. 
The power to make such orders was restricted to upon 
applications under S.367A which provided a specific procedure 
for seeking orders for the examination of persons associated 
with companies. 68 However, this amendment seems to have 
been ignored by the legislature given the nature of a subsequent 
amendment to S.367B effected in 1976. 69 
(ii) In New South Wales and South Australia, but not in Victoria, 
Western Australia or Queensland, a subsection S.374C(3) was 
inserted to the effect that notwithstanding S.381 (which imposed 
a 3 year limitation period from the date the offence was 
committed) a 3 year limitation period from either the date the 
company became insolvent or the date the debt was contracted, 
whichever was the latter, would apply. However, no proceedings 
could be brought where the debt was contracted more than 3 
years before the company became insolvent. 79 
(iii) In New South Wales S.374D(1) was amended to permit civil 
applications to be brought where the offences had been 
committed under the earlier sections, S.303(3) and S.304(4). 71 
(iv) In South Australia, S.374D(5) was amended to enable 
applicants other than "appropriate officers" to give evidence and 
call witnesses.72 This technical defect had been created by the 
original Victoria legislation in 1966 and repeated in all other 
jurisdictions except for New south Wales. Neither Victoria, 
Western Australia or Queensland took the opportunity to amend 
their provisions. 
67 	Op. cit.; Creditors and contributories now had to have the Commission's authorization 
to commence proceedings, not merely its consent. 
68 No. 20/1973. 
69 	No. 1/1976. 
70 	NSW (No. 20/1973); S.A. (No. 54/1979). 
71 	No. 20/1973. 
72 	No. 54/1979. 
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(v) There was another set of amendments to the provisions in New 
South Wales during 1976. 73 These amendments were 
inconsequential, with the exception of an amendment to 
S.367B(1) which clarified that the court had power to make both 
examination and payment orders concurrently. 
5.4 Companies Code 
5.4.1 A new defaulting officer regime 
In 1981 a new co-operative scheme was introduced into Australia 
designed to further the goal of removing the difficulties encountered by 
businesses operating nationally of having to satisfy varying legislative 
requirements across the country and, especially, of having to lodge 
multiple sets of documents. In that year each State enacted legislation 
applying certain Commonwealth legislation as part of the laws of the 
State, such laws to be known as the Companies Code, and undertook 
to only amend these laws in accordance with the other States. 
This Code repealed the previous legislation. The misfeasance 
provision appeared as S.542 of the Code whilst the reckless and 
fraudulent trading provisions were contained in S.556 and S.557. 
Misfeasance provision 
The misfeasance provision was analyzed in detail in chapter 4. 
Basically it repeated S.367B but with a number of innovations. The 
most important of these included: 
(i) the removal of the requirement that the company be insolvent or 
experiencing financial difficulties, 
(ii) the repositioning of the power to order the examination of an 
officer to a separate provision, 
(iii) the removal of the requirement that the person the subject of the 
application must have taken part in the formation, promotion, 
administration, management or winding up of the company, 
.(iv) the extension of the category of causes of action permitted to 
brought by a misfeasance summons to include "fraud", 
73 	No. 1/1976. 
Page 171 
Chapter 5 
Legislative Development 
(v) the removal of any qualifications on the types of orders the 
courts might make, 
(vi) the reservation of the right in any person to institute other 
proceedings in relation to the breach or otherwise, and 
(vii) the provision for the respondent to have an opportunity to give 
evidence, call witnesses and employ a solicitor. 
Apart from (i), (iii) and (vi) most of these aspects had already been 
considered by the judiciary and the new provisions simply served to 
clarify the position. 
Reckless trading provision 
On the other hand, the changes to the reckless and fraudulent trading 
provisions were significant. S.374E, the interpretation provision, 
appeared as S.553. The offences formerly contained in S.374C were 
placed in S.556, with S.557 essentially providing for civil liability, 
replacing S.374D. 
S.556(1) provided for the offence of reckless trading. The provision 
provided that: 
"If - 
(a) a company incurs a debt, whether within or outside the [State or 
Territory]; 
(b) 	immediately before the time when the debt is incurred - 
(i) there are reasonable grounds to expect that the company 
will not be able to pay all its debts as and when they 
become due; or 
(ii) there are reasonable grounds to expect that, if the 
company incurs the debt, it will not be able to pay all its 
debts as and when they become due; and 
(c) 	the company is, at the time when the debt is incurred, or 
becomes at a later time, a company to which this section 
applies, 
any person who was a director of the company, or took part in the 
management of the company, at the time when the debt was incurred 
is guilty of an offence and the company and that person or, if there are 
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2 or more such persons, those persons are jointly and severally liable 
for the payment of the debt." 
This provision contained solely objective ingredients. The subjective 
aspects, which had bedevilled the early provisions, were the subject of 
defences contained in S.556(2). Thus the onus of proving subjective 
matters was to be borne by the respondent. It is therefore arguably 
inaccurate to refer to the provision as a reckless trading provision and 
it is probably more aptly described as a negligent trading provision. 
The Explanatory Memorandum74 states that the reckless trading 
offence, although based on S.374C(1), was restructured to place 
greater responsibility on directors and managers of companies. 75 It 
would appear that this was to be achieved by the reversal of the onus 
in relation to difficult matters of proof. 
In relation to S.556(2) the Explanatory Memorandum states that it was 
designed to protect persons who had not authorized the incurring of 
the debt or who did not realize that the company would not be able to 
pay its debts. 76 
In addition to the normal criminal sanctions, S.556(1) granted the court 
power to impose personal liability on guilty parties. The over-lap 
between this aspect of the provision and the civil liability contained in 
S.557 created some confusion. This was exacerbated by the 
enactment of S.556(3) which provided that a criminal conviction did 
not need to be obtained before civil proceedings were instituted, 
whereas S.557(1) expressly stated that a conviction was a prerequisite 
for civil liability. Problems arising from these inconsistencies are 
discussed in section 5.5 below. 
S.556(4) was new and sought to ensure that an officer who was 
ordered to pay a corporate debt was not able to subsequently exercise 
his rights of indemnity and subordination contained in S.558. 
Fraudulent trading provision 
The fraudulent trading offence was contained in S.556(5). The 
Explanatory Memorandum states that this was based on S.374C(2) 
with the clarification that it applied to acts performed both prior to and 
during the period the company was a company to which the provisions 
74 Neither the second reading speeches nor the parliamentary debates considered these 
provisions. 
75 	Paragraph 1219. 
76 Paragraph 1220. 
Page 173 
Chapter 5 
Legislative Development 
applied. 77 
The provision in fact contained a number of differences from 
S.374C(2). It provided: 
"If - 
(a) a company does any act (including the making of a contract or 
the entering into of a transaction) with intent to defraud creditors 
of the company or of any other person or for any other fraudulent 
purpose; and 
(b) the company is at the time when it does the act, or becomes at a 
later time, a company to which this section applies, 
any person who was knowingly concerned in the doing of the act with 
that intent or for that purpose is guilty of an offence. 
Penalty: $10,000 or imprisonment for 2 years, or both." 
The section acknowledged that it was the acts of the company which 
were at issue and furthermore particularised the types of acts with 
which it was concerned. 
Other provisions 
S.556(6) and S.556(7) were procedural and provided that certificates of 
conviction were evidence of the matters stated therein. S.557(1) and 
S.557(2) granted the court power "if it thinks it proper to do so" to 
declare a person convicted of reckless and fraudulent trading 
respectively, personally liable. Again the provisions imposed no 
additional express requirements for the imposition of civil liability other 
than evidence of a conviction. 
The two subsections differed as to who had standing to bring the 
respective applications and as to whom the liability was owed. S.557(1) 
restricted standing to the Commission or creditors and directed that 
liability in the sum of the debt concerned was owed to the creditor 
whose debt was the subject of the application. S.557(2), together with 
S.557(3), provided a more generous range of applicants but directed 
that the liability was owed to the company in the sum of "the amount 
required to satisfy so much of the debts of the company as the Court 
thinks proper". 
77 Paragraph 1222. 
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The policy behind this difference in the two subsections is probably that 
reckless trading, as defined, was a discrete offence, being directed at 
the incurring of a particular debt, and so was probably viewed by the 
legislature as a wrong against a specific creditor. Fraudulent, trading 
on the other hand, was dynamic and was directed at a course of 
dealings or conduct, so properly regarded as a wrong against the 
company and its creditors generally. 
S.557(4) to S.557(7) repeated the ancillary powers of the court 
previously contained in S.374D(2) and S.374D(3). 78 These provisions 
simply empower the court to make such further orders as are 
necessary to give effect to the declaration of personal liability. 
S.557(9) initially was an important subsection. It authorised 
proceedings under S.557 where the corresponding conviction was 
obtained under the earlier legislation. 79 
During 1985 S.556(3A) was inserted.80 It provided that where civil 
proceedings were brought under S.556(1) the onus of proof was the 
balance of probabilities. The need for clarification of this nature has 
been a feature of the history of the fraudulent and reckless trading 
provisions, arising from confusion generated by the concurrence of civil 
and criminal aspects within the provisions. Although this aspect has 
been remedied in most jurisdictions, and indeed was not a feature of 
the legislation immediately preceding the Companies Code, it re-
appeared as a feature of S.556 and S.557 by virtue of the inclusion of 
the references to civil remedies and proceedings in S.556. In fact the 
placement of subsection (3A) within S.556 exacerbated this problem 
and added to the already confused state of the provisions. 81 
5.4.2 Comparison with preceding provisions 
The Explanatory Memorandum indicates that S.556 and S.557 were 
based on S.374C and S.374D respectively but with some 
modifications. 
78 	S.304(2) and (3) of the 1961-1962 legislation. S.374D(A) [S.304(5)] was deleted whilst 
S.374D(5) [S.304(6)] was enacted at S.557(8). S.374D(5) had been altered in 
accordance with the earlier N.S.W. and S.A. amendments (supra) to ensure that all 
applicants could give evidence and call witnesses. See the Explanatory Memorandum, 
paragraph 1224(c). 
79 This provision is designed to have the same effect as the N.S.W. amendment to 
S.374D(1) effected by No. 20/1973. 
80 	A.C.T. (No. 192/1985). 
81 	See the discussion in section 4.5. 
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Generally 
In relation to S.556 it has been noted that the offence of reckless 
trading in particular was modified to contain solely objective elements. 
Furthermore the criminal sanctions were extended to empower the 
court to impose personal liability on the delinquent officer. A further 
modification was that the elements of the offence specified that the 
relevant debt may have been incurred either "within or outside the 
[State or Territory]". This was to counter argument, in the nature of that 
raised in Lyndon v Wren, 82 to the effect that the court of a particular 
State had no jurisdiction to convict where the offences were committed 
in another State, namely the State where the debts were incurred. It is 
likely that this argument would have been frequently raised where 
inter-State companies were concerned. 
Another modification was that the inquiry was not to be whether the 
company could pay the debt "taking into consideration the other 
liabilities" but rather could the company pay "all its debts". Whether this 
modification was of any significance is doubtful. In Re Concept 
Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq)83 the defendant argued that as the 
company could have paid any one of the thirteen debts the subject of 
thirteen counts then convictions under S.374C(1) could not stand. This 
argument was rejected on the basis that in relation to each debt the 
other liabilities had to be taken into consideration. Clearly the same 
result would have followed under S.556(1). 
On the other hand in 3M Australia Pty Ltd v Kemish, 84 Foster J., 
referred to the difference in wording and stated that S.556(1) appeared 
to demand a more specific inquiry into the status of the other debts. 
Still, it is difficult to envisage the significance of this "more specific 
inquiry". 
In relation to S.557 the Explanatory Memorandum identifies a number 
of changes from S.374D. The most important of these is that in the 
case of an application under S.557(1) any court order was to be in 
favour of the person to whom the debt was payable. 85 
Procedural provisions or new rights created? 
It would appear that the differences between the old and new 
provisions were sufficient to counter the suggestion that S.556(1) was 
82 Sydney Petty Sessions (Berman S.M.) 21 April 1972. The argument was not raised 
before the appeal court (supra). The importance of this amendment has been 
highlighted by the applicant creditor's failure in Re Hanlon Homes Pty Ltd (in liq) 11 
ACLR 481. 
83 2 ACLR 219. 
84 (1986) 4 ACLC 185. 
85 See paras 1223 and 1224. 
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merely a procedural provision creating no new rights and liabilities but 
simply providing a different method of doing what could have been 
done under S.374C. 
This argument was advanced in Russell Halpern Nominees Pty Ltd v 
Martin and Anot66 to justify the making of orders under S.556(1) in 
respect to a debt pre-dating the Companies Code. The West Australian 
Court of Appeal rejected the argument holding that the rights created 
by S.556(1) had no counterpart under the previous legislation, nor did 
S.556(1) have a retrospective operation. 
Olney J. embarked on an extensive comparison of the relevant 
legislation and observed numerous similarities including: 
(i) the existence of a prerequisite of a conviction for personal 
liability, 
(ii) that the company had to be a company to which the section 
applied at the time the offence was committed, 
(iii) that the criteria for conviction included the circumstance that the 
officer concerned had no reasonable or probable grounds of 
expectation of payment of the debt, and 
(iv) that creditors required Ministerial authorization to apply under 
the provisions. 
However, his Honour was impressed by one essential point of 
distinction, namely that under the former legislation the orders were 
made in favour of the company whereas under S.556(1) and S.557(1) 
liability was owed to the particular creditor. Hence his conclusion that 
S.556 created a new cause of action. 
Nevertheless, his Honour differed from the majority holding that 
S.556(1) had a limited retrospective operation by virtue of the fact that 
liability arose under the provision from the date when the company 
became a company to which the section applied rather than from the 
date when the debt was incurred. This particular issue is discussed 
further in chapter 6. 
Similarly Young J. in Ross McConnel Kitchen & Co Pty Ltd (in liq) v 
Ross & 0rs87 contrasted the old and new provisions, concluding that 
86 (1986) 4 ACLC 393. 
87 (1985) 3 ACLC 326. 
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S.556 had no exact counterpart in the earlier legislation and that S.557 
was significantly different from S.374D. 
These differences were again canvassed in 3M Australia Pty Ltd v 
Kemish88 Foster J., referred to the "clear change in legislative policy in 
S.556(1)", viz.: 
"The net of liability, both criminal and civil, is cast far more widely than 
in the earlier section. Whereas Sec. 303(3) was aimed solely at a 
company officer who had knowingly been a party to the contracting of 
the debt in question, with the attendant necessity that the prosecution 
prove this threshold matter beyond reasonable doubt, Sec. 556(1) 
contains no such limiting requirement. A prima facie liability in a 
director of the company or a person in a managerial position, can be 
established without proof that such person had any personal 
knowledge of, let alone involvement in, the incurring of the relevant 
debt. Such matters form no part of the ingredients of the offence." 89 
Some of the differences noted by his Honour were considered above. 
In addition he observed that the heavy burden of proof which rested on 
the applicant under the earlier provisions no longer existed 88 and that 
the provisions created a new structure. 
Locus standi 
Another major change was in relation to locus standi. Leaving aside 
S.556, which is discussed below, S.557(1) and S.557(2) differed 
significantly from S.374D(1) and S.374D(2) respectively. Locus standi 
under the former provisions was the same. S.557(1) however restricted 
standing to the Commission or particular creditors which, although a 
narrower category than under S.374D(1), importantly provided the 
creditor with standing as of right. 
S.557(2) repeated the position under S.374D(2), a creditor requiring 
authorization, and additionally extended locus standi to shareholders 
where the company was under investigation. Prima facie this appears 
anomalous91 but is possibly attributable to the difference in nature 
between the reckless and fraudulent trading provisions, discussed in 
section 5.5.3 below. 
88 (1986) 4 ACLC 185. 
89 	Id, 190. 
90 See chapter 6. 
91 	Farrar, "The Obligations of a Company's Directors to its Creditors", an unpublished 
paper, at p.16. 
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Potential respondents 
S.556(5) repeated the feature of the fraudulent trading provision that 
the respondent only need be a "person". S.556(1), on the other hand, 
required that the respondent be a director or had taken part in the 
management of the company when the debt at issue was incurred. 
This was a departure from S.303(3) and S.374C(1) which had simply 
required that the person be an officer at the relevant time although it 
was arguably merely a cosmetic amendment. "Officer" as defined in 
S.5(1) of the earlier legislation included directors, liquidators and 
employees generally. "Director" was, in turn, defined broadly to include 
what can loosely be called "shadow directors" or "de facto directors". 
On other hand, whilst the Code adopted this definition of "director" and, 
in fact, tightened it to ensure that unofficial directors were caught, the 
requirement of a management capacity arguably reduced the category 
of potential respondents to exclude employees although as S.374C(1) 
required that the officer be knowingly a party to the contracting of the 
debt this would typically have required that he have been involved in 
management for the requirement to be made out. 
The extension to include management within the provision did, 
however, raise the possibility that any professional advising or 
assisting corporate management might be caught by 8.558(1) in the 
appropriate circumstances. It is understood that the Accountancy 
bodies warned their members to be careful should their activities be in 
the nature of a management capacity. 92 Notably the first case in which 
S.556(1) was successfully raised involved an accountant who had 
become involved in the management of a company. 93 
5.5 A national companies scheme - the Corporations Law 
Background to the legislation 
The recent history of Australian company law is characterised by 
attempts to rationalise the law across the States. Whilst an attempt at 
uniformity occurred during the early 1960's the first true co-operative 
scheme was established in 1981 with each State enacting legislation 
adopting the Companies Act 1981 (Commonwealth) as part of the law 
of the State concerned. Any amendments to this law required approval 
by a Ministerial Council composed of the Attorney-Generals of the 
States and of the Commonwealth but once approved the 
Commonwealth was obliged to enact them. 
92 The writer was informed of this development during discussions with members of the 
accounting profession. 
93 3M Australia Pty Ltd v Kemish (1986) 4 ACLC 185. 
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The administration of this co-operative scheme was the province of the 
National Companies and Securities Commission (NCSC). However 
each State retained its own local administration which was required to 
work with the NCSC and act as its delegate. Whilst the NCSC had 
broad powers it was generally considered to have been under 
funded . 94 
With the change in the Commonwealth government in the early 1980's 
moves commenced to satisfy a long-standing ambition of the new 
governing party to establish the Commonwealth as the sole source of 
company legislation. This ambition found support in the defects of the 
co-operative scheme, namely that it was perceived to inhibit law-
making, presented problems of ministerial accountability and lacked 
effective enforcement. Wide business community support for a truly 
national scheme also existed, at least in the eastern States. 
The major hurdle for the Commonwealth was that, in contrast to the 
State legislatures, it only had limited power under the Constitution to 
legislate in respect to companies. The original national companies 
scheme legislation introduced in 1988 and intending to operate to the 
exclusion of State legislation and without the co-operation of the States 
was, indeed, successfully challenged by a number of States on the 
basis that it was beyond the powers of the Commonwealth. In ihe 
result the Commonwealth negotiated a compromise with the States 
whereby the new national scheme with its central administrative body, 
the Australian Securities Commission (ASC), was, essentially, 
introduced with the Commonwealth undertaking to pay the States 
annual indexed grants to compensate them for the loss of revenue they 
would sustain from no longer administering the legislation. 
Furthermore, whilst the States would continue to have some input into 
the form of the companies legislation via the Ministerial Council the 
jurisdiction of the Council was reduced and the voting rights of the 
Council members were weighted in favour of the Commonwealth. 
The Commonwealth legislation was, accordingly, adopted in each 
State by legislation and enforcement powers were conferred on the 
ASC. The mechanics of the enactment of the law involved the adoption 
by the States of the Corporations Law as enacted in the 
Commonwealth Corporations Act 1989. Furthermore the Australian 
Securities Commission Act 1989 provides for the administration and 
enforcement of the law to be carried out by the Commonwealth body. 
94 	See Ford, para 113. This outline of the developments preceding the introduction of the 
1991 co-operative scheme draws heavily upon the detailed consideration in Ford at 
paras 111 to 115. 
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Defaulting officer provisions 
The legislation dealing with defaulting officers entered into effect on 1 
January, 1991. It is contained in Part 5.8 of the Corporation Law, 
entitled "Offences," and merely repeats the previous Code provisions 
dealing with liability for fraudulent and reckless trading. Essentially 
S.592 restates S.556 with only one change of any significance. 
S.592(8) provides that a document purporting to be a certificate of 
conviction shall be deemed to be such unless the contrary is 
established. Similarly S.557 is restated as 5•593,96 the misfeasance 
provision (S.542) as S.598 and the interpretation provision (S.553) as 
S.589. 96 
Thus the above commentary in relation to the Companies Code 
provisions is equally applicable to the Corporations Law. 
5.6 Difficulties with the legislation 
5.6.1 Generally 
This legislative history of the defaulting officer provisions is 
characterised by ambiguity and uncertainty. 
In chapter 4 it was observed that the scope of the misfeasance 
provision, indeed even whether it provided a summary remedy or a 
new cause of action, gave rise to considerable debate and eventually 
legislative reform. The failure to more fully particularize the nature of 
the summary procedure has also generated some confusion. 
Similarly the fraudulent and, more recently, reckless trading provisions 
have suffered from anomalies and drafting inadequacies. Many of 
these difficulties derive from the fact that the fraudulent trading 
provision was initially drawn to counter a particular practice but 
subsequently it has undergone a piecemeal extension as difficulties in 
its application to a wider set of practices have become apparent. 
Indeed the reckless and wrongful trading extensions are illustrative of 
thie piecemeal approach. 
Some of the problems encountered in the legislation over the years 
have arisen from isolated drafting defects and have either been the 
subject 	of 	amending 	legislation 	or 	ameliorative 	judicial 
95 S.557(9) was moved to S.589(6). 
96 With some minor reorganisation. 
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pronouncements. However, many of the difficulties associated with the 
provisions can be attributed to two particular features. One of these, 
namely the concurrence of criminal and civil liabilities within the 
provisions, has been recognised and attended to in the United 
Kingdom, South Africa and New Zealand but not in Australia where the 
feature continues to bedevil S.592 and S.593. 
The other feature, which has been a problem peculiar to Australia, is 
the discrete nature of the reckless trading provisions in that they 
purport to apply to the incurring of a particular debt. In this respect the 
provisions are to be contrasted with the United Kingdom wrongful 
trading provision, the South African reckless trading provision and the 
New Zealand private and general company provisions, which, however, 
have unique problems of their own, as identified in chapter 8. 
The implications of the existence of these features for the Corporations 
Law provisions is discussed below. 
5.6.2 Co-existence of criminal and civil liabilities 
Many of the interpretative difficulties discussed in the following chapter 
have arisen due to the co-existence of civil and criminal liabilities within 
one set of provisions. For example, doubts as to the relevant onus of 
proof and as to the rules of interpretation 97 to apply can be attributed to 
this feature. 
In all jurisdictions this aspect has been the subject of legislative 
attention. Unfortunately the Australian legislature have displayed an 
inability to successfully structure the provisions to remove this feature. 
Drafting and structural defects 
From the initial placement of the fraudulent trading provision in the 
offences sub-division of the part of the Act dealing with winding-up and 
the placement of the reckless trading offence in the section entitled 
"Liability where proper accounts not kept", to the subsequent 
placement of the provision creating a reckless trading civil liability in 
the following section of the Uniform Companies Acts the legislature has 
97 	The interpretative difficulties created by combining civil and criminal liabilities within 
the same provision are well illustrated by Hodgson J. in Metal Manufacturers Ltd v 
Lewis & Anor (1986) 4 ACLC 739 who stated at p.747 that a penal provision was 
required to be strictly construed whilst at the same time he acknowledged that the 
section should bear the same construction in relation to both the civil and criminal 
liability. Also see Hussein v Good (1990) 1 ACSR 710; Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia v Friedrich (1991) 5 ACSR 115; Sunshine Management Services Pty Ltd v 
Russo (1991) 4 ACSR 192. Macquarie Bank Ltd v Focini Pty Ltd (1992) 6 ACSR 553. 
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exhibited a failure to appreciate the true nature of the provisions. 
Admittedly the defaulting officer legislation of the mid 1960s partially 
accommodated these criticisms by repositioning the provisions and 
separating the criminal and civil aspects. However, with the enactment 
of the Companies Code and Corporations Law these drafting defects 
have returned. 
First, all the provisions, including the civil liability provisions, have been 
categorised under a heading entitled "Offences". 
More importantly the provision now contained in S.592 purported to 
replace S.374C and provide for the offences of reckless and fraudulent 
trading whereas the S.593 provision purported to replace S.374D and 
provide a civil remedy. The difficulty is that a conviction for reckless 
trading under S.592(1) renders the officer jointly and severally liable 
with the company for the payment of the debt. Not only does this 
create an anomalous result when compared with the fraudulent trading 
offence, which does not provide for such liability, but by virtue of Ss. 
592(3) and (4) it would appear that civil proceedings may be brought 
under S.592(1). These subsections are most anomalous if the scheme 
of the provisions is to provide for civil liability in S.593. 
This over-lap between the two provisions would not appear to have 
been intentional. It has created much confusion, with resultant calls for 
legislative attention from both commentators and, in particular, the 
judiciary. 
The most emphatic judicial criticism of the provisions is that of Rogers 
J. in 3M Australia Pty Ltd v Watt; NEC Home Electronics Australia Pty 
Ltd v White.98 The defendants sought to have the proceedings 
dismissed on the basis that on the proper construction of S.556 of the 
Code a creditor had no standing to institute proceedings for the 
recovery of a debt incurred by a company. One submission on behalf 
of the defendants was to the effect that it was incongruous that a 
creditor should be able to obtain an order against a director pursuant to 
S.556 for payment of the whole of the debt where that director suffered 
no conviction, whilst under S.557 a conviction might result in only 
perhaps a limited liability in respect of the self-same debt. 
In the course of dismissing this argument and holding that S.556 is 
available as a cause of action to a creditor and could not be read 
down, Rogers J. observed that there were very real problems in giving 
the provisions an equitable operation. His Honour stated that: 
98 9 ACLR 203. 
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"I think that it should be acknowledged that the mini-code constituted 
by Ss.556, 557 and 558 exhibits difficulties. Perhaps insufficient 
attention was paid by the draftsman to the fact that S.556 creates a 
civil liability on the part of directors and others to pay the amount of the 
debt while S.374C of the 1961 Act which it replaces provided only for 
the criminal offence included in S.556. S. 557 replaced S.374D of the 
former Act. It is structured the same way as its predecessor in making 
a conviction under S.556 a condition precedent to the jurisdiction to 
make, inter alia, a director liable for the whole or part of a debt. In 
framing S.557, the change effected by S.556 appears not to have been 
fully taken into account. It is also somewhat odd that S.556(1) 
establishes both a criminal and civil liability where a debt is incurred 
without reasonable grounds for repayment while the much more 
serious offence of fraudulent trading provided for by sub-s(5) does not 
automatically attract a civil liability. That is a function left to S.557(2) as 
was the case under the former Act. Again, S.557 deals with a 
obligation to pay the company. Is this additional to the obligation 
imposed on say a director by S.556 to make payment direct to the 
creditor? Is one payment a discharge of the other obligation?" 99 
His Honour concluded that if he were correct in perceiving these logical 
inconsistencies in the structure of the Code they should be addressed 
by the legislature. 
On appeal, the New South Wales Court of Appeal agreed that the 
provisions created difficulties. 100 Their Honours were even more 
adamant that it was desirable that the legislative attention be given to 
the conflict between the two provisions. Priestley J.A. stated: 
"There are parts of those two sections which appear to be marching in 
quite different directions. In the administration of some liquidations this 
could quite seriously hamper those concerned with the affairs of the 
company, both creditors and liquidators, in their efforts to sort out the 
respective rights of unsecured creditors. It seems to me the possible 
anomalies arising under the two sections are serious enough to require 
the urgent attention of the legislatures involved". 101 
The judgment of Rogers J. was cited with approval in Ross McConnel 
Kitchen & Co Pty Ltd (in liq) v Ross & 0rS102 where Young J. also 
perceived problems with the provisions resulting from his conclusion 
99 	Id, 207. 
100 (1985) 3 ACLC 324. 
101 Id, 326. 
102 Supra. 
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that standing to apply under S.556(1) was not vested in a liquidator. 
His Honour stated: 
"I too can see problems in a case where not only has there been the 
crime committed set out in Sec.556(1) but that crime was committed in 
the course of fraudulent trading, which is the more serious crime dealt 
with in Sec.556(5). In the case of fraudulent trading, not only has a 
liquidator a statutory right under Sec. 557(2) of the Code, but also 
there would almost certainly be a misfeasance under the general law 
which would mean a recovery by the company if loss or damage arose. 
Problems obviously arise in this area. Fortunately those problems can 
be put aside for another day". 103 
His Honour also observed other difficulties with the legislation arising 
from the use of the term "debt". This issue is considered in chapter 6. 
Criminal liability a prerequisite for civil liability 
In addition to these drafting difficulties there is the more fundamental 
issue as to why criminal liability is a prerequisite for civil liability under 
S.593. The need to rely on the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
various prosecuting bodies is a source of justifiable concern. 104 
It has been observed that the original fraudulent trading provision did 
not require a criminal conviction as a prerequisite for civil liability. This 
feature first appeared with the enactment of civil liability for reckless 
trading and was subsequently adopted as a feature of both provisions 
in the defaulting officer legislation initiated by Victoria. No rationale has 
been advanced for this aspect and it may simply be an historical 
accident that the feature has become such an integral part of the 
legislation. It is certainly anomalous that under the current legislation a 
conviction is definitely a prerequisite for civil liability for fraudulent 
trading whereas it may not be for civil liability for reckless trading. The 
legislation has swapped the prerequisites for reckless and fraudulent 
trading civil liability without any rationale being advanced. 
103 Supra, 328. 
104 Often prosecuting bodies do not have the resources or decide for various reasons not 
to pursue a prosecution. This was conceded by Raplh Watzlaff, then head of the 
investigations department of the NSW Corporate Affairs Commission, who stated that, 
in NSW at least, they tend to prosecute only the important cases. Reported in English, 
"Directors Duties", [1989] Aust Accountant 24 at 26. In the United Kingdom, where 
this prerequisite of a conviction does not exist, another problem arises that it is 
common for a liquidator to be inhibited from commencing civil proceedings because of 
the imminence or currency of criminal proceedings against the same defendants 
based on the same evidence. (Cork Committee Report, para 1759). 
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Furthermore the relevance of S.592(7) and S.592(8) in providing that 
certificates of conviction are evidence of the matters stated therein is 
not immediately apparent. If civil liability is sought under S.592(1) by 
the prosecutor then these provisions have no application as no 
conviction would yet have been recorded. The issue does not arise 
under S.592(6) as no civil liability may be imposed pursuant to that 
provision. 
Similarly S.593(1) and (2) only require proof of a conviction and not 
proof as to the elements contained in S.592(1) and (6) respectively and 
so again S.592(7) and (8) are of no significance. 
It may be that the provisions are relevant to the issue of sentencing for 
S.592(1) or S.592(6) offences where there are prior convictions, or 
where a civil applicant proceeds under S.592(1) after a conviction has 
been obtained. In the later event it is difficult to envisage why such an 
applicant would prefer to proceed under S.592(1) rather than S.593(1). 
Issues of standing aside, 105 where a conviction has already been 
obtained, and so S.592(3), which provides that a conviction need not 
be obtained before institution civil proceedings under S.592(1) provides 
no advantage, an application under S.593(1) would clearly be 
preferable to one under S.592(1) as it would only be necessary to 
prove the conviction and not the elements of the offence/action. 
Alternatively the existence of S.592(7) and S.592(8) may assist in 
establishing peripheral matters of proof required by S.593(1) and 
S.592(6), such as to the quantum of the debt(s) and, where relevant, to 
whom it is payable, and in aiding the court in the exercise of its 
discretion under those provisions. A further possibility is that the 
provisions may be relied upon by civil applicants under S.592(1) in 
circumstances where no conviction has been secured in relation to 
their debt but such a conviction has been secured in relation to another 
debt incurred at about the same time. 
5.6.3 Discrete nature of the Australian reckless trading provisions 
The other feature of these provisions which has been the source of 
many difficulties is the discrete nature of the reckless trading 
provisions. Whilst the fraudulent trading provisions are concerned with 
a course of dealings, in contrast when the reckless trading provision 
first appeared in S.303(3) it referred to the unreasonable contracting of 
a "debt". This feature was perpetuated by S.374C and now appears in 
105 Creditors and the Commission have standing under S.593(1). It is unclear who has 
standing under S.592(1). Ross McConnel Kitchen & Co Pty Ltd (in lig) v Ross & Ors 
(1985) 3 ACLC 326. 
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S.592. 
One implication of this feature has been the need for the drafting 
differences between S.593(1) and S.593(2) which were discussed in 
section 5.4.2 above. 
Evidential difficulties 
Most importantly however are the difficulties this feature creates for an 
applicant seeking to prove the offence or liability. A major creditor of a 
company is likely to have many outstanding invoices with the company 
at any particular time. Thus, an applicant under S.592(1) or S.593(1) 
will need to establish that the relevant ingredients of the action are 
made out as at the date of each invoice. This creates evidential 
difficulties. As a result pre-trial procedures, especially interrogatories 
and, in the case of actions by the ASC, investigatory hearings, become 
drawn out and complex as typically does the eventual trial. As a result 
such actions involve a real risk as to costs, which is compounded by 
the doubts of success generated by the complexities of the action. 
Together these aspects substantially reduce the attractiveness of the 
S.592(1) and S.593(1) proceedings. 
Sentencing difficulties 
Similarly the discrete nature of the S.592(1) offence creates sentencing 
difficulties. In De Rossi v Hamifton106 the defendant had been convicted 
on 141 counts under S.374C(1) for which he received a sentence of 18 
months imprisonment. In the course of ordering a rehearing, Wickham 
J. observed that the maximum penalty for an offence under S.374C(1) 
(reckless trading) was imprisonment for 3 months or a fine of $500 
whereas under S.374C(2) (fraudulent trading) the maximum penalty 
was imprisonment for 1 year or a fine of $2,500. Accordingly his 
Honour concluded that it was not easy to see that an overall term of 
imprisonment of 18 months for what was not fraud but was an activity 
for which the maximum period of imprisonment was to be 3 months 
was a reasonable sentence. 
In the event, his Honour left open the question of whether when a 
custodial sentence is called for the sentence should not be more than 
the maximum provided for in S.374C(1). He resolved the issue on the 
facts before him by concluding that it was an appropriate case to treat 
the offences as one continuing transaction and according passed 
concurrent sentences.lm 
106 7 ACLR 40. 
107 It is clear that although the conduct of the respondent may be treated as one course of 
conduct for sentencing purposes, a complaint drawn in such a manner would be 
invalid on the grounds of duplicity. See chapter 6. 
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A consequence of providing individual creditors with a cause of action 
The discrete nature of the provision is, arguably, a necessary 
consequence of providing individual creditors with a cause of action. 
The Australian States and New Zealand are the only jurisdictions 
where creditors have this remedy and the provision has a discrete 
nature. 109 It is argued in chapters 8 and 9 that provisions which provide 
a cause of action directed at a course of conduct, particularly those 
which confer on individual creditors a cause of action, also exhibit 
difficulties in their application. 
Until recently the dearth of reported decisions on S.592(1) 109 could 
have supported an argument as to the difficulties of making out the 
offence or cause of action. However the recent proliferation of such 
decisions might suggest that possibly the provision had simply taken 
some time to become familiar to potential applicants. In any event it 
has been suggested that the provision has served creditors, both 
individually and collectively, as a potent weapon of negotiation. 110 
Whether the defaulting officer provisions ought to contain discrete 
elements or not depends, in turn, upon whether individual creditors are 
to be provided with a cause of action. Whilst for the purpose of, in 
chapter 9, identifying the thematic development of these provisions, it 
will be assumed that creditors are to retain their individual rights, 
whether this is ought be a feature of the provision or not will be 
explored in chapter 11. 
5.7 Corporate Law Reform Act 1992 
From 24 June 1993 the reforms contained in the Corporate Law 
Reform Act 1992 take effect with the result that the fraudulent and 
reckless trading provisions only apply to debts incurred before that 
date. Debts incurred after that date are subject to a new insolvent 
trading provision which departs, at least in form, from the old law. An 
account of the development of this new provision and a consideration 
of its features will be detailed in chapter 10. It will be observed that the 
provision addresses many of the deficiencies in the earlier provisions 
and reflects, with particular clarity, the underlying theme of the creditor 
recovery regime. 
108 The New Zealand provision (S.320) contains both a discrete and dynamic limb. 
109 See chapter 6. 
110 Gower, chapter 6. 
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6. 	Conclusion 
Piecemeal, reactive and unsophisticated legislation 
It was observed in this chapter that the legislative development of the 
defaulting officer regime has been piecemeal, reactive and 
unsophisticated. The initial provision, the misfeasance provision, 
simply provided, notwithstanding some early views to the contrary, a 
summary procedure by which to enforce the common law actions, 
typically, for fraud and breach of trust. The inadequacies of the 
common law in dealing with what was perceived as a particular form of 
abuse of the privilege of limited liability provided the impetus for the 
enactment of the first statutory cause of action in the form of the 
fraudulent trading provision. In due course the ambit of this provision 
was widened, in all jurisdictions considered, to provide a cause of 
action against corporate management essentially where debts were 
incurred by a company in the absence of a reasonable expectation that 
they would be paid. Whilst this extension has manifested itself in a 
variety of forms the resultant provision has typically been characterised 
as a reckless, wrongful or insolvent trading provision. 
Whilst these provisions provide the central feature of the recovery 
regime available to creditors of corporations, by building upon the 
narrow base initially comprised of the misfeasance provision and latter 
the fraudulent trading provision, subsequent legislative developments 
have suffered from a mindset that the creditor recovery regime must be 
expressed in a particular legislative form and directed at managerial 
conduct exhibiting particular features. Accordingly this legislative 
development has been characterised by forced attempts to provide 
creditors, in the guise of these provisions, with an adequate recovery 
regime. However this narrow base and the other limitations and 
drafting defects contracted from the source provisions have cast doubt 
on the effectiveness of the regime and, particularly, on its ability to 
adapt to protect creditors from novel avenues of abuse and 
entrepreneurial ingenuity. 
Identification of an underlying theme 
Furthermore subsequent legislative focus has tendered to tinker with 
the provisions rather than attempt to identify an underlying theme and 
the essential nature of the practices against which the provisions are 
designed to operate. Whilst generally the development of the 
provisions has witnessed an extension in the width of their application 
there is a need, in the Australian context at least, to identify the 
essential aim and theme of this regime and establish a plan for future 
reform. This will be further explored in chapters 9, 10 and 11. 
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The thematic development of the defaulting officer provisions 
It could be anticipated that the retention of the fraudulent and reckless 
trading provisions as an element of the creditor recovery regime would 
witness their thematic development in such a way as to address the 
deficiencies identified. It was observed that with the enactment of the 
Companies Code provisions the subjective elements which had 
previously plagued the substantive provisions of the reckless trading 
provision had been removed to a defence provision. However it was 
noted that a number of major limitations remained and that, in fact, 
some of these defects had been compounded by the reforms. In 
particular, it was observed that problems continued to plague the 
provisions created by the concurrence of the criminal and civil liabilities 
and the discrete nature of the reckless trading provision. The possible 
development of these provisions in such a way as to address these 
limitations will be canvassed in chapter 9. Furthermore, in chapter 11 
the fundamental issue, inherent in the discrete nature of the reckless 
trading provision, of whether the provisions ought provide individual 
creditors with a cause of action or provide only a collective remedy, will 
be considered in detail. 
Judicial interpretation of the provisions 
Prior to considering these matters it is appropriate to examine the 
judicial interpretation of the provisions with a view to identifying further 
areas where inadequacies exist and what the judicial response has 
been. Furthermore any judicial insight into the underlying rationale for 
the legislation needs to be identified. This is the subject matter of the 
following chapter. 
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